TFAP
Tokyo Forum For Analytic Philosophy
Past Events
Naturalizing Practical Knowledge
Speaker: Kodai Sato
From: Keio University
URL: https://researchmap.jp/k_sato?lang=en
Abstract: An agent has practical knowledge about their intentional action. For instance, I know that I am currently typing. We have two conflicting intuitions regarding practical knowledge:
(1) Practical knowledge seems not to be evidenced by theoretical reasoning or observation.
(2) It seems to be evidenced by those.
Let us call this “the puzzle of practical knowledge.” This talk will develop the perception theory to the puzzle of practical knowledge by addressing its shortcoming, namely the unclarity regarding what observation and perception are. According to the perception theory, what evidences practical knowledge is not theoretical reasoning or observation but the perception which guides the intentional actions. In doing so, this talk will naturalize practical knowledge, i.e. refer to a revised two visual systems hypothesis in neuroscience. Clarifying practical knowledge leads to a better understanding of intentional actions, because when an agent acts intentionally, they must, in some sense, know that they are doing the action.
Correspondence Pluralism and Moral Truths
Speaker: Tamaki Komada & Kengo Miyazono
From: University of Hokkaido
URL:
Abstract: This paper presents a new form of correspondence theory of moral truths. Traditional correspondence theory, when applied to moral truths, has a costly ontological commitment to moral properties and facts that are mind-independent. Instead of traditional correspondence theory, we focus on “correspondence pluralism” (Sher 2005, 2015, 2023, Horgan & Barnard 2006, Horgan & Matjaž Potr? 2008), which combines the correspondence theoretic idea that truth consists in correspondence with the pluralistic idea that truth (=correspondence) can take different forms. Correspondence pluralism allows for different forms of correspondence other than traditional correspondence; e.g. “indirect correspondence“ (Sher 2015, 2023), or “mediated correspondence” (Horgan & Timmons 2006). Section 1 of this paper presents a list of desiderata for a plausible account of moral truths. Section 2 gives a brief overview of correspondence pluralism by Sher and Horgan, and Section 3 discusses a possible correspondence pluralist account of moral truths. Adopting Sher’s motivation for correspondence pluralism and Horgan's account of the contextual flexibility of ontological restrictions, we argue that our version of correspondence pluralism gives a plausible account of moral truths, which satisfies all the desiderata.
Against Inferential Moral Knowledge: A Defence of Hume's Law
Speaker: Marvin Backes
From: University of Cologne
URL: https://marvinbackes.com/
Abstract: According to Hume's Law, we cannot infer moral conclusions from wholly non-moral premises; or, more concisely, we cannot infer an `ought' from an `is'. While Hume's Law (at least in qualified form) has enjoyed widespread acceptance, recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in inferential accounts of moral knowledge that are distinctly anti-Humean. According to these accounts, we can come to know moral conclusions via inferences from wholly non-moral premises. The main aim of this paper is to defend Hume's Law against these recent threats and to argue, more generally, that there are good reasons to remain pessimistic about anti-Humean accounts of moral knowledge. In particular, the paper raises doubts about the leading accounts of inferential moral knowledge currently found in the literature and proposes but ultimately rejects a new, modified, account of inferential moral knowledge that promises to avoid the main epistemic shortcomings of its predecessors.
Fregean Evaluativism: Valence as a mode of experiential presentation
Speaker: Krys Dolega
From: Center for Cognition and Neurosciences, Université Libre de Bruxelles
URL: https://www.krysdolega.xyz/about/
Abstract:
A growing body of work across different disciplines investigating the mind suggests that, at least sometimes, perceptual experiences are laden with varying degrees of affective value. Most philosophers try to capture the phenomenology of valence in intentional terms, arguing that perceptual valence supervenes on the contents of perceptual experience. However, a number of authors disagree with this view, defending a competing claim according to which valence depends not on the contents of experience but on the affective attitudes directed at those contents. In this work, I introduce and motivate a novel account of perceptual valance: Fregean Evaluativism, according to which valence is a mode of presentation of perceptual content. As I will argue, this view can not only accommodate the empirical evidence and competing intuitions behind the currently available philosophical accounts of perceptual valence but can also be generalized to all affective experiences.
A Kantian Dissolution of the Dilemma of Inference
Speaker: Maximilian Tegtmeyer
From: National University of Singapore
URL: https://philpeople.org/profiles/maximilian-tegtmeyer
Abstract: Inferring is plausibly conceived of as a thinker taking her premises to support the conclusion
and drawing that conclusion because of this fact. However, it is often noted that this leads to
the following dilemma: If we accept this taking condition, our account of inference faces a
Carroll-style regress, but if we reject it, we conceive of inference not as personal-level,
rational mental activity, but as mere blind association. I argue that this dilemma stems from
understanding inference as composed of three independently intelligible elements: (1)
judging the premises, (2) consciousness that the premises support the conclusion, and (3)
judging the conclusion. I explain how a plausible assumption about the relation of mental
contents and acts motivates this compositional conception and the ensuing dilemma. I
contend that dissolution of the dilemma requires an alternative conception of inference,
which I find in Kant’s conception of inference as a form of synthesis, and on which the three
elements of inference can only be understood together. I argue that this synthetic conception
can explain inference by sidestepping the problematic assumption. I thus reveal the
compositional and synthetic conceptions to be the systematic sources of the dilemma and of
its dissolution respectively; show that, for Kant, inference is a form of synthesis; and illustrate
the persistent significance of understanding rational mental activity as synthesis.
A Formalist Approach to Aesthetic Value (Note: Room change to the Komaba International Building for Education and Research (KIBER) Room 110 (1F))
Speaker: Kiyohiro Sen
From: University of Tokyo
URL: https://www.senkiyohiro.com/home2
Abstract: This talk proposes to approach aesthetic demerits and merits in terms of formal defects and unity. I will first point out the problems with a popular view of aesthetic value, aesthetic empiricism, and then show that these problems lead us to a kind of formalist theory of aesthetic value. I will develop and defend the position I call Framed Formalism: aesthetic badness or goodness as a kind is a matter of whether an item is a formally defective member or a formally unified member with respect to that kind. Framed Formalism has an important implication for aesthetic normativity. Aesthetic normativity is not primarily a matter of what an agent aesthetically ought to do, but of how an item aesthetically ought to be.
Liberal Legitimacy and Future Citizens: Addressing a Sceptical Challenge
Speaker: Emil Andersson
From: Uppsala University
URL: https://www.emilandersson.org/
Abstract: Most of us believe that it is possible to act justly and unjustly not only towards our contemporaries, but also towards people who do not yet exist, but who will exist in the future. Hence, we believe that there is such a thing as intergenerational justice. Most of us also believe that those who rule should not only rule justly, but also legitimately. This invites the question: if future people matter for what counts as ruling justly, is the same true for ruling legitimately? In this talk I argue, from a Rawlsian perspective, for an affirmative answer. I then go on to consider a recent sceptical challenge to the very idea of intergenerational legitimacy, and show that it fails. Even if we cannot govern future citizens, legitimacy in the present might depend on what is justifiable to them.
Proximate and Ultimate Causation
Speaker: Yafeng Shan
From: Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
URL: https://www.shanyafeng.com/
Abstract: It has been over 60 years since Ernst Mayr famously argued for the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology. In the following decades, Mayr’s proximate-ultimate distinction was well received within evolutionary biology and widely regarded as a major contribution to the philosophy of biology. Despite its enormous influence, there has been a persistent controversy on the distinction. It has been argued that the distinction is untenable. In addition, there have been complaints about the pragmatic value of the distinction in biological research. Some even suggest that the distinction should better be abandoned. In contrast, Mayr had consistently maintained the significance of the proximate-ultimate distinction in biology. There are also other attempts to defend the distinction. The talk will examine the debate by taking an integrated History and Philosophy of Science approach and argue for a functional approach to causal concepts in scientific practice.
Shared Thought and Communication
Speaker: Rachel Goodman
From: University of Illinois Chicago
URL: https://phil.uic.edu/profiles/goodman-rachel/
Abstract: On a Fregean view of communication, communication requires shared sense. On a Russellian view of communication, it requires only shared reference and fulfillment of what I will call transactional requirements. My first aim is to illustrate that the Fregean view is dialectically unstable: the Fregean must explain some failures of communication in terms of difference of sense, and others in terms of failure to meet transactional requirements, without an explanation of the difference. However, even among those who shy away from the Fregean view, hesitation to embrace a Russellian view is common, so my second aim is to ask whether this is justified. I do so by clarifying the relationship between Russellianism about communication and relationism about communication—a view which provides a third option. I’ll suggest a way to adjudicate between these views by clarifying a commitment shared by the Fregean and the relationist, but rejected by the Russellian. If this commitment is justified, then given the instability of the Fregean view, relationism is preferable. However, the upshot may rather be that traditional dissatisfaction with a Russellian view of communication is undermotivated.
A.I. Interpretability: Ethics and Philosophy of Science
Speaker: Adrian K. Yee & Andre Curtis-Trudel
From: Lingnan University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/adriankyee/
Abstract: (Note: The two speakers will present separate 30min papers, followed by the usual discussion period.) Adrian K. Yee: 'Machine Learning, Interpretability, & Drone Strikes': While drone strikes have become a mainstream topic in military ethics, increasing usage of controversial machine learning methods in the development of automated weapons systems remains under analyzed from a philosophical perspective. I argue that problems of the interpretability of algorithms present uniquely difficult issues in contemporary drone strike methodology. With reference to a recent policy document from the US Department of Defense, and drawing upon historical sources, I argue for an account of algorithmic interpretability that is most appropriate for enhancing our abilities to assign proportionate moral responsibility to the numerous actors involved in drone strikes. Andre Curtis-Trudel: 'What can philosophy of science do for XAI'. The recent and striking success of deep learning models (DLMs) in a variety of domains has driven an explosion of interest in explainable AI (XAI) techniques and methods, the goal of which is to render opaque DLMs and their decisions comprehensible to human users. Yet XAI is still in its infancy, and significant conceptual and technical problems remain to be addressed. Increasingly, XAI practitioners are looking to the philosophy of science for guidance regarding key notions such as ‘explanation’, ‘interpretation’, and ‘understanding’, among others. The goal of this talk is to identify some of the more prominent uses - and abuses - of philosophical work on these notions, and to mark off some potentially fruitful avenues for collaboration between philosophers of science and XAI practitioners.
Computability and Relativity <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Zhao Fan
From: Kobe University
URL: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8870-2677
Abstract: In his remarks before the Princeton bicentennial conference, Gödel famously appraised Turing’s 1936 analysis of computability “for the first time succeeded in giving an absolute definition of an interesting epistemology notion. i.e., one not depending on the formalism chosen” (Gödel 1946:150, emphasis by me). Some contemporary philosophers of logic, however, contend that computability is a relative notion. For instance, in his recent article, Brauer claimed that “whether a function is computable depends on which notations are acceptable, which is relative to our interests and abilities” (Brauer 2021:10485; see also Rescorla 2015). Scholars arguing for the relativity of computability often appeal to the phenomenon of “deviant encodings” – i.e., encodings that enable Turing machines to “solve” an unsolvable problem. In this talk, I will examine various conceptions of computability by taking an in-depth look at the issue of “deviant encodings” and its recent development.
Consciousness-Free Approach to Animal Welfare
Speaker: Taiga Shinozaki
From: Keio University
URL: https://researchmap.jp/shinozakitaiga?lang=en
Abstract: Some philosophers and scientists oppose the view that phenomenal
consciousness or sentience is seen as something that defines animal welfare, because the presence of phenomenal consciousness in an animal is indeterminate, or at least difficult to validate through scientific methods (Dawkins 2021; Kammerer 2022). According to these researchers, we should define welfare in terms of satisfaction or frustration rather than consciousness. This consciousness-free approach would facilitate the ethics and science of animal welfare. However, there is said to be a risk associated with the consciousness-free welfare; it does not seem to have "normative aptness"; (Birch 2022). In the consciousness-free conception, even simple animals, such as single-celled ciliates, can have "welfare"; while they do not seem to be morally significant. In this talk, I will argue for the consciousness-free approach to animal welfare by addressing the normative aptness objection.
Human Neural Organoids and Creature Consciousness <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Yoshiyuki Hayashi
From: Saitama Medical University
URL: https://jglobal.jst.go.jp/en/detail?JGLOBAL_ID=201201021707619024
Abstract: We argue that a substantive distinction in consciousness — namely, state consciousness and creature consciousness — is mandatory in order to advance current ethical debates of neural organoids, which are entities that mimic the ontogeny of the human brain. While the Block model regards creature consciousness as a mere aggregate of state consciousness, the Field model equates it with the unified consciousness, the maximal determinable level associated with a living organism on a one-to-one basis. Although indecisive, we defend the Field model as the more accurate model of consciousness from both conceptual and empirical viewpoints. For the purposes of accuracy, we consider the ethical consequences of each model. If the Field model was the right one, we can drastically reduce the numbers of neural organoids we need to be careful of. On the other hand, if the Block model was the adequate model, we would need a more rigorous regulatory framework. We further investigate the ethical implications of each model for the transplantation of neural organoids into animal brains.
Artificial Intuitions <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Kiichi Inarimori (with Masashi Takeshita & Kengo Miyazono)
From: Hokkaido University (for all three authors)
URL: https://philpeople.org/profiles/kiichi-inarimori
Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT can perform tasks in experimental psychology, such as reasoning tasks, mindreading tasks, or moral judgment tasks. It has been suggested that LLMs might replace human subjects in moral psychology research because LLMs’ moral judgments predict human moral judgments with a high accuracy (Dillon et al. 2023). This paper explores LLMs’ potential roles in experimental philosophy. We will begin with a general taxonomy of the use of LLMs in the context of experimental psychology/philosophy, and clarify the differences between different research programs. We will then explore the idea that LLMs can contribute to experimental philosophy in a non-predictive way; i.e. LLMs’ responses can be valuable for experimental philosophy even if they are not predictive of human responses. In particular, LLMs’ responses can be more reliable than human responses, which exhibit problematic biases, distortions, and misunderstandings. As a case study, we present our new experiment of LLMs’ intuitions about free will and determinism, and discuss its implications to non-predictive uses of LLMs in experimental philosophy.
Ethics within the Bounds of Evolution <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Momo Kiyosue
From: Kyushu University
URL: https://jglobal.jst.go.jp/en/detail?JGLOBAL_ID=202101005166499840
Abstract: The Descent of Man (1871) written by Darwin claimed that morality occurs as the result of evolution. In the following years, Spencer stated in Data of Ethics (1879) “We should follow the law of evolution” as evident from the statement “Morality arises as a result of evolution”. However, it included a logical mistake which lost its credibility in its field. In the 1970s, the biologist E. O. Wilson published Sociobiology (1975) which attracted the attention of ethicists. Evolutionary ethics restarted from this attraction. However, this started an endless debate on whether evolution denies the reality of universal ethics or not. I believe these are the causes of the problem: Firstly, the definition of morality is different between evolutionary ethicians. Secondly, evolutionary ethics based on old type theory of evolution that denied now. The purpose of my research is to solve these problems.
The Nature of Imagistic Thinking <Note: Collaboration Room 4. You can join us at Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Piotr Kozak
From: University of Bialystok
URL: https://piotrkozak.jimdo.com/
Abstract: Imagistic thinking is the use of mental imagery and iconic representations in problem-solving and reasoning, such as the use of maps in navigation and geometric diagrams in mathematical operations. There is a widespread belief that imagistic thinking is common among scientists and artists. However, there is no theory that can explain the nature of imaginative thinking. Moreover, the assumption that we can think with images seems to contradict our well-established beliefs about the nature of thinking, which see thinking as a matter of operations on propositions.
In my talk, I will address the question of what it is to think with images. I will argue that any imagistic theory of thought must satisfy two kinds of conditions. First, it must show that images are necessary for the existence of some thoughts. Second, it must satisfy three constraints placed on any theory of thought: it must provide a theory of knowledge and mental content, and it must account for the compositional and systematic nature of thought. I argue that the best way to meet these two conditions is to interpret images as measuring devices. Accordingly, I will present the so-called measurement-theoretic account of images and imagistic thinking.
Swords and Diamonds – Thich Nhat Hanh on the Law of Identity <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>
Speaker: Mirja Holst
From: American University in Vietnam
URL: https://mirjaholst.wordpress.com
Abstract: The Diamond Sutra is one of the earliest and most treasured of the Perfection of Wisdom sutras, and had a wide influence on the development of Zen Buddhism. There has been, in recent years, great interest in one particular form of sentences that repeatedly occur in the sutra, sentences of the form ‘a is not a, therefore it is a’. These sentences display what has been called the ‘logic of not’ or the ‘logic of affirmation-in-negation’. They are of special interest since they do not only encapsulate one of the central insights of Zen Buddhism, that of non-duality, but at the same time seem to go against one of the most orthodox laws of logic in Western philosophy, the law of identity. This paper discusses the interpretation of these ‘diamond sentences’ by the Vietnamese Zen monk Thich Nhat Hanh. I present Thich Nhat Hanh’s interpretation of the diamond sentences in terms of interbeing, and go on to argue that, and explain how, on this interpretation, the law of identity is indeed rejected. Finally, I spell out consequences for formulating a ‘logic of Zen’ and for a related debate about the validity of the law of non-contradiction in Zen.
Can exemplars promote character development in the wake of adversity? (special summer talk). Note: this talk will be in-person only.
Speaker: Michael Brady
From: University of Glasgow
URL: https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/staff/michaelbrady/
Abstract: Experiencing adversity and suffering is an inescapable part of human life. Although such suffering can have damaging effects on wellbeing, it might also lead, for some, to positive change and growth. Moreover, recent philosophical theorising has highlighted the importance of exemplars for improving our character. In this paper, I discuss whether and how exemplars can promote character development in the wake of adversity. As we’ll see, examining this question can lead to important revisions of how exemplars have been discussed in the philosophical literature.
The Metaphysics of Desire <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Ashley Shaw
From: University of Leeds
URL: https://www.ashleyshaw.co.uk
Abstract: Motivational accounts of desire hold that desire is a motivational state. But what is a motivational state? A dominant approach treats motivational states to be states causally relevant to how an agent behaves as part of a broader reductive causal account of action. I explain why this approach is objectionable. I develop a non-reductive account of desire as a disposition of an agent to exercise her agential powers. I explain how this account can explain ‘passion'—a species of desire involving manifestations of both passive and active powers—without assimilating them to actions or “quasi-hydraulic' brute forces.
Can Machines Acquire Human Mindedness? <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Sebastian Sunday Greve
From: Peking University
URL: https://www.yhposolihp.com/
Abstract: The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion that is sometimes called ‘strong’ AI is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of the possibility of an artificial form of life. This latter question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit in several of the terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it. For instance, the question would then appear to be that of the possibility of an unnatural form of nature. Explaining this paradoxical kind of possibility is the argumentative burden of the present paper.
3NT and Justified Decision Making <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Martijn Boot
From: University of Groningen
URL: https://www.rug.nl/ucg/about-us/education-teaching-staff/dr.-martijn-boot?lang=en
Abstract: I will explore implications of 3NT value relations. 3NT stands for choice situations in which it is not true that either alternative is (definitely) better than the other, nor true that they are (roughly) equally good. 3NT options – if they represent conflicting ethical values – form significant problems for rationally and ethically justified decision-making.
I will discuss Sidgwick's 'dualism of practical reason' because it is a source of examples in which options have a 3NT value relation. It concerns conflicts between self-interested and impartial reasons for action, which, according to Sidgwick, cannot be rationally resolved.
Parfit has tried to refute Sidgwick's problem of dualism. I will argue that he did not succeed in resolving the underlying cause: indeterminacy of practical reason.
Further, I will argue that the problem of rational and ethical indeterminacy is not restricted to Sidgwick's dualism. It can be extended to conflicts of plural ethical reasons between which there is a 3NT value relation.
Naked Statistical Evidence and Verdictive Justice <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Sherrilyn Roush
From: University of California, Los Angeles
URL: https://philosophy.ucla.edu/person/sherrilyn-roush/
Abstract: What is it for a guilty verdict to be just? I develop an account that explains 1) why a just verdict must be accurate, 2) why coercing a confession undermines the justness of a verdict, 3) how a no-fault erroneous conviction can be not only harmful, but also a moral wrong, and 4) how following a rule that is generally justice-promoting can lead to injustice. (“He got off on a technicality.”) Justness of a verdict is a moral property, a goal to which all epistemic goals are subordinate, but its requirements have epistemic implications. One is that a just guilty verdict cannot be achieved using only naked statistical evidence.
Attention and Perception in Autism <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>
Speaker: Heather Annan
From: University of Glasgow
URL: https://www.gla.ac.uk/pgrs/heatherannan/#publications
Abstract: Although autism has been extensively researched, it remains a poorly understood condition. It has proven difficult to provide a clear definition of autism. This is largely due to the fact that autism is characterised by a wide range of seemingly unrelated symptoms and behaviours which are notcommonly shared by all autistic individuals. For example, some autistic individuals may experience sensory hypersensitivity, while some may experience sensory hyposensitivity, some may have difficulties with language development, while others may not. I am in the process of developing an account of autism in which I examine perceptual and attentional differences as the core aspect of autism. I believe that considering these differences may: allow for the unification of disparate symptoms and behaviours, explain why autism commonly co-occurs with many seemingly unrelated conditions, and account for inconsistencies in research findings.
Detached Agency: How to Go Through the Motions. <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Jules Salomone-Sehr
From: McGill University
URL: https://www.jsalomone-sehr.com/
Abstract: Suppose B is a feasible course of behavior. How might you B at will? Here is an obvious answer: you form the intention to B, and then enact that intention. Ordinary intentional agency, however, is not the only mechanism through which you might B at will. In this paper, I highlight a more circuitous mechanism, one that dispenses with the intention to B, hence that enables to B by going through the motions. I call this mechanism detached agency. Detached agency, roughly, involves coming up with a plan designed to B, and intending to enact that plan, while not intending to B. Although paradoxical, detached agency, I argue, neither collapses into ordinary intentional agency, nor breaks any requirements of practical rationality. This account of detached agency illuminates agency under non-ideal circumstances. It explains how, when pressured to B, we might get ourselves to B while not intending to B.
Incas, Aliens, and Anarchists <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Jesse Spafford
From: Trinity College Dublin
URL: https://jessespafford.com
Abstract: This paper presents a novel solution to egalitarianism’s leveling down problem. The leveling down objection holds that egalitarian theories are implausible because they sometimes take justice to require leveling down, i.e., leaving some people worse off and no one better off. This paper argues that egalitarians can sidestep this objection by adopting an amended version of my recently proposed anarchist schema of egalitarian rights. First, the paper argues that only a certain species of leveling down requirement is theoretically unacceptable (what it calls a “remote leveling down” requirement). It then argues that an adjusted version of my proposed rights schema avoids the implication that such leveling down is required. Finally, the paper considers a revised version of the leveling down objection that focuses on the apparent unacceptability of requiring what the paper calls “strong leveling down.” The paper argues that adopting my anarchist rights schema renders any strong leveling down requirement acceptable.
Imposter Concepts <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Denis Kazankov (below image) & Edison Yi (above image)
From: Central European University & University of Oxford (respectively)
URL: https://www.deniskazankov.com/
Abstract: Our talk will explore a linguistic phenomenon that we call imposter concepts. These are the concepts that are systematically and consistently misapplied without a significant portion of its users noticing it. For example, ‘grooming’ originally referred to the crime of establishing an emotional connection with a child in preparation for committing sexual abuse against them. However, since the early 2020s, some conservatives in the U.S. society have been systematically applying the concept also to LGBTQ+ inclusive education, thereby associating LGBTQ+ inclusive education with the harms of sexual predation. The objective of our talk is threefold: First, we will argue that imposter concepts present a distinctive case of linguistic subversion that should be distinguished from dogwhistles as well as from occasional misapplications of concepts. Next, we will examine the working mechanism of imposter concepts, arguing that this mechanism is based upon retaining some salient features associated with their correct application such as their lexical effects, evaluative associations or sanctioned inferences and exploiting them for creating a false impression that they are not misapplied. We will outline different ways in which this might happen. Finally, we will discuss what makes imposter concepts effective in corrupting public discourse and how their pernicious effects can be effectively attenuated.
Fiction, Imagination, and Modality <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Eugene Ho Wei Kang
From: National University of Singapore (NUS)
URL: https://philpeople.org/profiles/eugene-ho
Abstract:
The imagination plays an essential role in engagement with fiction. However, there is an underlying tension between the roles we often want imagination to play.
On one hand, philosophers of imagination suggest that there are restrictions on what we can coherently imagine, and these restrictions allow us to perform inferences and gain knowledge from our imaginings. And since we engage with fiction via the imagination, these restrictions also explain how we learn from fiction.
On the other hand, authors of fiction (especially science fiction, avant garde, or postmodern fiction) frequently write fictions with fantastical contents that seem virtually unrestricted in terms of what can happen in these stories, challenging the norms of classical logic by distinguishing between necessarily equivalent propositions. Such contents are sometimes called ‘hyperintensional’ contents.
Fictions with purportedly hyperintensional contents are controversial because they pose a challenge to models that rely on merely intensional accounts of the content of thought. As such, some philosophers of fiction reject the notion that audiences genuinely engage with hyperintensional contents when they read fiction. However, I think that this risks underestimating the representational power of fiction. In this talk, I examine philosophical accounts of the imagination in order to resolve this tension.
The Case for Open Borders: On the Permeability of the Perception/Cognition Distinction <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Zed Adams
From: Institute for Philosophy and the New Humanities
URL: https://www.newschool.edu/nssr/faculty/zed-adams/
Abstract: In Seeing and Thinking (2023), Ned Block argues that there is a fundamental distinction, a “joint in nature,” between perception and cognition. For Block, perception is distinctive in being iconic in format, non-conceptual and non-propositional in content, and quasi-modular in architecture. In this paper, I summarize Block’s view and critically evaluate two possible objections to it. First, Eric Mandelbaum has argued that perception cannot be distinctive in virtue of being iconic and non-conceptual, because there is evidence that “basic-level” concepts are operative in perception (Mandelbaum 2018). Second, James Tanaka and Victoria Philibert have argued that perceptual learning leads to “downward shift” in the concepts operative in perception, making possible perceptual expertise involving subordinate concepts more specific than “basic-level” concepts (Tanaka and Philibert 2022). Whereas Mandelbaum’s criticism allows for the possibility of retaining a revised version of the perception/cognition distinction (exclusively in terms of modularity), Tanaka and Philibert’s criticism is more radical, challenging the very intelligibility of the distinction. Having summarized the debate between Block, Mandelbaum, and Tanaka and Philibert, I will conclude by offering my own case for having an open policy with regard to the border between perception and cognition.
Justification of Memory Beliefs – Where Do They Come From? <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Saskia Neumann
From: Eötvös Lorand University
URL:
Abstract: Our memory has highly generative powers when it comes to forming beliefs. However, does the same apply to justification as well? In this talk, I try to find an answer to the question of whether memory is generative of justification for our memory beliefs. In doing so, I will mainly focus on a debate between Jennifer Lackey and Thomas Senor about three cases in which memory could either be interpreted as generative or preservative, depending on whom of the two you ask. In my opinion, both partly got it right. I will argue for the view that memory indeed does have generative features for epistemic justifcation. However, not in the way the authors would like to think. In my opinion, memory generates justification for our memory beliefs through the process of forming that belief itself.
In this talk, I will firstly introduce the three individual cases in question and explain Senor's objections and Lackey's reaction to them. Secondly, I will show where I agree and where I disagree with Lackey and Senor. Even though for different reasons than Senor claims, I will argue for the view that Lackey does not give examples of memory being generative in her first two cases but actually gives us an example of memory being generative in the third case. Thirdly, I will explain how even though I object to many arguments given by Senor and Lackey, the discussion still helps me to make a case for memory being able to generate but also preserve justification.
The Apple of Kant's Ethics: i-Maxims as the Locus of Assessment <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Samuel Kahn
From: Indiana University Indianapolis
URL: https://euro.indiana.edu/about/affiliated-faculty/kahn-samuel.html
Abstract: A maxim is a subjective principle of volition. But I want to distinguish between maxims at three levels of abstraction. At the first level are what I shall call individual maxims, or i-maxims: maxim tokens as adopted by particular rational beings. At the second level are abstract maxims, or a-maxims: abstract principles distinct from any individual who adopts them. At the third level are maxim kinds, or k-maxims: sets of various action-guiding principles that are grouped on the basis of their content. In this paper, I argue for the thesis that i-maxims are the locus of assessment in Kant’s ethics. I argue for this thesis in two ways. First I argue that there is textual evidence in favor of my thesis. Then I argue that there are good philosophical grounds in favor of my thesis. Thus, I argue that there are reasons to think that Kant thought i-maxims are the locus of assessment and, further, that he was right about this.
The Syntax of Perception (NB: THIS TALK IS ON A MONDAY) <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Kevin J. Lande
From: York University
URL: http://www.kevinlande.com
Abstract: Thought, memory, and perception involve forming representations of the world. As the vision scientist Stephen Palmer wrote, these mental representations are “selectively organized data structures.” My visual representation of the maple leaf in front of me is organized from a representation of the leaf’s orange shade of color and a representation of its articulated shape. My representation of the leaf’s shape is itself complex, consisting in representations of different curved segments of the leaf’s outline. In the first part of this talk, I explicate what it means to say that mental representations have “structure”---what it means to say that a mental state encodes information or content in one way rather than another. Focusing on vision, I examine the sorts of things vision scientists explain when attributing structure to visual representations. In the second part of the talk, I suggest that some perceptual representations have domain-specific ``ecological form.’’ Namely, the constraints on how those perceptual representations combine into more complex representations reflect environmental constraints on how the represented features of the world are related. The ecological form of some perceptual representations contrasts with the logical form of discursive representations in language and thought. I discuss how this type of structure relates to the “pictorial” format of perception. In the last part of the talk, I argue that the domain-specific syntax of a perceptual representation can contribute to the distinctive way in which perception epistemically warrants belief.
Grounding Subsequentism <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>
Speaker: Ikuro Suzuki
From: Nihon University
URL: https://researchmap.jp/ikurosuzuki/?lang=english
Abstract: The deprivation account (or the counterfactual comparative account) of the harm of death is a popular view, but it faces the timing problem, a problem when people are harmed by death. In this talk, I consider Subsequentism, according to which death harms people after they have died. Subsequentism is attractive in that it can provide a unified explanation for the harm of death and other ordinary harm. However, there are several worries about it. First, there is a general worry called the problem of subject: how can people have any properties, including being harmed by death, after they have ceased to exist? Second, there is a more specific (and serious) worry: Subsequentism seems to be committed to the implausible claim that people occupy a well-being level of zero after they have died, but how is that possible? In his recent paper, John Martin Fischer provides a new way to avoid these worries, by appealing the notion of metaphysical grounding. I agree with Fischer that the notion is helpful, but I argues that Fischer (and other proponents of Subsequentism) fails to specify the proper ground of the Subsequentist's claim. Then, finally, I will provide and defend my own proposal.
Temporal Parts in Perception and Truth Implications <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Felipe Cuervo
From: Kyoto University & Universidad de los Andes
URL:
Abstract: Everybody assumes that occurents (things like events or actions) have temporal parts. Accordingly, current debates focus exclusively on whether continuants (things like objects or people) also have temporal parts. However, the question of whether occurents have temporal parts is less obvious than authors have assumed. Part of the issue is that previous scholars have restricted the discussion to metaphysics. Expanding the discussion to the philosophy of language and perception reveals hitherto unnoticed reasons for rejecting the existence of temporal parts. In this paper, I draw on these reasons to present a novel argument against the existence of temporal parts.
A Care Solution to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Kodai Sato
From: Keio University
URL: https://researchmap.jp/k_sato
Abstract: The doctrine of double effect (DDE) is a famous principle of morality, which has the ring of the truth. According to the core claim of this doctrine, an action which is only foreseen to cause a bad effect is permissible. However, it is known that there is a difficult problem for DDE, namely the closeness problem, where DDE classifies an action as permissible contrary to our intuition. Although various solutions to this problem have been proposed, none of them are conclusive. In my view, the thick plan solution is the most plausible among them, but it has problems. With the clue of this solution, in this talk, I propose a new solution, namely a care solution, and show how this solution overcomes the problems for the thick plan solution.
Ameliorative Epistemic Responsibility <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Kunimasa Sato
From: Ibaraki U; CUNY Graduate Center (until August 2022)
URL: https://researchmap.jp/kunisato?lang=en
Abstract: This presentation explores epistemic responsibility for testimonial injustice. Fricker (2007) argues that in epistemically bad luck environments, one is not culpable yet responsible for testimonial injustice. In contrast, Dotson (2012) and Medina (2013) claim that even in such environments, one can be culpable for testimonial injustice. In this talk, I first evaluate the debate and refine the concept of epistemic agent-regret as a form of non-fault epistemic responsibility, as suggested by Fricker. I then attempt to articulate ameliorative epistemic responsibility by characterizing this epistemic agent-regret as a part of transformative epistemic identity that enables the cycles of reflection to mitigate one’s earlier prejudicial value and the spontaneous manifestation of one’s well-improved values.
Referential Communication and Coordination <Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Chulmin Yoon
From: Korea Institute of Energy Technology (KENTECH)
URL: https://sites.google.com/view/chulmin-yoon/home
Abstract: Semantic relationism is the view that there is a semantic relation between representations, above and beyond their intrinsic or local content. Following Kit Fine (2007), let us call this semantic relation coordination. On semantic relationism, coordination holds both in intra-personal cases (e.g., coordination between terms used by a single speaker) and in inter-personal cases (e.g., coordination between terms used by two speakers). In this talk, I discuss a case of inter-personal coordination presented by Angel Pinillos (2015). On Pinillos’s reading of such a case, inter-personal coordination is not transitive. In this talk, I argue for two claims. First, I argue that alternative readings, on which inter-personal coordination is transitive, are available to semantic relationists. I present two such readings. Second, and more importantly, I argue that there are reasons to favor one of the two alternative readings. In doing so, I present an important difference between intra- and inter-personal coordination, one that is often overlooked by semantic relationists.
How the body shapes diachronic self-identity <NON-STANDARD STARTING TIME: 5:30PM. Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK>.
Speaker: Katsunori Miyahara
From: Hokkaido University, Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence, and Neuroscience (CHAIN)
URL: https://hokudai.academia.edu/KatsunoriMiyahara
Abstract: Narrative views of the self hold that we constitute our diachronic self-identity by producing self-narratives. In this talk, I propose that the body also plays a role in constituting the sense of diachronic identity that derives from its nature to form habits. After outlining the habit-forming body view of the constitution of diachronic self-identity, I will demonstrate its benefit by considering how it might improve ardent defender of the narrative view Marya Schechtman’s account of why narrative self-constitution is insufficient for personal identity.
Delusions of Advocacy (Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK).
Speaker: Nina Strohminger
From: University of Pennsylvania
URL: http://ninastrohminger.com/
Abstract: Wishful thinking is constrained by reality; people cannot believe the utterly implausible simply because they want to. Here, we uncover an exception to this basic principle of motivated cognition. We show that one goal in particular—the goal to advocate—systematically biases judgments in spite of strong countervailing evidence. This is more than a harmless delusion. Advocacy goals lead to greater endorsement of far-fetched ‘crackpot’ theories, and impede the resolution of legal negotiations. These effects do not show up in other kinds of goals: when participants desire an outcome, but do not have a goal to advocate for it, reality constrains bias. This revision to the theoretical record illustrates a novel path to endorsement of implausible information.
Positionalism and the Symmetry Problem (Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK).
Speaker: Jan Plate
From: University of Lugano
URL: https://usi-ch.academia.edu/JanPlate
Abstract: Since Kit Fine’s seminal ‘Neutral Relations’, a prominent family of conceptions of relations has been known as ‘positionalism’. At the same time, positionalism has been known to be subject to a grave difficulty, pointed out by Fine himself, concerning the treatment of relations with certain non-trivial symmetry patterns. To have a name for this difficulty, I call it the ‘symmetry problem’. My primary aim in this talk is to present a form of positionalism that does not suffer from the symmetry problem. The main innovation that makes this possible is a multigrade notion of role application: whereas a traditional positionalist would characterize the state of Abelard’s loving Héloïse as a state in which Abelard occupies the position (or role) of Lover and in which Héloïse occupies the role of Beloved, the multigrade positionalist would characterize that state instead as one in which Abelard occupies Lover ‘relative to’ Héloïse’s occupying Beloved—or, equivalently, as one in which Héloïse occupies Beloved relative to Abelard’s occupying Lover.
Finding Value-Ladenness in Science: The Case of Evolutionary Psychology (Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK).
Speaker: Yuichi Amitami
From: University of Aizu
URL: https://yuiami.wordpress.com/
Abstract: Feminist scholarship of science has found androcentric biases in scientific hypotheses and pointed out that they misguided researchers in unproductive directions. For example, it was found that researchers in various biological fields, such as primatology and cell biology, seemingly held the idea that it is men, not women, that approach their potential partner in mating, and thereby overlooked the positive roles that female primates or gametes play in mating or fertilization. Thus, it is clear that feminist scholarship has made a significant contribution to progress in biology and other fields. However, feminist scholars are sometimes incorrect in the attribution of values to scientific hypotheses and the way in which they discuss the value-ladenness in them may not lead to progress in knowledge production. In this talk, I will introduce some cases where feminist scholarship seemingly failed to prove value-ladenness of scientific hypotheses, in particular those in evolutionary psychology. Then I will explore why it is sometimes hard to find value-ladenness of scientific hypotheses and why proving value-ladenness in them alone is often not enough to make a contribution to progress in a field in question.
What are Basic Needs? An Empirical Investigation of Folk Intuitions (Note: You can join us on-campus on Komaba Campus (see "Venue" in the menu bar) or online, on Zoom: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK).
Speaker: Thomas Poelzler
From: University of Graz
URL: https://www.thomaspoelzler.com/
Abstract: Some normative theorists appeal to the concept of basic needs. They argue that in matters of international development, justice to future generations, basic rights or sustainable development our first priority should be that everybody is able to meet these needs. But what are basic needs? We attempt to inform discussions about this question by gathering quantitative empirical evidence about ordinary English speakers’ intuitions about the concept of basic needs. First, we explain and defend our empirical approach to analyzing this concept. Then we identify several potential necessary or prototypical features of the concept. Four preregistered empirical studies were conducted to investigate the extent to which ordinary speakers endorse these features. We present these studies and finally discuss their implications for analyses of basic needs in normative contexts.
Early Sellars is Sellars (5-7 pm, Japan Time) <online talk> Join: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK
Speaker: Theodore Paradise
From:
URL: https://philpeople.org/profiles/theodore-paradise?app=
Abstract: In his early essays, Wilfrid Sellars develops “pure pragmatics”, a formal system that modifies Carnap’s formal theory of language, so that the truth of statements about the world is determinable within the system. In Carnap’s semantic system, the criterion for assessing the truth of a statement is illustrated by “‘p’ is true iff p”, but Carnap offers no formal way to determine whether it is the case that p. He leaves that to pragmatics, which he thinks of as a part of psychology and not part of philosophy. Sellars’s “pure pragmatics”, in contrast, purports to show how p can be verified in a purely formal way. It is commonly thought that Sellars quickly abandoned pure pragmatics because it was a failure. I seek to show that, on the contrary, Sellars’s system of pure pragmatics is the foundation of his mature philosophy, and he only abandoned some of the superficial aspects of that system, including its name.
Bridging the Gap between Statistics and Epistemology <NON-STANDARD TIME: WEDNESDAY, 5-7 pm, Japan Time> Join: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK
Speaker: Jun Otsuka
From: Kyoto University
URL: http://www.philosophy.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/junotk/
Abstract: Despite having a shared concern in obtaining secure knowledge, philosophical epistemology and mathematical statistics have developed independently of each other without much interaction or mutual references. This talk tries to bridge the gap and draw a parallelism between the two inductive traditions. In particular, I show that the justificatory structures of the two main schools of modern statistics, Bayesianism and frequentism, can be characterized in terms of internalist and externalist epistemologies, respectively. Such parallelism not only shows an intriguing common pattern in our reasoning, but also reveals limitations and difficulties of each epistemological/statistical standpoint. Moreover, the recent development of highly-efficient deep learning techniques calls for yet another, perhaps somewhat virtue-theoretic, epistemological framework. I will sketch the possibility of the machine-virtue epistemology in connection with the recent development in explainable AI (XAI), and also explore its philosophical implications.
On the Heuristic Interpretation of Evolutionary Psychology and the Role Adaptive Thinking Plays as Its Primary Heuristic (5-7 pm, Japan Time) <online talk> Join: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK
Speaker: Shunkichi Matsumoto
From: Tokai University
URL: https://researchmap.jp/mshunkichi
Abstract: In recent years, quite a few evolutionary psychologists have come to embrace a heuristic interpretation of the discipline. They claim that, no matter how methodologically incomplete, adaptive thinking works fine as a good heuristic that effectively reduces the hypothesis space by generating novel and promising hypotheses that can eventually be empirically tested.
In this talk, I will elucidate the use of heuristics in evolutionary psychology, thereby clarifying the role adaptive thinking has to play. As a touchstone to examine the issue, I will first introduce a conventional charge against evolutionary psychology of circular reasoning in identifying adaptive problems in our ancestral past in order to see whether two typical heuristic interpretations—Machery’s "bootstrap strategy" and Goldfinch’s heuristically streamlined evolutionary psychology—can manage to circumvent it.
With regard to the former, I will make a diagnosis that whether the bootstrap strategy proves to be successful in yielding a novel prediction or collapses into an unproductive circularity hinges upon whether there is any chance to subject the end products of this reasoning chain (i.e., predicted psychological mechanisms) to empirical confirmation that can be designed independently of the corresponding behavioral patterns observed at the outset that are supposed to supervene on those mechanisms. Here, I bring up Buss’s theory of jealousy as a case example for probing whether this requirement is satisfied.
With respect to the latter, I will pay a special attention to Goldfinch’s idea that evolutionary psychology can manage to escape the vicious circle charge by being interpreted as a heuristic project, not as an explanatory project. Then I will argue that, despite an exclusive emphasis he puts on the conclusiveness of the final testing procedure (in the context of justification), the reliability of the heuristic hypothesis generation procedure (in the context of discovery) should count no less in establishing scientific facts; put another way, nature does not always get the last word. Philosophy also counts.
The conclusion to be drawn is that although adaptive thinking is a fair heuristic, providing the discipline with its raison d’etre of tracing the trait in question back to its historical origin, it can only work effectively when it is substantiated by sufficient historical underpinnings.
(This talk is based on: Matsumoto, S (2021) “Making Sense of the Relationship Between Adaptive Thinking and Heuristics in Evolutionary Psychology,” Biological Theory, Vol 16, pp 16–29.)
What to Believe and Consider about 'Believe' and 'Consider': Subjectivity as Idealized Disagreement <NON-STANDARD TIME: Wednesday, 10am-noon, Japan Time> Join: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK
Speaker: Anthony Nguyen
From: University of Southern California
URL: https://anthonynguyen.org/
Abstract: What is subjectivity? To answer this question, I will focus on how subjectivity manifests in natural language. In particular, I will investigate the subjective attitude verb 'consider', which tracks subjectivity in English. For example, 'I consider mushrooms to be tasty' is felicitous but 'I consider 2 to be an even number' is not. In other words, the former sentence sounds fine, but the latter does not. In contrast, both 'I believe mushrooms are tasty' and 'I believe 2 is an even number' are felicitous. What explains this contrast between 'consider' and 'believe'? That is, why can 'consider' only embed subjective sentences (like 'Mushrooms are tasty') but 'believe' can embed both subjective and objective sentences (like '2 is even')? After describing data that any account of 'consider' must capture, I object to the three existing accounts in the literature. I then develop a new view that does not have the problems faced by these accounts. On my view, subjectivity concerns a difference in what agents infer on the basis of certain evidence. This evidence concerns what agents believe to metaphysically ground what. A proposition p is subjective when there are two salient agents such that one agent believes something they believe grounds p and the other agent believes something they believe grounds the negation of p. This appeal to grounding explains why a 'consider'-report is infelicitous when the attitude holder believes the "considered" proposition on the basis of testimony or inductive inference. I then present a formal intensional semantics for 'consider' on which 'consider' presupposes subjectivity. But I will point out a couple limitations of this formal semantics that I hope to remedy in future work. Finally, I outline my view's implications for the subjective attitude verb 'find', subjective belief or opinion, and faultless disagreement. The subjectivity of natural language can therefore do serious philosophical work.
Experimenting with philosophy in Japanese high schools (5-7 pm, Japan Time) <online talk> Join: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK
Speaker: Alexander Dutson & James Hill
From: The Philosophy Foundation
URL: https://uk.linkedin.com/company/the-philosophy-foundation?trk=public_profile_topcard-current-company
Abstract: In this personal and practical talk we share our experiences teaching philosophy in Japanese high schools over the last decade or so, and provide an interactive overview of our pedagogical approach. First, we discuss the educational challenges and opportunities afforded by this demographic, in particular the question of how to motivate philosophy as both a topic and an activity for predominantly Japanese students. Next, we offer a hands-on look at some of the questioning techniques we use to extend and develop philosophical thinking in the classroom, techniques which help students add nuance and depth to their shared explorations without sacrificing their interest in the material.
Imaginative Acquaintance (5-7 pm, Japan Time) <online talk> Join: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK
Speaker: Uku Tooming
From: Hokkaido University
URL: https://ukutooming.weebly.com/
Abstract: Participation in aesthetic practices generally involves experiential encounters with its objects. This observation has motivated the Acquaintance principle according to which one needs to have first-hand experience with an artwork to make warranted aesthetic judgments about it.
It seems highly plausible, however, that an experience of the work’s surrogate—e.g., a photo, a documentary—can also warrant aesthetic judgments. In addition, it has occasionally been suggested that, aside from material surrogates, a sufficiently detailed imagining can serve as an adequate surrogate.
In this paper, I analyse what it takes for sensory imagination in particular to enable surrogative acquaintance. I will argue that surrogative use of sensory imagination should be distinguished from cases in which it provides basic, non-surrogative acquaintance. As for the non-surrogative use, imagination can warrant aesthetic judgments because it is a standard response to work, invited by its prescriptive frame. However, regarding the surrogative use, there is a tension between will-dependence of imagination and the requirements of aesthetic judgment. I will consider a response to this challenge which appeals to constraints on imagining an artwork and bring out some issues with it. The conclusion of the paper is that there are specific problems with the surrogative use of imagination which material surrogates do not face.
Deflating distinctively mathematical explanations in biology: mathematics as enabler of teleological/functional explanations <online talk> <NON-STANDARD TIME: 7-9 pm, Japan Time> Join: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK
Speaker: Jose Perez Escobar
From: ETH Zurich
URL: https://hpm.ethz.ch/people/person-detail.MjM0OTIw.TGlzdC8yNDY4LC0yNDgyNTI2NTg=.html
Abstract: Recently, the issue of whether there are “genuine mathematical explanations” or “distinctively mathematical explanations” outside mathematics has received substantial attention. For instance, Lange has argued that some explanations are distinctively mathematical because mathematical necessity or impossibility, and not causes, has most of the explanatory burden (Lange 2013). On the other hand, Craver and Povich have argued that those examples are better explained by causal mechanisms since there is a concrete explanatory directionality for which mathematics, being directionless, cannot account (Craver and Povich 2017). In this talk, I address one of these paradigmatic examples, the hexagonal shape of honeycomb cells, and propose an alternative interpretation of the role of mathematics more in line with biological practices and scientific intuitions. I claim that, in biology, 1) the role of mathematics in those paradigmatic examples is one of heuristic enablement of teleological/functional explanations, and 2) this role is secondary to that of functions, the latter assuming most of the explanatory burden. I support this reconstruction of the explanation of the honeycomb by extrapolating it to a similar case but more illustrative case: the hexagonal periodicity of grid cell activity.
An extended mind approach to autonomy in Deep Brain Stimulation patients <online talk> <Non-standard time: 7-9pm, Japan Time> Join: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK
Speaker: Abel Wajnerman Paz
From: Alberto Hurtado University
URL: https://uahurtado.academia.edu/AbelWajnermanPaz
Abstract: The adaptive BCI known as ‘closed-loop deep brain stimulation’ (clDBS) is a device that stimulates the brain in order to prevent or modulate pathological neural activity patterns and automatically adjusts stimulation levels based on computational algorithms that detect or predict those pathological processes. One of the prominent ethical concerns raised by clDBS is that it may take subjects “out of the decisional loop.” By inhibiting or modulating undesirable neural states automatically, i.e., without any control or supervision by the subject, the device potentially undermines her autonomy.
I argue that not all DBS applications are equally problematic. I suggest that, if autonomy requires some degree of self-government, then clDBS may undermine the autonomy of a subject only in the situations in which action results from clDBS algorithm’s (instead of the subject’s) evaluation and regulation of her motivational states (which only occurs in some specific DBS applications).
Furthermore, I claim that if we endorse the ‘extended mind’ hypothesis (and its complementary ‘ethical parity’ thesis), it follows that these applications actually support autonomy. I suggest that, in this context, the function of a clDBS device is sufficiently and relevantly similar to a brain function of the subject and therefore the device can be considered (both ontologically and ethically) as part of herself. This means that its influence over her motivational states constitutes a form of self-government.
Time and Visual Imagination: From Physics to Philosophy <online talk> <NON-STANDARD TIME: MONDAY, 2-4 pm, Japan Time> Join: https://bit.ly/3wW74RK
Speaker: Jenann Ismael
From: Columbia University
URL: https://www.jenanni.com/
Abstract: I will talk about time and the visual imagination, because I think it is behind some of the most trenchant misunderstandings about (what physics tells us about) the nature of time. I’ll start with a brief history of space-time theories, then I’ll spend the rest of the time talking about the images of time coming out of physics and the philosophical confusions to which they give rise. The talk will presuppose no physics, and there will be lots of pretty pictures.
Propositions as Acts of Saying <online talk>
Speaker: Thomas W. S. Hodgson
From: Shanxi University
URL: https://twshodgson.co.uk/
Abstract: I defend a version of the act-type theory of propositions, following Hanks and Soames. Propositions are acts of referring to objects, expressing properties, and predicting properties of objects. I further propose that the content of a sentence is the act performed when that sentence is uttered, which will mirror the structure of that sentence. This act can be identified with what the speaker says. I then argue that this view has advantages over a traditional theory of propositions which says that propositions are complexes of objects and properties which mirror the structure of the sentences that express those propositions. In particular, I argue that the act-type theory avoids objections made by Pickel against the traditional theory. And, I argue that the act-type theory provides the best framework for understanding a popular view about the distinction between what is said and what is meant, using Bach's theory of what is said as my example.
Three Kinds of Relative Value: Contrasting Well-Being with Its Neighbouring Ideas <online talk>
Speaker: Shu Ishida
From: University of Tokyo
URL: https://researchmap.jp/okomefactory?lang=en
Abstract: What is good for me is not necessarily good for you as well. What Mary thinks is good may seem to Joe to be terribly bad. My parent’s deceiving me is by far worse than a stranger’s deceiving me. And so on. These are cases involving ‘relative value’: cases in which, roughly, the value of something depends on the identity of the relevant persons. They are contrasted with ‘neutral value’, which is independent of the question of ‘who’.
The literature on moral philosophy abounds with arguments focusing on relative value, often in the name of agent-relativity. Less attention has been paid, however, to the different ways to relativize value (a seminal exception is Garrett Cullity’s ‘Neutral and Relative Value’). In this paper, I argue that there are at least three ways for value to be relative. Starting from a statement of neutral value such as ‘?-ing is good simpliciter from the objective standpoint’, we can see the following. Firstly, if X’s ?-ing is good simpliciter (while Y’s is not) from the objective standpoint, then we have actor-relative value. Secondly, if ?-ing is good for X (while not for Y) from the objective standpoint, then we have recipient-relative value. Thirdly, if ?-ing is good simpliciter from X’s standpoint (while not from Y’s), then we have evaluator-relative value.
I illustrate that we can conceive of 2^3 = 8 distinct patterns of relative value (precisely, one among them is that of neutral value). For instance, a statement ‘anyone’s admiring Shu Ishida is good for me (even if not for you) from the objective standpoint’ involves actor-neutral, recipient-relative, and evaluator-neutral value. I finally provide a reason for regarding well-being as inherently recipient-relative value, in principle regardless of actor-relativity and evaluator-relativity. +++SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT: FOR THE TIME BEING, TFAP MEETINGS WILL BE HELD IN ONLINE FORM. FOR INFORMATION ON HOW TO JOIN THIS ONLINE MEETING, PLEASE SEND AN EMAIL IN ADVANCE TO info@tf-ap.com. THANK YOU.+++
'To Be is To Interbe' - Thich Nhât Hanh on Interdependent Arising <online talk>
Speaker: Mirja Holst
From: American University in Vietnam
URL: https://mirjaholst.wordpress.com/
Abstract: This talk presents the metaphysical picture of the Vietnamese Zen monk Thich Nhat Hanh. He interprets the Buddhist principle of interdependent arising in terms interbeing, the idea that everything depends for its existence on everything else. On his view, everything ‘inter-is’ with everything else, or ‘To Be is To Inter-Be’. His interpretation is particularly interesting in light of the contemporary debate on fundamentality in Western metaphysics. By embracing the idea of interbeing, he opposes the standard view that there are fundamental entities which do not depend for their existence on anything else. I give an outline of Thich Nhat Hanh’s views, answer an objection, and explain what reasons he has to adopt such a non-standard view. My aim is not to offer a full defence of his views, but only to extract them from his writings to make them accessible to Western philosophy. Nonetheless, I hope to show that the often neglected position of metaphysical coherentism, which Thich Nhat Hanh adopts, deserves further consideration. +++SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT: FOR THE TIME BEING, TFAP MEETINGS WILL BE HELD IN ONLINE FORM. FOR INFORMATION ON HOW TO JOIN THIS ONLINE MEETING, PLEASE SEND AN EMAIL IN ADVANCE TO info@tf-ap.com. THANK YOU.+++
Epistemic Injustice in Psychiatry <online talk>
Speaker: Eisuke Sakakibara
From: The University of Tokyo
URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Eisuke_Sakakibara
Abstract: Through the analysis of the cases of misogyny and racism, Fricker M. (2007) pointed out that a special type of injustice is prevalent in our society, and proposed the concept of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice refers to the unfair treatment of a person's status as a knower. She classified epistemic injustice into two classes: testimonial and hermeneutical injustices.
In recent years, the notion of epistemic injustice has been applied to the physician-patient relationship in medicine by Carel H. and colleagues. Furthermore, there have been a handful of attempts to apply the concept to analyze the problems found in psychiatry. But these are confined to reporting anecdotal failures without a consideration of general features of psychiatric services underlying these failures.
Of note, psychiatric disorders are disorders that impair patients' rationality and sometimes give rise to false beliefs, such as delusions. Therefore, psychiatry is the subfield of medicine in which patients’ status as " knowers" is compromised by their illness. But this also means that psychiatry is an area of medicine that is fraught with the possibility of serious epistemic injustice for patients.
I will stratify the characteristic interpersonal relationship in psychiatry into three layers: the characteristic of the professional-client relationship, that of the physician-patient relationship, and that of the psychiatrist-patient relationship. Based on this framework, I will examine how epistemic injustice can occur during psychiatric treatment along these three strata. +++SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT: FOR THE TIME BEING, TFAP MEETINGS WILL BE HELD IN ONLINE FORM. FOR INFORMATION ON HOW TO JOIN THIS ONLINE MEETING, PLEASE SEND AN EMAIL IN ADVANCE TO info@tf-ap.com. THANK YOU.+++
Conceptual to the Roots: A Quasi-Kantian Approach to Cognition <online talk>
Speaker: Theodore Paradise (joining us online, from Paris)
From:
URL:
Abstract: Kant had trouble explaining how the two faculties required for cognition of objects—sensibility and understanding—could interact. He attempted to bridge the gap with his theory of schematism and the faculty of imagination. But contemporary scholars diverge significantly in explaining how this bridging works, and in my view Kant’s solution is not satisfactory. I offer a quasi-Kantian solution: in my view, sensibility is conceptual all the way down to its primitive roots, and the nature of concept-formation is fundamentally the same at every level of cognition. My solution differs from that offered by John McDowell by clarifying the conceptual nature of sensation and sensibility. By doing so, I eliminate the need for McDowell’s Wittgensteinian quietism. +++SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT: FOR THE TIME BEING, TFAP MEETINGS WILL BE HELD IN ONLINE FORM. FOR INFORMATION ON HOW TO JOIN THIS ONLINE MEETING, PLEASE SEND AN EMAIL IN ADVANCE TO info@tf-ap.com. THANK YOU.+++
What Is It Like to Be a Material Thing? Cavendish's Arguments for Materialism
Speaker: Colin Chamberlain
From: Temple University
URL: https://sites.temple.edu/colinchamberlain/
Abstract: One common early modern strategy—found in Descartes, More, and Leibniz—is to argue that the mind’s apparent simplicity reveals the mind to be an immaterial or non-physical thing. Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673) turns this argument on its head. Cavendish argues from the mind’s apparent complexity to the conclusion that the mind is a material thing. More specifically, I show that Cavendish identifies four characteristics of our mental lives that suggest that the mind has parts or is composite. She appeals to cases of (i) mental division or psychic discord, (ii) mental obscurity, (iii) the perspectival and partial character of human perception, and, finally, (iv) the felt location of bodily sensations, viz. the fact that we experience pain in the foot. From these four kinds of experience, Cavendish infers that the mind has parts, and, hence, is a material thing. One objection to this argument is that although these various experiences might show that the mind has a certain kind of complexity—and perhaps even that the mind has parts in some sense—they do not show that the mind has the kind of complexity/parts sufficient for being a material thing. I argue that Cavendish’s position is more defensible than it might initially seem, and that she can respond to this objection. Finally, I consider whether Cavendish can accommodate her opponents’ motivations for insisting on the mind’s simplicity: viz. the unity of consciousness. I argue yes. One upshot of my reading is that Cavendish defends materialism about the mind from the first-person point of view. What is it like to be a material thing? Turn inward. Consider what it’s like to be you. That is precisely what it’s like to be a material thing.
The Normative Primacy of Attitudes
Speaker: Andrew T. Forcehimes
From: Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
URL: https://research.ntu.edu.sg/expertise/academicprofile/Pages/StaffProfile.aspx?ST_EMAILID=forcehimes&CategoryDescription=Philosophy
Abstract: In this talk, I argue that attitudes are the primary object of normative assessment. The argument turns on the idea that normatively assessable attitudes cause all normatively assessable actions, and that these attitudes have normative properties determined independently of the acts they cause.
A Historical Overview of Women and Philosophy in Japan
Speaker: Yuko Murakami
From: Rikkyo University
URL: https://researchmap.jp/read0140800/?lang=english
Abstract: This paper aims to historically overview women philosophers, focusing on social situations in the four periods:
before the Meiji revolution (before 1886);
from Meiji revolution to the end of WWII (1868-1945);
Transformation of the educational system from the German model to the American model (1945-1992); and
Modernization of higher education (1992-current).
Working questions:
(1) why are there so few women philosophers in Japan?
(2) How can we increase the ratio of women philosophers in Japan?
The reflections around the questions also arise related questions:
(3) what does it mean to "think philosophically" in the context of contemporary Japan?
(4) what is "philosophy in Japan"?
Moral Stability and Pragmatism
Speaker: Raff Donelson
From: Louisiana State University
URL: https://www.law.lsu.edu/directory/profiles/raff-donelson/
Abstract: It is a commonsense thought that the correct basic moral principles cannot change over time. If a principle like the Categorical Imperative is the uniquely correct basic moral principle today, it cannot be the case that the Principle of Utility is uniquely correct next week. Though popular, this commonsense thought, which I call the Moral Stability Thesis, has not often been explicitly stated, much less defended. This essay argues that the Moral Stability Thesis can be defended but not so easily and not without disappointing some philosophers. Defending it requires that we revise our thoughts about the proper manner by which we conduct moral inquiry. In particular, to defend the Moral Stability Thesis we must give up the notion that moral inquiry ideally proceeds as an attempt to describe moral properties or entities.
Structural Heteronomy
Speaker: Tuomo Tiisala
From: NYU Abu Dhabi
URL: https://www.tuomotiisala.net
Abstract: This paper identifies a new ethical problem called ‘structural heteronomy’ and defends a response to it. The problem arises when two theses from different areas of philosophy are combined for the first time. The ethical thesis defines autonomy as a guiding moral ideal that generates an ethical requirement for self-governing. I argue that this requirement is not limited to the motivation of the will but also requires, as an ethical task, that one exert rational control over the concepts that define one’s understanding. However, the semantic thesis reveals, by means of the rule-following regress, that understanding is a practical ability which cannot be exhaustively determined by representations of rules. Therefore, one cannot represent completely the inferential structure of one’s concepts, and to that extent they defy rational control. The problem of structural heteronomy emerges: one is ethically required to subject concepts to scrutiny, but the structure of understanding prevents complete rational control over them. In response, I argue that there is a requirement for ethical work that aims at semantic self-consciousness. By developing this thought, through a number of objections, the paper adds significant complexity to the normative landscape of ethical requirements that follow from the ideal of autonomy
Form as Meaning: Towards a Neo-Heideggerian Mereology
Speaker: Adrian Kreutz
From: University of Birmingham
URL: https://adriankreutzphilosophy.weebly.com
Abstract: Neo-Aristotelian Mereology (Hylemorphism), as advanced by Kit Fine (1999), takes objects to be trans-categorical compounds of matter (hyle) and form (morphe). Classical Extensional Mereology (CEM), the theory associated with David Lewis (1986), sees objects as unstructured wholes composed of uni-categorical parts. While CEM is the more elegant theory, Hylemorphism is closer to our ordinary understanding of what objects are and how they behave. Both come with their respective set of problems, both of technical concern as well as with regards to common sense. The mereology proposed in paper seeks to build on the virtues of those theories, and also to avoid their vices. In detail, it generates a promiscuous ontology via CEM's principle Universalism and determines ontological sub-sets via the hylomorphic notion of 'form'. The notion of 'form', however, is deprived of its Aristotelian content and endowed with a Heideggerian character. In Neo-Heideggerian mereology we understand the notion of 'form' in terms of 'meaning' or 'significance', or in Heidegger's terminology, as 'Zuhandenheit' (Eng. readiness-to-hand). Form understood as meaning is no longer a structure-inducing entity which compounds with matter to yield complex objects, it rather picks out those objects from the plenitude of objects generated by CEM which already have a meaningful structure, i.e. ordinary material and non-material objects. As such, it defines the notion of 'ordinary object' as opposed to being defined by it, as it is the case with Hylomorphism. It is a universal and sortal-free account of the metaphysics of (material as well as abstract) objects which has the potential to settle the long-standing debate on how liberal or conservative our ontology should be and makes for an intelligible solution to the puzzle-cases of material-object metaphysics. As the aim of this paper is expository, I shall limit the discussion to the problem of coincidence.
Millian Russellianism, Neo-Meinongianism, and Imaginary Names
Speaker: Paolo Bonardi
From: University of Geneva
URL: https://philpeople.org/profiles/paolo-bonardi
Abstract: Millianism is the doctrine that the semantic content of a name is just its referent; and Russellianism is the doctrine that the semantic content of a declarative sentence in a context of use is a Russellian proposition, i.e. a structured proposition whose basic constituents are individuals, attributes and functions. In my talk, I will first outline Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’ Millian Russellianism broadly construed, viz. as a theory that deals not only with philosophy of language but also with epistemology, metaphysics and logic. My goal is to present and defend a Millian-Russellian account of imaginary names – i.e. names of creatures from fiction (e.g. “Holmesâ€), error (e.g. “Vulcanâ€), dream, hallucination, etc. – according to which: every imaginary name has referent; such a referent is into our universe (i.e. into the spatiotemporal region where we live); it is in time but not in space and, strictly speaking, it is concrete; it exists (because the neo-Meinongian alternative that it is a nonexistent object encounters serious difficulties illustrated in the talk); and it is a mental type (e.g. Holmes is nothing but the mental type of having in mind Holmes).
Thought Experiments, Counterfactuals, and Knowledge
Speaker: Masaki Ichinose
From: Musashino University & The University of Tokyo
URL: https://www.musashino-u.ac.jp/m_ichinose/index-en.html
Abstract: My aim in this talk is to examine how thought experiments work in many kinds of our activities, in particular with regard to our epistemic phases, by referring to Williamson’s argument on thought experiments. Williamson analyses the basic structure of our thought experiments as having the form of counterfactual conditionals by focusing upon the traditional problem of “the Gettier case†which function as “alethic refuter†against the classical definition of knowledge, “justified true belief†(JTB). The unique point of his analysis lies in his pointing out that thought experiments typically exemplified by the Gettier case should be formulated in terms of counterfactuals, and his flatly admitting that the counterfactual judgement on the Gettier case is fallible and contingent rather than logically true. I will confirm that his line of arguments is almost reasonably acceptable despite having been seriously criticized.
It seems to me that this Williamson’s argument has broader implications than perhaps he himself might imagine. That is to say, it could imply that there would be an epistemic case that the Gettier case is not applied with JTB accepted, and all of epistemic phase should be understood not in a purely logical way but in a more pragmatic way, which reflects his characterization of judgements on the Gettier case as contingent. I will develop my idea based upon those implications in the form of another counterfactual, i.e. ‘If the Gettier case did not obtain, then if JTB obtained, the knowledge obtained’. I plan to interpret this formulation as showing a causal relation through connecting this with the counterfactual analysis of causation, hoping to propose a new causal theory of knowledge. In the course of proposing the theory, I appeal to Edgington’s idea on evaluating counterfactuals.
The Origin of Selfhood: A Functionalist Account Based on the Predictive Processing Paradigm
Speaker: Zong Ning
From: The University of Tokyo
URL:
Abstract: In this paper I examine the notion of selfhood through the lens of the predictive processing paradigm. I argue that an agent’s individual existence is essentially associated with the reflexive capacity of information processing, or “predictive self-evidencingâ€. I provide a functionalistic explanation of selfhood in terms of this association. In this explanation, consciousness plays no indispensable role. The paper ends with an argument for the significance of selfhood under my characterization, in terms of (1) constituting a general ground for epistemically significant types of selfhoods, and (2) offering a functionalistic alternative to both the subjectivist and objectivist views on the nature of self.
Aesthetic Properties and Philosophy of Perception
Speaker: Sonia Sedivy
From: University of Toronto
URL: https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/sonia-sedivy/
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to bring consideration of aesthetic properties to the table in theories of visual perception. I address two debates: (i) whether perception is purely relational, contentful or both; and (ii) the extent and form that understanding of categories – or conceptual capacities – take in perception. I focus on some aesthetic properties: those that are experiential and for which strong argument has been made that they depend on the historical category to which the object belongs. The paper begins by reconstructing arguments for the historical nature of art by Arthur C. Danto and Kendall L. Walton. The paper goes on to argue that relational views of experience by Charles Travis and John Campbell cannot explain experience of aesthetic properties determined by historical categories of art. This pits relational theories of art against the intuitive view that some aesthetic properties are experienced and against argumentation such as Danto and Walton’s for the dependence of some aesthetic properties on historical categories of art. I argue that this cost is too high. A theory of perception needs to be able to explain experience of some aesthetic properties. This suggests that we need to explain how understanding of categories helps secure our perceptual relation to individuals and some of their properties.
Deflationism, Vague Existence, and Metaphysical Vagueness
Speaker: Rohan Sud
From: Ryerson University
URL: https://www.rohansud.com/
Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between the theses of vague existence, metaphysical vagueness, and ontological deflationism. I present (without endorsing) an argument that the ontological deflationist is committed to metaphysical vagueness. That argument comes in two steps. First, I present an argument that the ontological deflationist is committed to vague existence. Then, I present an argument that vague existence requires metaphysical vagueness. Unlike extant arguments (e.g. the Lewis-Sider argument) that vague existence requires metaphysical vagueness, the argument that I present applies to the deflationist. With my argument laid out, I assess some avenues a deflationist might use to resist my argument. That assessment helps shed light on the otherwise obscure metaphysical picture underlying deflationism. During the course of the paper, I’ll also explore rival regimentations of the theses of vague existence and metaphysical vagueness, revealing along the way some problems with how these theses are presently understood in the literature.
Testimonial Injustice Beyond Credibility Deficits
Speaker: Emily McWilliams
From: Duke Kunshan University
URL: http://undergrad.dukekunshan.edu.cn/faculty-en/
Abstract: Concepts that illuminate the ethical dimensions of our epistemic lives help us to see and understand the systematic injustices that inhere in our social epistemic norms, practices, and institutions. The ways that we delimit such concepts thus matters, since it has the power to reveal certain injustices, while obscuring others. One such concept that has gained widespread uptake in the philosophical literature of the past decade is Fricker’s (2007) notion of testimonial injustice, which occurs when a speaker receives an unfair credibility deficit owing to a prejudice on the part of the hearer. This concept has served to illuminate the many ways in which a speaker’s communicative intentions can be thwarted as a result of both individual prejudices, and unfair distributions of collective markers of credibility. Nonetheless, I will argue that this definition covers over other important ways in which epistemic injustice inheres in the social practice of testimony. I therefore make a case that the notion of testimonial injustice that need not be about a loss of credibility.
I argue for this by (1) introducing a kind of coercive silencing that I call testimonial withdraw, which does not operate via a threat to the speaker’s credibility; and, (2) arguing that there are principled reasons to expand our operative definition of testimonial injustice to include testimonial withdraw. More specifically, I draw inspiration from Wanderer (2017) in suggesting that we expand our notion of testimonial injustice to include all phenomena where our grasp of the injustice and the way(s) in which it is distinctly epistemic emerges from an understanding of the social epistemic practice of testimony, broadly construed. This broader notion avoids the danger of circumscribing our definition of testimonial injustice in a way that makes it harder to see and address injustices that fall outside of Fricker’s original purview.
Mathematics, Fictionalism, and Sherlock Holmes
Speaker: Alan Baker
From: Swarthmore College
URL: https://www.swarthmore.edu/profile/alan-baker
Abstract: Fictionalism is an increasingly popular philosophical response to metaphysical claims in a wide variety of contexts, including modality, ethics, mathematics, and science. One challenge for mathematical fictionalism is that it seems to conflict with the beliefs and practices of working mathematicians. Claims such as, “There is a prime number between 5 and 10,†are made categorically, and not merely within the scope of some implicit fictional operator. In this paper, I defend the thesis that, contrary to appearances, most mathematicians are in fact fictionalists. I outline a new philosophical position I call “game fictionalism,†and I argue that this position fits actual mathematical practice better than any of the other mainstream philosophies of mathematics. In explicating game fictionalism, I develop an extended analogy with “the Great Game,†a mode of engagement with the Sherlock Holmes stories that is practiced by a large group of aficionados. I use this example to help explain why it is so difficult to determine working mathematicians’ real attitudes to the ontological claims of their discipline.
Doing Good by Doing Philosophy
Speaker: Theodore Paradise
From: Tokyo
URL: https://www.davispolk.com/professionals/theodore-paradise
Abstract: Many philosophers are engaged in explicating the good, or some dimensions of it. But the theme of doing good by doing philosophy seems to be relatively neglected in the tradition of analytic philosophy. Furthermore, many analytic philosophers seem not to think that they are doing good when they do philosophy. While some analytic philosophers have offered normative justifications for doing philosophy, their models are limited to specific kinds of philosophical activity, or to specific visions of the good. I offer a model that any philosopher might use to approach the question of doing good with philosophy. I argue that most of us doing philosophy can do good by doing philosophy, and have reasons to want to do so. I believe that my model is flexible enough to accommodate most existing values, objectives and practices of most philosophers, while also facilitating transformation of those values, objectives and practices when desired.
Personal and Objective Ethics: How to Read Crito
Speaker: Hiroshi Ohtani
From: Tokyo Women's Christian University
URL: https://musashino-u.academia.edu/HiroshiOhtani
Abstract: Dominant interpretations of Plato’s Crito attempt to reconstruct the text deductively, searching for general principles that apply to particular facts in the famous Laws’ speech. However, Cora Diamond argues against this ‘generalist interpretation’, instead contending that the Laws’ speech should be seen as an exercise of moral imagination rather than the application of some general principle. In this talk, I argue that, although her ‘anti-generalist’ interpretation is interesting, it fails to engage both contemporary Plato scholarship and the details of Crito’s text. Instead, following the lead of Diamond, I offer a more rigorous anti-generalist interpretation. This paper both outlines some of the problems with Diamond’s reading and amends it to strengthen her insights on the importance of moral thinking. The main contention of this paper is that Crito’s ethics does not solely consist in drawing a conclusion from the application of general principles to particular facts. Rather, Crito is an attempt to exercise the readers’ imagination, thereby presenting ethics that is both personal and objective. I argue that while the ethical statements in Crito essentially refer to an individual, Socrates, they still have objective import.
Lewis and Leibniz on Possible Worlds and Possible Individuals: Differences and Similarities Between the Two
Speaker: Jan Levin Propach
From: LMU Munich & University of Augsburg
URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jan_Propach
Abstract: At first glance David Kellogg Lewis (1941-2001) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) do not seem to have that much in common. The one was an atheist, a physicalist, a 20th century philosopher, the other was a classical theist, believed in souls and spirits, monads and divine thoughts and was one of the most famous representatives of early modern rationalism. But in this presentation, I want to talk about some important similarities between both famous philosophers of modality, particularly concerning their concepts of possible worlds, and possible individuals and their rejection of transworld identity.
Veritism and Its Vices
Speaker: Tamer Nawar
From: University of Groningen
URL: https://tamernawar.weebly.com
Abstract: Veritism, which may be here characterised as the view that
true belief is the fundamental epistemic value, is often thought to be
an intuitively attractive position but has been criticised on numerous
fronts by several epistemologists and philosophers of science. In this
paper, I give a clear analysis of what I take to be the principal
arguments against veritism and clarify precisely what I take them to
show.
Is Color Cognitively Penetrable: How and Why?
Speaker: Yasmina Yrassaiti
From: American University of Beirut
URL: http://jraissati.com
Abstract: Color is often used as an example of cognitive penetration in the literature. Reference to some empirical results is used in support of the claim according to which higher cognitive states, such as beliefs or language, modulate the appearance of color. In this talk, I examine two areas of research in color cognition that are most relevant to the cognitive penetration discussion: memory color, or the idea that knowledge of a color’s object modulates an object’s appearance; and categorical perception, or the idea that knowledge of a color’s label affects the perceptual distance between colors depending on whether they belong to the same or to adjacent lexical categories. I will focus on the most relevant or most widely cited results and argue that they do not provide support to the cognitive penetration claim. I conclude that the relevant question when it comes to color is not only whether it is cognitively penetrated, but also why it should or shouldn’t be.
Actually Solving the Sorites
Speaker: Nicholas J.J. Smith
From: University of Sydney
URL: https://sydney.edu.au/arts/philosophy/staff/profiles/nicholas.smith.php
Abstract: A requirement on any theory of vagueness is that it solve the sorites paradox. It is generally agreed that there are two aspects to such a solution. One task is to locate the error in the sorites argument. The second task is to explain why the argument is nevertheless compelling: why the sorites reasoning constitutes a paradox rather than a simple mistake. I argue for a further constraint on approaches to the second task: they should conform to the standard modus operandi in formal semantics, in which the semantic theory one develops is taken to be implicit in the usage and/or intuitions of competent speakers. I then argue that, out of the current main contenders for a theory of vagueness, only certain theories that posit degrees of truth can meet this further constraint. Thus, while many have claimed to have solutions to the paradox, only certain kinds of degree theory can actually solve the sorites.
Kant, an Unlucky Philosopher of Moral Luck
Speaker: Samuel J.M. Kahn
From: Wuhan University + Indiana University-Purdue University
URL: https://liberalarts.iupui.edu/about/directory/kahn-samuel-j-m.html
Abstract: Ever since Williams' and Nagel's seminal articles on moral luck, debate about the issue has been understood as pitting Kantian ethics against Aristotelian ethics. The dialectic is set up in this way by friend and foe alike: Kantian ethics is taken to be an attempt to insulate against the possibility of moral luck whereas Aristotelian ethics is taken to embrace it. But this backdrop is mistaken. Indeed, as this paper will show, Kant’s theoretical framework for resultant moral luck is more sophisticated than those developed by modern philosophers, philosophers who usually stop short after pointing to examples that, as instances of moral luck, are supposed to expose some deep flaw in Kantian approaches to ethics. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I review the literature to show that participants in the moral luck literature take moral luck to be anathema to Kantian ethics. In the second, I give an account of resultant moral luck. In the third, I explain why philosophers have taken Kantian ethics to reject moral luck and, in particular, resultant moral luck. In the fourth, I explain why these philosophers are mistaken and I set out Kant’s theoretical framework for resultant moral luck. In the fifth, I connect the framework from the fourth section to the doctrine of double effect. I argue that a better understanding of Kant’s ideas about resultant moral luck allows us to shore up and gain insight into a doctrine that seems to have stood the test of time notwithstanding its own foundational issues.​ Thus it is not only unlucky for Kant that his position on moral luck has been overlooked and his ethics mischaracterized by Williams, Nagel and their followers: it is also unlucky for us.​
What Constraint Should be Imposed on Adequate Criteria of Ontological Commitment?
Speaker: Masahiro Takatori
From: Keio University
URL: https://researchmap.jp/m_takatori/?lang=english
Abstract: One of the central issues in contemporary meta-metaphysics is the criteria for ontological commitment. The Quinean criterion for ontological commitment is mainstream, though some (typically inspired by D. M. Armstrong) support the “truthmaker†approach. The topic of this talk are conditions any criteria should meet in order to be formally adequate. First, I will present a neutral scheme of ontological commitment. It will be shown that various criteria of ontological commitment can be interpreted as instances of the scheme. Second, I will point out that in the scheme of ontological commitment, a component which can be described as “a definition of the range of reality/world (relative to the object language)†plays a key role. Finally, I will formulate and defend a general constraint under which these kinds of definitions could be considered adequate. I argue that a constraint on these definitions can work as a necessary condition which a formally adequate criteria of ontological commitment should satisfy.
Propositions and Their Constituent Facts: An Essay in Pointillist Metaphysics
Speaker: Aviv Hoffmann
From: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
URL: https://philpapers.org/profile/28912
Abstract: Consider two fundamental questions in the metaphysics of propositions. (1) What in the nature of a proposition enables it to be true (or false)? (2) What in the nature of a proposition enables it to be about a given thing (especially, what enables necessarily equivalent propositions to be about distinct things)? To answer these questions, I offer the biregional theory of propositions. According to this theory, propositions inhabit what I call exemplification space, where each point is either a positive or a negative world-specific fact (such as the fact that Sophia is sad at w1 and the fact that it is not the case that Sophia is sad at w2, respectively). Propositions are (some) ordered pairs of disjoint regions of exemplification space: the first component of a pair corresponds to the truth of the proposition, and the second component corresponds to the falsity of the proposition. A proposition is true (false) at a possible world iff some fact in the truth (falsity) region of the proposition is specific to that world. A proposition is about a thing iff some fact in either the truth or the falsity region of the proposition is about the thing. The biregional theory is part of a novel doctrine I call metaphysical pointillism, which also includes a theory of facts and a concomitant theory of truth-making (I expound these theories elsewhere).
A Unified Analysis of Attitudes: Bridging the De Re / De Dicto / De Qualitate Divide
Speaker: Christopher Tancredi
From: Keio University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/christophertancredi/
Abstract: A standard assumption in modern semantics is that propositions function both as the contents of thoughts and as the denotations of sentences. Propositional attitude statements like a believes that S under this view typically identify the proposition denoted by S as the content of a belief of a’s, at least under a pure de dicto interpretation of the sentence. This assumption makes it necessary to treat the de re / de dicto (/de qualitate) distinction as a semantic distinction: the proposition attributed to the subject under a de re (/de qualitate) interpretation of an expression contained in S is not the proposition denoted by S but rather some other suitably related proposition.
In this talk I challenge this perspective. I accept that attitude predicates denote relations between an attitude holder and a proposition. However, I reject the view that the relation is one of identifying the proposition that is the content of the holder’s attitude. Instead, I argue that the proposition denoted by S merely has to be inferable from an underlying, non-linguistically denoted thought of the attitude subject. This simple idea makes it possible to account for de dicto, de re and de qualitate attributions within a single unified semantics.
A Puzzle About Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
Speaker: Jesse Mulder
From: University of Utrecht
URL: http://jessemulder.com/
Abstract: Higher-order theories of consciousness start from the thought that a conscious state is a state one is aware of being in. So they use the transitive notion "awareness of ..." in order to account for the intransitive idea of "being conscious" (which is glossed as "having conscious mental states"). I argue, however, that their explanatory notion, "awareness of", implies a form of ‘seeming’ that the higher-order approach requires, yet cannot account for. I show that (1) if the relevant kind of seeming is declared to be present in all representational states, the seeming in question is objectionably trivialized; that (2) using the higher-order strategy to capture the relevant kind of seeming together with intransitive consciousness in one fell swoop results in an infinite regress; and that (3) highlighting distinctive features of representations that explain why they display seeming amounts to abandoning the higher-order approach altogether. I end by considering the prospects of a higher-order theory of consciousness in the light of these considerations. They are dim.
What is the Point of Understanding?
Speaker: Michael Hannon
From: Institute of Philosophy, London
URL: http://mjhannon.com/
Abstract: What is human understanding and why should we care about it? I propose a method of philosophical investigation called `function-first epistemology' and use this method to investigate the nature and value of understanding--why. I argue that the concept of understanding-why serves the practical function of identifying good explainers, which is an important role in the general economy of our concepts. This hypothesis sheds light on a variety of issues in the epistemology of understanding including the role of explanation, the relationship between understanding--why and knowledge, and the value of understanding-why. I conclude that understanding--why is valuable and yet knowledge plays more important roles in our epistemic life.
Plurals and Mereology (joint work with David Nicolas)
Speaker: Salvatore Florio
From: University of Birmingham
URL: https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/philosophy/florio-salvatore.aspx
Abstract: In linguistics, the dominant approach to the semantics of plurals appeals to mereology. However, this approach has received heavy criticisms, especially in philosophical logic. The main aim of this article is to assess the logical, linguistic, and philosophical significance of these criticisms. The conclusion is that they do not undermine the mereological approach to plurals.
The Indeterminacy of Unconscious Belief
Speaker: Raamy Majeed
From: The University of Auckland
URL: https://raamymajeed.com
Abstract: What is the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality? According to the contemporary conception, (i) unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world in the same way conscious ones do, and (ii) both sets of attitudes represent by having determinate propositional content. In his presidential address to the Aristotelian Society, Crane (2017) denies both claims, arguing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes, e.g. beliefs, differ from conscious ones in being less determinate in nature. In this paper, I evaluate Crane’s proposal, and argue that one of his denials has to give.
Rawls's Self-Defeat: How the Utilitarian Dog Bit the Rawlsian Hand that Fed It, A Formal Analysis
Speaker: Hun Chung
From: Waseda University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/hunchung1980
Abstract: One of John Rawls’s major aims, when he wrote A Theory of Justice, was to present a superior alternative to utilitarianism. Rawls’s worry was that utilitarianism may fail to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of persons in its attempt to maximize total social welfare. Rawls’s main argument against utilitarianism was that, for such reasons, the representative parties in the original position will not choose utilitarianism, but will rather choose his justice as fairness, which he believed would securely protect the worth of everybody’s basic rights and liberties. In this paper, I will argue that, under close formal examination, Rawls’s argument against utilitarianism is self-defeating.That is, I will argue that Rawls’s own reasons, assumptions, and the many theoretical devices he employs demonstrably imply that the representative parties in the original position will choose utilitarianism instead of justice as fairness. I will show this through a formal model.
The Logic of Emptiness (6:40 pm - 8 pm)
Speaker: Koji Tanaka
From: Australian National University
URL: https://philpeople.org/profiles/koji-tanaka
Abstract: An error theorist about morality holds that it is an error to think that there are facts we can appeal to in making moral judgements and also it is an error to think that moral claims can be true. A global error theorist holds that it is an error to think that there are facts of any kind and no statement of any kind is true. The Buddhist philosophers, MÄdhyamikas, can be described as global error theorists. What, then, are we to make of their position that there are no facts or that there are no true statements? It seems to be self-refuting to say that it is a fact that there are no facts or that it is true that there are no truths. Even if one can make such claims coherent as MÄdhyamikas seem to think they can, how can anyone come to claim that there are no facts or truths to begin with? In this paper, I will investigate the possibility of a method that can establish global error theory. I will show that a global error theorist can have a coherent view about logic and reasoning that can show that there are, ultimately, no facts or truths of any kind.
Conceptuality and Mathematical Thinking in Aristotle: an Ancient Intervention into the McDowell-Dreyfus Debate (5 pm - 6:20 pm)
Speaker: Bronwyn Finnigan
From: Australian National University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/bronwynfinnigan/
Abstract: John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus argue that human beings have a capacity for ‘situation-specific skilful coping’. Both claim that they are articulating Aristotle’s notion of phronēsis or practical wisdom. And both insist that it is best understood as a kind of perceptual capacity. They disagree, however, about whether it is a form of conceptual rationality. I argue that neither provides an accurate analysis of Aristotle, but I consider whether there are textual grounds for extending Aristotle’s position to include McDowell’s idea that conceptuality is a rational capacity that informs perceptual experience. I derive an account from Aristotle’s debate with Plato on the nature and presuppositions of counting. This debate fundamentally concerns the boundary conditions for rationality. I argue that their differences imply distinct models of perceptual activity and I give reasons to think that Aristotle’s position corresponds broadly to that of McDowell. It has a problem, however. It implies that animals cannot perceive, or not in the same way as human beings, and there is reason to think that Aristotle thinks their perceptual capacities are structurally similar. I conclude by proposing a (partial) solution that is inspired by Plato’s views about the role of calculation in resolving inconsistencies in perception.
Trusting the Predictions of a Hypothesis vs Believing that the Hypothesis is True
Speaker: Olav Benjamin Vassend
From: Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/olavbvassend/home
Abstract: It is often reasonable to trust the predictions of a hypothesis that is known to be false. Indeed, as Forster and Sober (1994) emphasize, in the context of statistical model selection it is sometimes rational to trust the predictions of a known false model over the predictions of a known true model. Hence, the goal of identifying true hypotheses is distinct from the goal of identifying hypotheses that can be expected to be predictively accurate. The aim of my presentation is to show that the pursuit of truth and the pursuit of predictive accuracy in fact are governed by different rational norms. In particular, although degrees of belief ought to be updated through Bayesian conditionalization, degrees of trust ought instead to be updated through a different method that I call "Brier updating" (after (Brier 1950)). I argue that Brier updating has strong theoretical support and I show that it results in more accurate predictions than Bayesian conditionalization in simple simulation experiments. I then explore the philosophical implications of the arguments, including the upshot for scientific realism.
Epistemic Partiality, Epistemic Injustice, and Virtue Responsibilist Epistemology
Speaker: Rie Iizuka
From: University of Edinburgh
URL: https://www.ed.ac.uk/profile/rie-iizuka
Abstract: This paper addresss the issue of credibility attribution in friendship and its relation to virtue responsibilist epistemology. Sarah Stroud has claimed that we have an epistemic commitment to stick up for our friends. I apply Regina Riniʼs (2017) analysis of epistemic partisanship. According to Rini, partisan affiliation reflects a personʼs value commitments, such that it can make sense to give more credibility to people who share your political affiliation. However, an excess of credibility in friends can also be regarded as the reverse of an ad hominem argument. In agreement with Heather Battaly, I argue that such ad hominem arguments are legitimate from in the virtue epistemological light. However, the virtuous inquirers' credibility attribution towards friends should be much more restricted from what Stroud's has described.
Naming and Possibility
Speaker: Andre Bazzoni
From: LOGOS, University of Barcelona
URL: https://barcelona.academia.edu/Andr%C3%A9Bazzoni
Abstract: In this talk I will revisit some of the main topics in Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, with special emphasis on the rigidity thesis about the semantics of proper names, and its connections (or disconnections) with counterfactual thinking, as well as with metaphysical issues such as essentialism and the necessity of identity. Two notions of rigidity will be distinguished, one which I call ‘naive rigidity’ which is intuitive and neutral enough with respect to metaphysical commitments; and another which will be labelled ‘K-rigidity’, and which is (I will argue) the one that is actually operative in Kripke’s work -- at the very least, it is the one (and not naive rigidity) that gives room to all the topics that follow the rationale surrounding the rigidity thesis and the criticisms to descriptivist theories -- and the one that is metaphysically loaded. In the discussion, I will suggest that what makes Kripke depart from naive rigidity is the violation of an important methodological principle that he himself literally states in his rejection of a certain way of dealing with the philosophical notion of possible worlds -- he thus writes: “That is not the way we ordinarily think of counterfactual situations†(p. 44). I will turn this statement on him, and argue that the type of restrictions that K-rigidity imposes on our cognitive mechanism of ‘transposing’ objects across worlds and, relatedly, on the use of proper names, is actually in fundamental conflict with “the way we ordinarily think of counterfactual situationsâ€.
Introspective Error
Speaker: Andrew Y. Lee
From: New York University
URL: https://www.qualia.space
Abstract: This talk argues for two contrasting theses about introspective error. The first is global fallibility: no kind of introspective judgment is both infallible and epistemically significant. The second is evidential immunity: introspective (but not perceptual) judgments are immune to errors of evidence. I show how these two theses can be reconciled to yield a unified picture of the epistemology of experience. Along the way, I also argue that radical introspective error is possible, that we are acquainted with our own experiences, and that introspection is both direct and causally mediated. I also explain why there is an asymmetry between skepticism about the external world and skepticism about one’s current experience, why certain principles about the epistemology of introspection are false but tempting, and how these claims about introspective error relate to issues about justification and rationality.
Why Moral Risks Don't Matter
Speaker: Samuel Mortimer
From: Tokyo
URL: https://independent.academia.edu/SamuelAMortimer
Abstract: In this talk, I will discuss a particular kind of moral risk that some philosophers have identified recently. That is, the risk that we are wrong, not about the facts of a case, but about the moral evaluation of the facts—the risk that we might make a moral mistake, so to speak. Some philosophers argue that this kind of risk is not normatively inert: the fact that we could have made a moral mistake, coupled with how bad the consequences of making such a mistake would be, might give us a reason to avoid certain actions we otherwise think are morally unobjectionable. I will argue that such claims are false.
Concepts as Event Types
Speaker: Arvid Bave
From: Stockholm University
URL: https://www.philosophy.su.se/english/research/our-researchers/associated-researchers/arvid-båve-1.341524
Abstract: I here explore Wayne Davis's proposal that concepts and (Fregean) propositions are event types. I argue that this simple, if unobvious, proposal lends itself to an attractively simple yet powerful overall theory of concepts. By "concept", I mean "constituent of propositions" (as is commonplace in philosophy and psychology). I take all concepts to be either syntactically simple or complex. Each concept belongs to some syntactic category (predicative, propositional, individual, propositional-operator, and so on) and I take propositions, the objects of the attitudes, to be simply concepts of the propositional category. The theory says that: (1) Concepts are mental event types. (2) To undergo such a mental event is to entertain the relevant concept. (3) Complex concepts are actt-ypes of conjoining, in a certain sense, the concepts immediately involved in the concept in question.(4) A concept is individuated by its entertaining (i.e., undergoing) conditions, to the effect that it plays a certain inferential (conceptual, functional) role. (5) To possess a concept is to be able to entertain it. Its simplicity is partly due to the fact that (2)-(4) can be inferred from (or at least motivated by) claim (1) plus independently plausible assumptions.
Only Knowers Are Happy
Speaker: Brian Kim
From: Oklahoma State University
URL: https://philosophy.okstate.edu/people/faculty/20-faculty-directory/255-kim
Abstract: How does being a knower and possessing knowledge contribute to human flourishing? Many have assumed that the eudaimonic value of knowledge is exhausted by its role as either a means or a final end. On this basis, they have concluded that while there are contingent connections between well-being and knowledge, being a knower is not necessary for being happy. To expand our exploration of this question, I propose that we have overlooked how knowledge might contribute to well-being in virtue of being constitutive of certain eudaimonic goods. More specifically, I argue that if achievement is necessary for well-being, then knowledge is necessary for well-being by way of being necessary for achievement.
From Trust to Knowledge
Speaker: Leon Horsten
From: Bristol University
URL: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/school-of-arts/people/leon-f-horsten/index.html
Abstract: Wright has argued that entitlement to cognitive project constitutes an epistemic warrant for assuming anti-sceptical propositions (such as that there exists an external world). I will argue that entitlement of cognitive project is in fact strong enough to provide an epistemic warrant to *believe* such anti-sceptical propositions. I will explain how such warranted belief can emerge through a process of reflection.
Two Syllogisms in the Mozi: Chinese Logic and Language
Speaker: Byeong-uk Yi
From: University of Toronto
URL: http://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/byeong-uk-yi/
Abstract: This paper examines two syllogistic arguments contrasted in an ancient Chinese book, the Mozi, which expounds doctrines of the Mohist school of philosophers. While the arguments seem to have the same form, one of them (the one-horse argument) is valid but the other (the two-horse argument) is not. To explain this difference, the paper uses English plural constructions to formulate the arguments. Then it shows that the one-horse argument is valid because it is an instance of the plural cousin of a standard form of valid categorical syllogisms (Plural Barbara), and argues that the two-horse argument involves equivocal uses of a key predicate (the Chinese counterpart of `have four feet') that has the distributive/non-distributive ambiguity. In doing so, the paper discusses linguistic differences between Chinese and English and explains why the logic of plural constructions is applicable to Chinese arguments that involve no plural constructions.
In the Mood of Reasons
Speaker: Tanya Kostochka
From: University of Southern California, Los Angeles
URL: http://tkostochka.weebly.com
Abstract: There is a vast philosophical literature about the nature of emotions but there is very little discussion about the nature of moods. Indeed, moods are commonly brought up only to show how much more interesting emotions are in comparison. The key claim is that moods lack an interesting feature that emotions have: a connection to reasons. That is, emotions are said to be reasons-responsive and evaluable as appropriate or inappropriate while moods are said to lack both of these features. In this talk, I will explore this claim in more detail. I will argue that not only do moods have a connection to reasons, but it is the same kind of connection that emotions have. So, whatever explanation we posit of the connection between reasons and emotion, the same explanation needs to work for moods as well.
Doings and Things Done
Speaker: Istvan Zardai
From: Keio University
URL: https://keio.academia.edu/IstvanZoltanZardai
Abstract: That there is a distinction between doings and things done has been endorsed by several authors in philosophy of action during the last 90 years. However, there is no agreement on what purpose this distinction serves. John Macmurray uses it to distinguish between doing something and what has been done. In Georg Von Wright's work it separates bringing something about and what is brought about. For Jennifer Hornsby it highlights the difference between a particular instance of an action and the kind of action. Constantine Sandis puts it to a different use: he stresses the usefulness of the distinction for ethics, claiming that x (what is done) and the doing of x are two different objects of evaluation. While surveying these four positions I argue that Hornsby is right, and the important distinctions Macmurray, Von Wright, and Sandis highlight can be captured in more straightforward terms.
The Language of Reasons
Speaker: Adam Marushak
From: University of Pittsburgh
URL: http://www.adammarushak.com/
Abstract: There is a tension in recent work on normativity and normative language: it is widely held that the concept of a reason is our most fundamental normative concept, but most work on normative language concerns talk of obligation and value. My aim in this talk is to set out a general program for theorizing about the semantics of natural language talk of normative reasons. I will argue that reason-talk is a type of modal language, and I will use this thesis to put pressure on the two main approaches to the semantics of epistemic modals. I will conclude with a proposal for how to integrate the semantics of epistemic reasons and epistemic modals.
Ethics in a World of Women
Speaker: Clare Mac Cumhaill
From: Durham University
URL: https://www.dur.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/?id=11902
Abstract: G.E.M Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley and Iris Murdoch all emerged as key philosophical voices in analytic philosophy in the last century. What is little known, however, is the fact that they were all at Oxford during World War II, when many of the dons and male undergraduates were away. Even less noted is the fact that they were friends. I detail the academic world in which they found themselves in the early Forties, and I say a little about their unusual wartime education. I then go on to make a case that, when read collectively, there are grounds for reading the quartet as having a shared philosophical program, despite a number of notable differences. More provocatively, I outline a case for treating them as school.
The Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness to Personal Identity
Speaker: Yoshiyuki Hayashi
From: University of Tokyo
URL: http://researchmap.jp/yoshiyuki_hayashi/
Abstract: Some claim that if we lost phenomenal consciousness, that would affect our identity. In this talk, I argue that that is not the case. I examine various types of phenomenal approach to personal identity, according to which our existence is guaranteed by a stream of consciousness. I claim that any forms of it will ensure neither diachronic nor synchronic identity, citing thought experiments invoked by a subject with damages to area MT, and split-brain. I also draw some implications from this conclusion.
Some claim that if we lost phenomenal consciousness, that would affect our identity. In this talk, I argue that that is not the case. I examine various types of phenomenal approach to personal identity, according to which our existence is guaranteed by a stream of consciousness. I claim that any forms of it will ensure neither diachronic nor synchronic identity, citing thought experiments invoked by a subject with damages to area MT, and split-brain. I also draw some implications from this conclusion.
Making the Veil of Ignorance Work: Evidence from Survey Experiments
Speaker: Akira Inoue
From: University of Tokyo
URL: http://u-tokyo.academia.edu/AkiraInoue
Abstract: The impartial reasoning plays a pivotal role in discussing what justice is, or, more concretely, what a fair distribution is. On the impartial reasoning, contemporary theorists have emphasized the importance of keeping us from the information about who we are, e.g., our income class, with the aim of making unbiased judgments about a conception of justice. This way of depriving people of their personal information has a variety: the content and degree of the information deprivation varies depending on the conceptions of 'the veil of ignorance' among which John Rawls’s is the most famous and has been intensely debated. Importantly, the issue on the validity of the veil is queried not only on purely theoretical terms, but also on empirical terms: an experimental approach has been employed for testing the impartial reasoning to justice in terms of whether subjects truly follow it.
Our research aims to give empirical feedback on the impartial reasoning to justice by using online survey experiments. More specifically, our experimental studies focus on whether and how the different conceptions of the veil of ignorance and Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium affect real people's impartial reasoning to justice. We attend to the influence of the different experimental veils of ignorance and the experimental practice of reflective equilibrium---the well-known method of reconciling principled judgements and our considered judgments---on people’s reasoning to the difference principle (maximin), which Rawls took as the principle chosen behind his conception of the veil of ignorance and stably endorsed by the state of reflective equilibrium.
What Do Variables Mean in Nonlogical Inferences? --- A Logical Inferentialist Expressivist Reply to Russell's Paradox on Variables
Speaker: Shuhei Shimamura
From: Nihon University
URL: http://researchmap.jp/sshimamura/?lang=english
Abstract: What do variables mean? This question is known to perplex Russell (and his followers), who believes that the meaning of a name is its referent and that a variable is a name. One natural way out of this impasse is to think that a variable is not actually a name, but rather a (part of) logical operator, and that the meaning of a logical operator is explained by specifying its inferential role instead of its referent. In this talk, I shall pursue this inferentialist line of reply to Russell's paradox on variables. First, I argue that the standard inferential rules for the universal quantifier in familiar proof systems (e.g., NJ and LJ) are flawed for the following reason: In the presence of (some) nonlogical axioms, they do not satisfy a condition that is supposed to be essential for the meaning of the universal. Second, I propose an alternative proof system, QNM, which circumvents this problem. Finally, based on the relevant inferential rules of QNM, I offer a Brandomian logical inferentialist expressivist explanation of the meanings of variables and universals.
Quine's Critical Turn? `Truth by Convention' and Conceptual Pragmatism
Speaker: Rob Sinclair
From: Soka University
URL: http://fila.soka.ac.jp/en/faculty_sinclair.html
Abstract: Quine's `Truth by Convention' (TC) has often been presented as containing the seeds of his later more radical criticisms of analyticity. Others have challenged this view arguing that TC does not contain any criticism of Carnap's position, but offers a carefully constructed request for further clarification concerning the conventional status of mathematics and logic. These and other studies all highlight the way Quine's famous criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction developed slowly in stages, with Quine maintaining a stalwart conviction that an adequate scientific clarification of analytic truth remained forthcoming. My presentation tries to further our understanding of some of the historical episodes in this development. It summarizes recent work discussing C.I. Lewis's pragmatic conception of the a priori as Quine’s main critical target in TC. It further attempts to locate this critical stance within Lewis's conceptual pragmatism, by examining Quine's unpublished graduate papers and other work from this period. Further support is given for the view that Quine's appropriation of Lewis's pragmatic, conventional conception of the a priori is used both as a critical tool, and as playing a positive constructive role in our justification of both the conventional and non-conventional aspects of science.
Two Ways of Making the Social World
Speaker: Brian Epstein
From: Tufts University
URL: https://epstein.org/
Abstract: This talk sets out an organizing framework for the field of social ontology---the study of the nature of the social world. I discuss the subject matter of social ontology, and present a model aiming to clarify a variety of projects that have been traditionally confused with one another. The model helps explain and situate, for instance, varieties of individualism, theories of the building blocks of the social world, and theories of convention and collective intentionality. It is built on the distinction between two different inquiries: the study of the grounding of social facts, and the study of how social categories are "anchored" or set up. In the talk I explore these inquiries and discuss some applications.
Naive Realism and Hallucination as Involuntary Sensory Imagination
Speaker: Takuya Niikawa
From: Chiba University & Fuji Women's University
URL: https://chiba-u.academia.edu/TakuyaNiikawa
Abstract: Naïve realism is a view about perceptual experiences, according to which the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience is constituted by the subject's perceiving an environmental object with perceptible properties. One task for naïve realists to tackle is to explain total and causally matching hallucinations (shortly perfect hallucinations). In this talk, I will argue that naïve realists should adopt a radical version of the imagination view of hallucination (RIH), which states that not only actual hallucinations but also hypothetical perfect hallucinations are involuntary sensory imagination with imaginative phenomenology rather than perceptual phenomenology. My argument consists of the following three parts. First, I will argue that perfect hallucinations can be plausibly counted as belonging to the mental category of sensory imagination, despite the fact that they differ significantly from typical sensory imaginations. Second, I will argue that RIH has the potential of explaining the introspective indiscriminability of a perfect hallucination from a corresponding veridical perception. Third, I will defend RIH from the screening-off argument, which M. G. F. Martin presented as a case against positive disjunctivism.
Informal Logic and the Logic of Provability
Speaker: Hidenori Kurakawa
From: Kanazawa University
URL: https://ridb.kanazawa-u.ac.jp/public/detail_en.php?id=4634&page=2&org1_cd=585000
Abstract: It is often stated that S4 modal logic is a logic whose necessity operator expresses a certain notion of provability. However, it is also well-known that the necessity operator in S4 cannot be interpreted as the notion of formal provability in a fixed formal system of arithmetic such as Peano Arithmetic (PA) due to Godel's incompleteness theorem. As a result, the necessity operator of S4 is usually interpreted as "informal provability." Finding out a way of talking about the necessity operator of S4 that is compatible with PA turned out to be difficult. In order to understand better the relationship between S4 and PA, Sergei Artemov introduced the Logic of Proofs (LP) around 15 years ago. LP is an "explicit" modal logic in which we have formulas with proof-terms (of form t:A, interpreted as "t is a proof of A") instead of formulas with the necessity operator. In particular, due to a theorem called "the realization theorem," LP can make explicit those structures of "proofs" which are implicit in the necessity operator of S4. Roughly, this theorem establishes the fact the structure of a S4 proof and that of a LP are essentially the same. Nevertheless, one of the outstanding features of LP is that, unlike S4, LP has a sound and complete arithmetic interpretation with respect to PA. Moreover, Artemov argues that via the Godel translation from intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC) into S4, LP establishes a precise connection between IPC and PA. Combining these results, he argues that, at least to some extent, we can give a formal account of the intended but informal semantics for intuitionistic logic that is known as Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation, which gives an interpretation of intuitionistic logical constants in terms of "constructive proofs."
In this talk, we revisit LP and give some philosophical reflections on these results for LP from the viewpoint of "informal provability." Our discussions will be based on conceptual analyses of both the notion of "informal provability" and that of "constructive proofs." We try to give at least a partial answer to a general question, "in what sense does LP give a formal account of BHK interpretation?" In particular, we do this by addressing the following questions. i) What is informal provability? ii) In what sense is S4 (LP) a logic of informal provability (proofs), respectively? iii) What role does the Godel translation play in Artemov's account of BHK interpretation? iv) Which aspects of constructive proofs does LP give an account of? We also give a survey of those technical results for LP which are pertinent to our philosophical discussions.
Narration in Judiciary Fact-Finding: A Probabilistic Explication
Speaker: Rafal Urbaniak
From: Ghent University
URL: http://ugent.academia.edu/RafalUrbaniak
Abstract: One of the alternatives to legal probabilism (the view that juridical fact- nding should be modeled using Bayesian methods) is the narration view, according to which instead we should conceptualize the process in terms of competing narrations of what happened. The goal of this paper is to develop a reconciliatory account, on which the narration view is construed from the Bayesian perspective within the framework of formal Bayesian epistemology.
Irreflexive Similarity: Another Solution to the Sorites Paradox
Speaker: Shimpei Endo
From: ILLC, University of Amsterdam
URL: https://www.illc.uva.nl/MScLogic/people/show_person.php?Person_id=Endo+S.
Abstract: The sorites paradox (i.e. the bald man paradox, paradox of heap) leads to a contradiction from (seemingly) plausible assumptions such as tolerance principle (n hair and n+1 hair are similar with respect to baldness). This paper will outline a new solution to this paradox. I will focus on which any other previous attempts have accepted for granted: reflexivity of similarity. Similarity is usually understood as a binary relation which is symmetric, non-transitive, and reflexive (i.e. x is similar to x itself, for whatever x). I cast a doubt on this reflexivity; There might be something which is not similar to itself (non-reflexive similarity). Even further, it may be that nothing is similar to itself (irreflexive similarity). My talk will begin with a technical argument to see how non-reflexive/irreflexive similarity can block the Sorites paradox. Next, I defend the existence of an object that is not similar to itself. Furthermore, I will discuss connections with my solution and previous attempts, especially Priest's paraconsistent and Williamson's epistemic approaches.
alarm/will/sound: Identification, Perception, Characterisation, and Interaction Design of Modified Car Alarm Systems
Speaker: Alex Sigman
From: iCLA, YGU
URL: http://lxsigman.com
Abstract: alarm/will/sound is a collaborative artistic and scientific research project, undertaken since 2013 by Alexander Sigman (composer/researcher), Stuttgart-based artist/product designer Matthias Megyeri, and Institut de Recherche et Coordination Artistique/Music (IRCAM) Sound Perception and Design researcher Nicolas Misdariis. Encompassing the domains of sound perception, acoustic modeling, and sound, product, and interaction design, alarm/wil/sound has addressed not only on the repurposing of the audible car alarm, a device that has become more of a nuisance than an effective deterrent in recent decades, but also on the human response to static and dynamic auditory warnings in general, and on the role of the alarm in delineating perceived boundaries between public and private space. Once the salient phases and goals of the project have been outlined, this talk will focus on perceptuo-cognitive issues surrounding (and motivating) the research, and philosophical implications thereof.
From Chaos to Reality: How Carnap Built Worlds in the 1920s
Speaker: Thomas Mormann
From: University of the Basque Country
URL: http://www.ehu.eus/es/web/miguelsanchezmazaskatedra/praxis/people/members/mormann
Abstract: Rudolf Carnap's first opus magnum The Logical Construction of the World (Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, 1928) aimed for a characterization of the world in terms of a minimal vocabulary, from which all concepts of all sciences could be defined. In Carnap's own - Neo-Kantian jargon - the Aufbau aimed at the construction of a comprehensive constitutional system for all sciences (at least in principle) within a single comprehensive formal system the only primitives of which were the concepts of elementary experiences and (recollection of) similarity.
Since the incisive criticisms of Quine, Goodman, and others the Aufbau project has been considered by many as definitely failed. The aim of this talk is to show that this verdict may have been premature. In particular, I’d like to show that Carnap's attempt of applying his notorious method of "quasi-analysis" to the task of defining properties (or qualities) in terms of similarity does not fall prey to Goodman's "difficulties". To argue for this claim some new mathematical devices are introduced (not available to Goodman), and some arguments are taken into account that can be unearthed from some of Carnap's early unpublished manuscripts of the 1920s in which he dealt with various issues of "world-building".
Person Perception and Predictive Processing
Speaker: Ryoji Sato
From: The University of Tokyo
URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ryoji_Sato
Abstract: We encounter many people in daily life—family, friends, colleagues, shop staff, random pedestrians, etc. When it comes to familiar people, it seems that we can directly perceive their identity. When you see your close friend at a bar, your recognition of him or her is instant and has a perceptual feel (e.g., “I saw Joeâ€). Most of the time, you don’t need to consciously infer who the person is based on their physical properties; you just know. This aspect is more dramatically highlighted by the existence of disorders of person identification: misidentification syndromes. For example, patients with Capgras delusion, a version of misidentification, typically insist that a close friend or family member has been replaced by an imposter, despite that person not having changed in appearance. Capgras patients admit the similarity of the alleged imposter, yet they insist that the person before them is a different person from the familiar person.
The duual pathway account of person recognition has been popular in the field, but the informational aspect of emotional pathway is rather unexplored. When it is working properly, what kind of information is obtained through the pathway, in other words, what information is lost when the emotional pathway is disrupted? I first discuss William Hirstein’s mindreading account, which argues misidentification syndrome is due to disruption in the mechanism of assigning affective mental representations to other persons. As a response to Hirstein’s view, Elisabeth Pacherie proposed and briefly discussed a view according to which disruption in temporal aspects of person perception plays a significant role in misidentification syndrome. This paper attempts to develop her view in further details and proposes a hierarchical model of a person that can integrate perspective of Hirstein’s and Pacherie’s based on predictive processing framework. I will also argue for perceptual nature of person identification. Identification of a person is thought to be a sophisticated cognitive act-- it seems to require a subject to have the concept of the particular person and integrate relevant information about his/her appearance and how he or she behaves etc. under the concept. Despite its sophistication, person identification is, at least in some familiar cases, phenomenologically direct. This paper supports perceptual account of person identification from a functional point of view.
A spatiotemporal model of consciousness: Can we replace the mind-body problem by the world-brain problem?
Speaker: Georg Northoff
From: University of Ottawa
URL: http://www.georgnorthoff.com/
Abstract: There is much debate about consciousness and mental features in general in both neuroscience and philosophy. However, despite intense debates, both empirical mechanisms and ontological characterization of mental features remain unclear. I here suggest a novel approach to mental features, namely a spatiotemporal approach that can account for both empirical mechanisms and ontological characteristics of mental features. My main argument is that mental features are intrinsically spatiotemporal in that they reflect the construction of time and space by the brain in relation to time and space in both body and world. Empirically, consciousness can be related to the capacity of the brain's spontaneous activity to construct its own "inner time and space". While ontologically, mental features presuppose an ontology that focuses on relation and structure as constructed in spatiotemporal terms. This leads to ontic Structural realism (OSR) of mental features which must be distinguished from the traditional property-based ontology with the assumption of mental and/or physical properties. OSR of mental features considers the relation between world and brain in spatiotemporal terms which makes it possible to establish necessary connection between world-bran relation and mental features. I therefore consider world-brain relation including its spatiotemporal features as necessary condition of possible consciousness, i.e., ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC). I conclude that the question for mental features can ontologically be addressed in terms of world-brain relation rather than mind-body relation -- the mind-body problem may consecutively be replaced by what I describe as "world-brain problem".
Troubles with Constitutivism in Epistemology (and Ethics)
Speaker: Masahiro Yamada
From: Claremont Graduate University
URL: https://www.cgu.edu/people/masahiro-yamada/
Abstract: Suppose belief has a built-in norm: somehow, it is constitutive of belief that it is subject to that norm. For instance, suppose that the constitutive norm of belief is that a belief is correct only if it is true. Some people argue that appealing to such a constitutive norm of belief can explain various features of epistemic norms such as the apparent fact that justification supervenes on facts `internal' to the epistemic agent (Ralph Wedgwood), or the apparent fact that only evidence can justify a belief (Nishi Shah). This is an instance of the more general idea that features of normative facts are to be explained by appeal to some constitutive norms: for instance, some argue that moral norms are to be explained through constitutive norms governing action. In this talk, I will argue that there are in fact two distinct types of constitutive norms that philosophers appeal to and that neither can on its own do the job constitutive norms are supposed to do. I will then use this insight to suggest how one might improve upon the arguments in the epistemological case but also highlight some serious difficulties.
World 3 and Methodological Individualism in Popper’s Thought
Speaker: Francesco Di Iorio
From: Nankai University
URL: https://francesco-di-iorio.com/
Abstract: Popper’s theory of World 3 is often regarded as incongruent with his defense of methodological individualism. I shall criticize this widespread view. Methodological individualism is said to be at odds with three crucial assumptions of the theory of World 3: (a) the impossibility of reducing World 3 to subjective mental states because it exists objectively, (b) the view that the mental functions cannot be explained by assuming that individuals are isolated atoms, and (c) the idea that World 3 has causal power and influences both individual minds and actions. I shall demonstrate that the inconsistency thesis stems from a confusion between methodological individualism as understood by Popper and reductionism. The reasons for this confusion shall be analyzed and clarified. I shall argue that two variants of methodological individualism can be distinguished, and that unlike psychologistic individualism, Popper’s nonatomistic individualism is fully consistent with his theory of World 3.
The New Bodily View: A New Problem Solver?
Speaker: Rina Tzinman
From: Bilkent University
URL: http://rinatzinman.weebly.com/
Abstract: I will defend a view according to which I am a composite object partly composed of a human animal, and partly of property parts (tropes). I will show that this view (which, for reasons I will spell out, I will call the "New Bodily View") allows us to keep the intuitions that motivate constitutionalism about personal identity, and doesn't face the puzzles that constitution views face. After presenting the basics of the view, I will show how it deals with two widely discussed problems about persons and thinking things in their vicinity: the Thinking Animal Puzzle and the Thinking Parts Puzzle. I will also show that its ability to give a unified solution to these puzzles provides us with a positive argument for the New Bodily View.
Practical Reasons as Appropriate Value Responses (non-standard day: MONDAY!)
Speaker: Joerg Loeschke
From: University of Bern
URL: http://www.philosophie.unibe.ch/about_us/staff/loeschke/index_eng.html
Abstract: In recent years, there has been extensive discussion of the so-called Buck-Passing Account of Value (BPA), according to which reasons have conceptual priority over values. While many authors accept BPA, its shortcomings have become clear by now, and they have triggered new interest in developing value-based theories of reasons. In this talk, I will present one way to spell out such a value-based theory of reasons, namely the view of practical reasons as Appropriate Value Responses (AVR). According to AVR, an agent has a reason to P; iff his P-ing would constitute an appropriate response to some agent-neutral value V. After motivating AVR and defending it against two possible objections, I will explain two important features of the view: that it accommodates agent-relative reasons even if it understands value as agent-neutral, and that it offers a two-level theory of moral requirements.
The Flow of Time (Note updated time: 5-7pm)
Speaker: Giuliano Torrengo
From: University of Milan
URL: http://dipartimento.filosofia.unimi.it/index.php/giuliano-torrengo
Abstract: Everybody agrees that, in some sense, time flows. However, metaphysicians disagree on whether this common sensical aspect of our experience latches on to some genuine, mind-independent feature of reality. Explaining how reality is like if time really flows is both tricky and deep. On the one hand, it is difficult to pin down what the distinction between someone who believes that time really passes and someone who does not is; on the other hand, skepticism towards the substantivity of the debate is a difficult to defend position. In this paper, I explore several strategies to put the issue in the clear. I will suggest that the most promising one is one that encodes what I call vanilla-genuine, rather than robust, passage.
Ensemble Perception, Perceptual Judgement and the Contents Of Visual Experience (NOTE: Updated Time)
Speaker: Tim Bayne
From: Monash University
URL: https://monash.academia.edu/TimBayne
Abstract: Recently, philosophers of mind have been exercised by a debate about the `admissible contents of perceptual experience'. The issue, roughly put, concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. It is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. This paper argues that `ensemble properties'--features that belong to a set of perceptible objects as a whole as opposed to the individuals that constitute that set--can figure in the contents of visual perception.
The Feet of Clay Underlying Bertrand Russell's Critiques of Idealism
Speaker: Javier Perez Jara
From: Beijing Foreign Studies University
URL: https://es.linkedin.com/in/javier-p%25C3%25A9rez-jara-67918363
Abstract: Bertrand Russell is one of the central figures in the historical development of analytic philosophy. Russell's ontology and theory of knowledge are often understood in contrast to other philosophical approaches such as idealism, existentialism, Marxism or Christian philosophy. Among Russel's criticisms to other philosophical approaches, his critiques to idealist and monistic philosophies, such as F. H. Bradley's and T. H. Green's, are usually highlighted by historians of philosophy. Nevertheless, my paper argues that Russell's critique of ontological and epistemological idealism is by no means definitive.
Russell's critique can only be understood in terms of his theory of matter and mind, a theory which underwent several changes. Nevertheless, my paper shows that Russell holds at every stage of his philosophical development that idealist premises are indeed ontologically possible, even the most radical ones such as Berkeley's. In Russell's philosophy, the problem of the external world is hence relegated to the issue of beliefs and probabilities. Furthermore, when he accepts neutral monism as a possible solution to the problem of mind and matter, Russell ends up holding a mentalist position which is at times as radical as Mach's.
My conclusion is that Russell's worldview is not as far-removed from idealism as many scholars think. Thanks to this revaluation of Russell's philosophy, I hope to contribute to modern debates about Russell's influence in current analytic philosophy.
The Epistemology of Generative Memory
Speaker: Kourken Michaelian
From: University of Otago
URL: http://phil-mem.org/
Abstract: Memory has been claimed to be epistemically generative--generative of new knowledge--in several distinct senses. Inter alia, it has been claimed (first-order generationism) that memory can generate new knowledge by providing the subject with with first-order information about an event that does not originate in his experience of the event, and it has been claimed (second-order generationism) that memory can generate new knowledge by providing the subject with second-order information to the effect that his first-order information about an event originates in his experience of the event. Together, first-order and second-order generationism seem to lead to the conclusion that episodic memory is systematically misleading and therefore unable to provide us with knowledge at all. This talk explores several potential responses to this problem. Should we reject first-order generationism? Should we reject second-order generationism? Or should we perhaps accept them both, grant that memory is systematically misleading, but maintain that this misleadingness is epistemically innocent?
"To Dress Up a Truism in High-flown Language": McDowell and the Identity Theory of Truth (Note: starts at 4pm)
Speaker: Giovanna Miolli
From: University of Padova
URL: https://unipd.academia.edu/GiovannaMiolli
Abstract: Is it possible to argue that truth is identical with reality? What does it mean to say that a thought content (namely, a proposition) is true if and only if it is identical with a real content (namely, a fact)? It is within this problematic framework that the so-called identity theories of truth try to give an account of what truth is. In the first part of my talk, I will offer a survey of the main positions within this "family" of theories, investigating the problem of the mind-world relation. In part two, I will focus on the notions of "identity" and "thought content" as understood within these theories. I will explain the theoretical problems they give rise to. In the last part, moving from this background, I will present McDowell's position and show how his reflections can help us problematize some aspects in which the identity theories get stuck.
Different Ways to Appreciate Music
Speaker: Tohru Genka
From: University of Tokyo
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/tohrugenka/
Abstract: Music is the artwork of sounds, and sounds are what we hear. So, it is natural to think that when we appreciate music, we should pay attention to only sounds. In this talk, I will argue that such a way of music appreciation is sometimes wrong both psychologically and aesthetically. My talk is based on three considerations. Firstly, the psychological consideration is multi-modality of perception. The perceptual system integrates information picked up by each of the sense modalities (O'Callaghan 2012). And multi-modal perception is also used in appreciation of artworks (Nanay 2012). In appreciating musical performance, we perceive various non-auditory properties, for example, we see an arm movement during playing, and feel sound pressure. Secondly, the aesthetic consideration is aesthetic supervenience (Levinson 1984). Aesthetic property (being graceful, garish, dynamic, etc.) of things is based on, and emerges from its non-aesthetic properties (color, shape, tone, etc.). By virtue of this relation, if we misperceive non-aesthetic properties, we also misperceive aesthetic properties. Together with the first and second considerations; it follows that aesthetic property of musical performance depends on not only auditory but also visual and tactile properties, and that if we want to perceive aesthetic properties of music appropriately, we should not ignore non-auditory properties of the performance. But this claim is true of only musical performance. Thirdly, a further aesthetic consideration is the distinction between live and recorded music (Taniguchi 2010). They are different art forms in the same sense that cinema and theater are different. Different ways of appreciation are needed to appreciate different art forms, and multi-modal appreciation is not needed for recorded music.
The Knowledge Argument: The Deaf Person Case (Different venue: Building 14, Floor 7, R. 710)
Speaker: Adriana Renero
From: The Graduate Center, CUNY
URL: http://adrianarenero.wixsite.com/philosophy
Abstract: Central contributions to the philosophy of mind by Saul Kripke include well-known refutations of physicalism: the type-type identity theory, e.g. a mental state (a pain) is identical to a physical state (C-fiber stimulation). In 1979 spring lectures at Princeton University, Kripke offers an argument against physicalism via a thought experiment in the auditory domain which has remained unexplored. Kripke claims that the physicalist thesis that "one who knows all the physical truths--or all the physical facts--knows everything" is false. He argues that all the physical truths do not determine the complete truths of the world. He provides an interesting picture of the auditory domain to show the limits of physicalism. I rebuild several cases of deaf people that he provides and adapt those cases into one single case: the deaf person case against physicalism (or "anaudism"). I claim that Kripke's argument is a precursor of Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument against physicalism" i.e. the often-quoted "Mary case" or the blind-color person (1982). I argue that Kripke's deaf person case is more persuasive than Jackson's Mary case. Kripke offers a novel picture of auditory descriptions for the phenomenal character of auditory experiences. I close by showing central parallels of Kripke and Jackson's arguments and I stress important aspects that Jackson's argument misses. (This talk is jointly hosted by TFAP and the Tokyo Colloquium for Cognitive Philosophy (TCCP).)
Content in Embedding Environments
Speaker: Ryohei Takaya
From: Keio University
URL: http://researchmap.jp/r_takaya/?lang=english
Abstract: In this talk, I will examine the assumption that the compositional semantic value of a sentence in a context is identical to its assertoric content (IDENTITY), and conclude that rejecting IDENTITY is a better way to theorize semantics. Although this assumption is an orthodox view in philosophy of language, we will face with alleged counterexamples when trying to explain embedding environments about tense, location, personal taste, and so on. How to avoid this problem and retain IDENTITY? I will discuss two solutions: adopting extensional treatments and revising compositionality. First option, which is popular in formal semantics, is a general solution to the problem. Theorists adopting this option claim that by using quantifiers and variables in object language instead of intensional operators, desired contents can be described without denying IDENTITY. Second option is much less popular, but still attractive for proponents of IDENTITY. According to this view, we can stipulate a weaker compositionality by which embedding problems disappear. I will claim that both cannot explain away the problems even if they seem so at a first glance. My discussion will concentrate mostly on arguments against IDENTITY, but I will finish the talk with suggesting a positive effect of rejecting it.
Sense and Judgment (Note: Talk will start later, at 7 pm!)
Speaker: Robert May
From: UCDavis
URL: http://philosophy.ucdavis.edu/people/rcmay
Abstract: Hardly anything in Frege is more broadly known than his account of identity statements, the idea that understanding ``a = b'' requires recognizing that ``a'' and ``b'' express different senses. What is innovative about Frege's account (relative to his contemporaries) is his denial that the issue is about propositional content. Rather, the issue is cognitive -- how we, as agentive thinkers recognize the difference in content and the role this recognition plays in our judging the truth of identities. The importance of Frege's framing of the identity puzzle is that it shifts the issue from being about the validity of logicism to a general issue of scientific knowledge. Central to Frege's view is his carefully distinguishing the process of making a judgement from the product of that act, a judgement. Sense is to be understood in this context, but properly understanding this notion requires teasing apart sense as an objective mode of determination of an object and sense as a mode of presentation, a cognitive state of thinkers who have grasped senses. The paper concludes with a discussion of whether Frege has an account of ``a = a'', even supposing that he does have an account of ``a = b''.
Knowing What It Is Like and Testimony
Speaker: Yuri Cath
From: La Trobe University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/yuricath/
Abstract: Can I know what it is like to deliver a stand-up comedy routine, give birth to a child, or go to war, without having had those experiences myself? Is it possible to gain this `what it is like'-knowledge by reading stories or talking with the experienced? Philosophers often hold a pessimistic attitude towards this possibility on the grounds that, normally, one can only know what it is like to have an experience if one has had an experience of that same type oneself (Lewis 1998, Paul 2014). And endorsements of this pessimistic attitude can also be found in novels, films, and pop music. But, I shall argue, a puzzle now arises because there are also countless examples of everyday practices and judgments that testify to our holding an optimistic attitude towards this same possibility. In this paper I explore how this puzzle can be illuminated and potentially dissolved by appealing to recent work in epistemology (on the linguistic meaning and form of knowledge-wh ascriptions) and the philosophy of mind (on `what it is like'-knowledge and empathy). I will also discuss a better understanding of this puzzle might help us to evaluate recent arguments by Paul (2014, 2015) concerning `what it is like'-knowledge and transformative choices.
Aboutness and Imagination
Speaker: Franz Berto
From: University of Amsterdam
URL: http://www.uva.nl/over-de-uva/organisatie/medewerkers/content/b/e/f.berto/f.berto.html
Abstract: We present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fine's works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmers' positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situation - a configuration of objects and properties - verifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to intentional states. The proposed formal framework combines a modal semantics with a mereology of contents: imagination operators are understood as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a content-preservation constraint.
Attributing Attitudes to the Confused
Speaker: Chris Tancredi
From: Keio University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/christophertancredi/home
Abstract: It is a common occurrence to find a person who has a misunderstanding of some particular word. When that happens, their understanding of the word affects how we attribute attitudes to them. If John thinks that the word ``prime'' means being equal to the cube of some number minus 1, I can easily say ``John thinks 26 is prime'' while at the same time acknowledging ``John knows 26 to have four factors''. There is no contradiction in my statement, and nor does my statement attribute a contradiction to John. In this talk I propose an analysis of this phenomenon. The core idea of the analysis is that for certain attributions, it is necessary to adjust the meanings of some of the words we use to make their meaning conform to the meaning we take the attitude holder to give to them. I show the necessity of such an analysis by showing that alternative analyses -- particularly de re, de dicto, and de qualitate analyses -- fail to predict the observed facts that this analysis explains. The analysis proposed is semantic in nature, not pragmatic, and the need for it to be semantic will also be argued.
Gradability, Vagueness, and Incommensurability
Speaker: Richard Dietz
From: University of Tokyo
URL: http://www.richarddietz.net/index.php
Abstract: This talk brings to bear an idea from value theory to the natural language semantics of gradable adjectives. Delineationists about gradability claim that the meaning of comparatives is reducible to the meaning of embedded gradable adjectives (Kamp; Klein; van Benthem; van Rooij; Burnett). On the other hand, it has been argued that in so-called cases of parity, pairs of items may be comparable with respect to a covering value even if they determinately fail to instantiate the trichotomy of being either better, worse, or equal (Parfit; Griffin; Chang; Gert; Rabinowicz). I will argue that delineationism fails to supply sufficient means of accommodating cases of parity.
Anaphora in Attitude Contexts: An Internalist Approach
Speaker: Naoya Fujikawa
From: Tokyo Metropolitan University
URL: http://tmu-jp.academia.edu/NaoyaFujikawa
Abstract: In this talk, I propose a semantic analysis of indefinite NPs and anaphoric pronouns in attitude contexts, in particular, cases of intentional identity exemplified by `Hob believes that a witch blighted Bob's mare. Nob thinks that she killed Cob's sow' (cf. Geach, 1967). Based on the idea in the literature of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) that discourse referents are mental representations of entities (cf. Kamp, Genabith, and Reyle, 2011), I make the following two points: (a) Indefinites and pronouns appearing in attitude contexts introduce what I call meta discourse referents, discourse referents of discourse referents; (b) what underlies anaphoric links between indefinites and pronouns in attitude contexts can be a certain `psychological' relation ---coordination--- between discourse referents, which is represented by using meta discourse referents in DRSs. I give an implementation of these points in DRT and compare it with the view proposed by Kamp et al. (2011).
Reference
Geach, P. T. (1967). ``Intentional Identity'', Journal of Philosophy, 64: 20, 627-632.
Kamp, H., J. van Genabith, and U. Reyle (2011). Discourse Representation Theory, in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume 15, Springer, pp. 125-394.
Plato on the Metaphysical Foundations of Truth
Speaker: Blake Hestir
From: Texas Christian University
URL: http://philosophy.tcu.edu/faculty-and-staff/blake-hestir/
Abstract: In the Sophist, Plato claims that statement and judgment involve doing something with words and thoughts, respectively, namely asserting or denying, and assertions and denials are either true or false. I argue that although Plato's conception of truth captures the basic correspondence intuition that a statement is true only if there is something in the world in virtue of which it is true, his view lacks a commitment to a correspondence relation between statements and facts or states of affairs that obtain or objects. At the heart of this conception is a particular account of the mechanism of being in predication. The consistency of his metaphysical realism with his conception of truth is one that some philosophers may find more attractive and intuitive than strict minimalist or deflationary views that eschew metaphysics altogether and deny that there is anything significant or interesting to say about truth beyond the platitude `p' is true if and only if p. Finally, I argue that Plato thinks that truth is a legitimate property and substantive, albeit atypical, what one might think of as a second order property.
Responsibility for Care
Speaker: Kevin Craven
From: University of Michigan
URL: http://lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/people/graduate-students/kcraven.html
Abstract: Care work is socially necessary work. Each of us needs care in childhood and in times of infirmity, and each of us relies on others receiving care when they need it. For this reason, a society cannot leave unanswered the question of who is responsible for providing care. One common answer to this question is what I will call 'the internalization model.' On this model, responsibility for care attaches primarily to the (marital, biological, nuclear) family. I argue that the internalization model's tendency to contain responsibility within the boundaries of the family represents a serious deficiency: it provides an ideological justification for dominant groups' closing ranks and monopolizing vital resources, thereby maintaining inequalities. In response, I offer an alternative model -- 'the distribution model' -- on which responsibility for care is a shared responsibility falling upon society as a whole. This model avoids the problems of the internalization model while retaining its virtues. In making my argument, I appeal to historical cases in which (something like) each of the two models seems to be at work. These cases suggest that the internalization model comes to the fore when a dominant group's control of resources is threatened, and that the distribution model comes to prominence under conditions of social solidarity. This observation both supports my claims regarding the ideological function of the internalization model and clarifies some challenges facing any attempt to put the distribution model into practice.
A New Semantic Characterization of Logical Constants
Speaker: Tomoya Sato
From: University of California, San Diego
URL: http://acsweb.ucsd.edu/~tosato/Tomoya_Sato/index.html
Abstract: Characterizing logical constants is necessary for characterizing logically valid arguments. The boundary between logically valid and invalid arguments varies according to a demarcation between logical and non-logical terms: some argument is logically valid under one demarcation and invalid under another demarcation. In the contemporary model-theoretic approach to logic, logical constants have been characterized using the concepts of invariance and similarity relation: a term is logical if its characteristic function is invariant under "appropriate" similarity relations among objects. Regarding what similarity relations are appropriate, several candidates have been proposed, and as a result, there are several theories available. In this presentation, I will introduce a new characterization of logical constants based on a new similarity relation. Prior to the introduction, I will provide a brief summary of the literature and explain the importance of the study of logical constants.
Measurement-Theoretic Foundations of Observational-Predicate Logic
Speaker: Satoru Suzuki
From: Komazawa University
URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Satoru_Suzuki7
Abstract: Vagueness is a ubiquitous feature that we know from many expressions in natural languages.
It can invite a serious problem: the Sorites Paradox.
The Phenomenal Sorites Paradox is a version of the Sorites Paradox, where observational predicates occur.
According to Raffman (2000), we can classify perceptual indiscriminability as follows: (1) s-Indiscriminability: perceptual indiscriminability in the statistical sense, and (2) d-Indiscriminability: perceptual indiscriminability in the non-statistical (dispositional) sense.
The Tolerance Principle on s-Indiscriminability can be false because the objects that are the same may often be recognized discriminable by an examinee A of limited ability of discrimination and the objects that are different may often be recognized indiscriminable by A.
The aim of this talk is to propose a new version of logic for observational predicates---Observational-Predicate Logic (OPL)---that can express formally this solution to the Phenomenal Sorites Paradox on s-Indiscriminability and makes it possible to reason about observational predicates.
To accomplish this aim, we provide the language of OPL with a statistical model in terms of measurement theory.
Intellectual Autonomy and Understanding
Speaker: Kunimasa Sato
From: Keiai University
URL: http://miamikunickham.wix.com/kunickham
Abstract: This presentation will focus on the role of competence at understanding as it bears on interpersonal justification. Specifically, I will first delineate the dialectical nature of argumentative exchange by developing the notion of a chain of arguments, thus construing it as a form of interpersonal justification. I will then demonstrate that "understanding competence" is a fundamental constituent of intellectual autonomy.
Strong Truth Pluralism (R. 315, Hobun 1, see Building 31 on: www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/content/400020145.pdf)
Speaker: Nikolaj Jang Lee Pedersen
From: Yonsei University
URL: http://www.nikolajpedersen.com/
Abstract: According to strong alethic pluralism truth is Many, not One. For each domain D, there is some property F such that a D-proposition's being true is identical to its being F. For example, for propositions about riverbanks truth simply is correspondence with reality, and for propositions about the law truth simply is coherence with the body of law. Across domains truth is identified with distinct properties, meaning that there is no truth property that applies to any proposition whatsoever, regardless of domain. This amounts to giving up on the idea of truth-as-such, one of the distinctive features of moderate truth pluralism. This paper has three aims. The first aim is to present and develop a novel form of strong alethic pluralism and to do so in considerable detail. This task has been somewhat neglected in the literature, one major reason being that strong pluralism is widely regarded as a non-starter due to a battery of seemingly devastating objections leveled against it. Among these objections the problem of mixed compounds is regarded as being particularly pressing-and difficult-for the strong pluralist to deal with. The second aim of the paper is to give a strongly pluralist response to the problem of mixed compounds. The third aim is to argue against moderate truth pluralism. I do so by appeal to principles concerning ontological economy and ideas about naturalness. THIS IS THE FINAL PART OF PROF. PEDERSEN'S LECTURE SERIES "TRUTH: CONCEPTUALLY ONE, METAPHYSICALLY MANY". FOR FURTHER INFO ON THIS: http://www.richarddietz.net/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/
pedersen%20announcement.pdf
Biconditionals and Biconditional Probability (jointly with David Over, Durham University)
Speaker: Tatsuji Takahashi
From: Tokyo Denki University
URL: http://takalabo.rd.dendai.ac.jp/en/tatsujit
Abstract: Psychology of reasoning has seen a shift in its normative theory of language and thought, especially aruond conditionals. This is in parallel with the movement toward constructing probabilistic logic for describing human thoughts, notably in Bayesian frameworks as the language for more flexible generative models (e.g., Lisp-like Church language by Goodman et al., 2008). In this talk, in joint progress with Jean Baratgin, David Over, and Guy Politzer, I will present the results of recent experiments of how people understand and use conditionals. A twist is that the setting for the experiments are more realistic than in previous works, allowing our knowledge of the occurrence of events to be not just true or false, but also uncertain, making the underlying logic three-valued. We also tested the truth table for biconditionals of the form "If p then q, and if q then p," which form a simplest class of composite conditionals. The resulting truth table conforms to the pattern quite frequently found but unexplained in many experiments on conditionals. It is also identical to the pARIs rule (Takahashi et al., 2010) which well describes the data of inductive inference of causal relationship from co-occurrence information.
Locutions in Metaphysics of Music and Ordinary Language: A Corpus-Based Study
Speaker: Michal Nakoneczny
From: University of Warsaw
URL: http://filozofia.uw.edu.pl/~nako/
Abstract: In this talk, I offer a new way of evaluating the strength of arguments from ordinary language in contemporary analytic philosophy. I apply this methodology to Kivy's and Dodd's arguments saying that the talk about musical composition is imbued with discovery-words as much as with creation-words. Basing on the British National Corpus, I show that the talk about creating musical works is formulated in both creation-verbs and discovery-verbs, but I show that there is a very strong statistically significant correlation between using creation-verbs rather than discovery-verbs while talking about musical composition. I take this to mean that Kivy and Dodd were wrong in claiming that creation verbs and discovery verbs are equally natural way of talking about the act of musical composition.
On the Fine-Graininess of the Ways Things are Presented in Experience (2nd pt. of a Perception Symposium, 5:30 - 7 pm)
Speaker: Hemdat Lerman
From: University of Warwick
URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/associates/lerman/
Abstract: When we see objects they are presented to us in our visual experience as being certain ways -- that is, they are presented as having certain colours, shapes, sizes, locations, and so on. Intuitively, when the conditions are favourable (i.e., when the relevant objects are just in front of us, in clear view, the light is good, etc.) the properties the objects are presented as having include very fine-grained properties -- properties that are as fine-grained as our capacity, in the given circumstances, to discern differences along the relevant dimension (e.g., colour, shape, length, distance). Thus, for example, it seems that when one sees a red pen just in front of one, in good light, etc., one experiences the pen as having a very fine-grained shade of red -- a shade that is the finest one can discriminate from other shades of colour in the given circumstances. My aim in the talk is to question this intuitive view. I'll do so by, first, suggesting an explanation of what makes the view so intuitive, and then questioning the assumptions that figure in the suggested explanation.
In Defense of a Perceptual View of Feeling Pain (1st part of a Perception Symposium, 4 - 5:30 pm)
Speaker: Thomas Park
From: Seoul National University
URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Thomas_Park
Abstract: When we get hurt, sick or suffer from problems like migraine or cavities, we often feel an unpleasant sensation in a certain part of our body. When we thus feel pain, is this feeling a kind of perception on a par with sense modalities like seeing or smelling? I present three criteria for sense modalities introduced by Fiona Macpherson, and argue that feeling pain is part of a distinct sense modality that fulfills these criteria. I will defend my conclusion against the appearance-reality argument and Murat Aydede's argument from focus. According to the first, the apparent lack of a discrepancy between appearance and reality in case of pain makes the feeling of pain different from traditional sense perception. For whereas we distinguish between seeing a bend stick and seeming to see a bend stick, we apparently cannot distinguish between having a pain and seeming to have a pain. However, I argue that we are able to make the relevant distinction with regard to what pain represents, namely disturbances of one's bodily tissue. We can thus distinguish between one's bodily tissue seeming to be disturbed and (really) being disturbed. Aydede's argument, I will argue, focuses too much on vision and audition, and neglects the diversity of our senses. For our standard "perceptual reports" are, pace Aydede, not always about public objects or objective state of affairs, especially when these reports are about the content of olfactory, gustatory or thermal experience. I will corroborate my thesis by means of two examples.
A Clash of Necessaritarians: Dispositional Essentialism and Varieties of Necessity
Speaker: Fabio Ceravolo
From: University of Leeds
URL: https://leeds.academia.edu/FabioCeravolo
Abstract: According to necessitarism, some connections between fundamental properties are necessary. As it stands, the view should be further distinguished as for its acceptance of a governance thesis, spelling out how the properties determine the necessary connections. Weak governance imposes strong supervenience of the connection on the properties; strong governance adjoins the further condition that the basic powers cannot change between worlds, and, therefore, that actual connections are necessary and no non-actual one is possible. As an explanation of how connections between properties are necessary I consider dispositional essentialism (DE, Bird 2007). I show that DE is committed to strong governance, an unexpected consequence of the general idea that dispositions ground natural laws independently of their actuality. Adopting weak governance within DE's framework, on the other hand, equals admitting what Kit Fine (2002) calls "varieties of necessity", by which we can take to mean to the failure of necessitarism. Finally, I argue that weak governance still denotes a mature approach to natural necessity,sensible to recognised forms of counterfactual reasoning in the natural sciences, and that a weakened non-dispositional necessitarism can live with Fine's argument.
Why Should We Need a Disjunctive Account of Bodily Movements?
Speaker: Rasmus Thybo Jensen
From: University of Tokyo
URL: http://u-tokyo.academia.edu/RasmusThyboJensen
Abstract: A number of authors have proposed a so called disjunctive account of bodily movement to deal with problems in Philosophy of Action. I will discuss three such accounts (Hornsby's, Haddock's and Stout's) that are all presented as analogues to McDowell's disjunctive conception of perceptual appearance. I will address the issue of how we should specify the problem concerning bodily agency that is supposed to be analogous to McDowell's problem concerning perceptual knowledge. I argue that the three accounts in question are in fact three quite different accounts and I suggest that we can understand the differences in terms of differences in the problems the accounts are supposed to deal with.
Embodied Moral Psychology: Empathy and Psychopathy (4 - 5:30 pm --- pt 1 of a Joint HMC+TFAP Symposium)
Speaker: Bongrae Seok
From: Alvernia University
URL: http://www.alvernia.edu/academics/arts-and-sciences/humanities/philosophy/faculty/seok.html
Abstract: Currently, major psychological approaches to moral cognition, such as Kantian, Humean, Rawlsian approaches, focus on deliberate moral reasoning, affective and motivational moral emotions, and implicit moral rules. But the body (i.e., the physical sense and activity) of a moral agent are not fully and seriously considered. In this presentation, I will develop a moral psychology of the body, i.e., a moral psychology of embodied and other-regarding emotion. I will explore this relatively uncharted territory of embodied moral psychology by focusing on the embodied nature of empathy in moral cognition. According to recent brain imaging studies, one's empathy to others' pain is supported by affective resonance and motivational preparedness that are associated with the activities of the anterior insula. The function of the insula, as reported by psychologists, is sensing and reacting to bodily changes. That is, our empathic concern is closely related to our bodily senses. On the contrary, insufficient or disrupted bodily reaction to others' pain and suffering can result in psychopathic orientations. According to several studies, psychopathy is associated with a specific deficit in affective processing that integrates particular type of stimuli with embodied visceral and autonomic reactions. Although psychopathy is a complex psychological phenomenon that cannot be explained by a single cause or a simple set of variables, lack of or disruption in affective and embodied sense and reaction to other's pain is often recognized as a reliably predictor of psychopathic behaviors. Based on these observations, I argue that embodied approach to moral cognition can provide a good theoretical framework that can complement existing approaches to moral psychology.
Evidential Force and Degrees of Belief (5:30 - 7 pm --- pt. 2 of a Joint HMC+TFAP Symposium)
Speaker: Masahiro Yamada
From: Claremont Graduate University
URL: http://cgu.edu/pages/3983.asp
Abstract: How should one update one's degree of belief that p in the light of new evidence that conclusively shows that q? One popular answer is that one ought to "conditionalize": the updated degree of belief for p ought to be set to the prior conditional probability of p given q. This paper argues that the same considerations that in many cases make conditionalization plausible also show why conditionalization fails in certain counterexamples. The diagnosis of the failure points to a need for reconceptualizing the investigation into updating procedures so as to pay attention to the force of evidence in addition to degrees of belief.
On Sharing One Emotion
Speaker: Alessandro Salice
From: Center for Subjectivity Research (University of Copenhagen)
URL: http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/?pure=en/persons/460617
Abstract: "To share" is quite a common verb in English, and its use is fairly uncontroversial in many contexts. 'Shared' can refer to concrete objects (e.g., a toy that siblings play with and which is "their" toy), abstract objects (e.g., the right of several persons to use a building in usufruct) and perhaps even objects of more questionable status (e.g., persons can share a debt or a need...). But can experiences be shared?
In this talk, I especially focus on shared emotions: recall Max Scheler's famous example of two parents mourning at the grave of their dead child (1913) -- in which sense is this emotion of mourning theirs? In which sense do they 'share' this emotion?
My presentation is organized into three parts. In the first, I introduce Scheler's example against the background of his taxonomy of forms of sociality (mental contagion, empathy, co-experiencing). In the second, I address two possible interpretations of shared emotions, which I respectively label the 'one-token' and the 'multiplicity' view. The first claims that collective emotions are an attitude of a plural subject, whereas the second contends that the notion of collective emotions can be cashed out in terms of singular emotions plus relevant relations held between them. In the final part, I argue in favor of my own take on this, which I develop by employing some of the conceptual tools that can be found in Scheler, and which I understand as a revised version of the 'one-token' view. I maintain that this view is respectful of our phenomenology and, at the same time, that it preserves the robust sense of collectivity one needs if one wants to talk of 'shared' emotions.
Towards a Post-Deflationary Conception of Truth
Speaker: Henri Galinon
From: Universite Blaise Pascal
URL: http://phier.univ-bpclermont.fr/article15.html
Abstract:
The view we shall defend is deflationary in the the sense that we accept the main tenets of classical deflationism regarding the role of the notion truth in scientific discourse. More precisely, we shall defend what we call "semantic deflation", arguing that the notion of truth is semantically akin to a logical notion and cannot play a "thick" role in explanations. We shall then explore the possibility to maintain, despite these conclusions, that the notion of truth still plays a substantial regulatory role in rational activity--- in short "functional inflation".
Quine's Naturalism and the Constitutive A Priori
Speaker: Rob Sinclair
From: Soka University
URL: http://suj.academia.edu/RobertSinclair
Abstract: In his Dynamics of Reason, Michael Friedman criticizes Quine's holistic view of human knowledge as unable to make sense of historical revolutions in science, and more crucially, as failing to account for the constitutive nature of the a priori frameworks that make possible the formulation of empirical laws. My paper will focus on this second criticism and demonstrate how recent work on Quine's epistemology of logic shows that his 'web of belief' account contains asymmetric structure with logic and mathematics serving as basic elements that enable both the formulation of scientific theories and their application to empirical phenomena. Friedman is then wrong in claiming that Quine's view can only explain differences in a given theory by degrees of entrenchment, with, for example, our reluctance to revise logical laws stemming from their relatively deep entrenchment within our current theories. This further suggests that Quine's structural holism can capture some of the central aspects of the constitutive a priori that Friedman deems central to scientific theories. I conclude by taking a closer look at the precise role the constitutive a priori frameworks play in Friedman's account, where they are further presented as serving to coordinate the abstract mathematical component of scientific theories with concrete sensible experience. It remains unclear whether Quine's structural holism has the resources to address this 'coordination' problem and this helps to clarify the exact issue at stake between Friedman and Quine concerning the significance of constitutive a priori principles and their role more generally within scientific theories.
The Role of Imagination in Philosophical Thought Experiments
Speaker: Kengo Miyazono
From: Keio University
URL: http://kengomiyazono.weebly.com/
Abstract: Is a (scientific or philosophical) thought experiment reducible to an argument (Brown 1991; Gendler 2000; Norton 1991)? Williamson and other philosophers (Ichikawa & Jarvis 2009; Malmgren 2011; Williamson 2007) argue that philosophical thought experiments, such as Gettier thought experiment, can be formalised as arguments. In this paper, I argue that, first, the proposed formalisations of philosophical thought experiments are problematic in one way or another and, second, there is an alternative account according to which a philosophical thought experiment does not have an argument-like structure. According to the account, a philosophical thought experiment is a special kind of imaginability-based modal judgment, where the imagination involves what I call "higher-level imagination". The phenomenon called "imaginative resistance" (Gendler 2000; Weatherson 2004) tells us about the peculiar features of higher-level imagination, and we can provide a plausible account of the nature of philosophical experiments in terms of these features.
Temporal Passage and Ontological Regress
Speaker: Akiko Frischhut
From: University of Geneva
URL: http://unige.academia.edu/AkikoFrischhut
Abstract: See attachment.
Negation is Failure: A Semantic Defense of Excluded Middle and Non-Contradiction
Speaker: Ben Burgis
From: Yonsei University
URL: http://uic.yonsei.ac.kr/academics/faculty_profiles_view.asp?page=1&idx=165&fndfield=&fndstr=&srhctgr=200102&fndName=&fndMajor=Common+Curriculum
Abstract: The most traditional reason to doubt the unrestricted truth of the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) is the problem of future contingents. This is a metaphysical objection, based on the claim that the world is not such as to make true every instance of the LEM. On the contemporary scene, it is far more popular to doubt the LEM on the basis of "purely semantic" considerations. For example, Scott Soames and Jamie Tappenden have argued that natural language includes "partially defined predicates." The rules governing whether some object falls within the extension of some predicate (or its negation) are silent in some cases. Ed Mares has endorsed this claim and argued on parallel grounds that natural language includes "overdefined predicates." Unlike Graham Priest, who (on some interpretations of Priest's project) believes that the world is such as to make some contradictions true, Mares believes the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) fails for purely semantic reasons. This version of dialetheism is widely seen as relatively innocent, since it doesn't violate the intuition that objective reality is in some important sense "consistent," but I argue that the consequences of "semantic" dialetheism are actually far more counter-intuitive than the consequences of "Priestly" dialetheism. The picture we get when we start taking "overdefined predicates" seriously should actually count as a reductio of the Tappenden-Soames thesis.
Is Bias Always Unreasonable?
Speaker: Peter Kung
From: Pomona College
URL: http://pages.pomona.edu/~pfk04747/
Abstract: Cognitive biases are typically conceived as mistakes in reasoning. They are epistemically unwarranted conclusions. The conclusion you reach is epistemically unreasonable because of the way that you arrived at it: e.g., you sought only evidence that confirmed your prior view; you failed to give adequate consideration to situational factors in explaining another's behavior; you regard information that you can easily recall as representative. It is natural to think that the explosion of recent findings in social psychology about implicit biases fits the same pattern. In judging a woman candidate to be less qualified than an equivalent male candidate, for example (which both men and women seem to do), you have exhibited flawed reasoning. Your conclusion is epistemically unreasonable because of the way that you arrived at that belief: you were sensitive to a factor, the candidate's sex, that you yourself regard as evidentially irrelevant. I think this is a mistake. I argue that social biases are not necessarily cases of epistemically flawed reasoning, and that, in some sense, the judgments under scrutiny can be epistemically justified. If (as I think is independently plausible) we deny the uniqueness thesis---the thesis that a body of evidence justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward a proposition---then the fact that evidentially irrelevant factors seem to make a difference to our judgment on an issue is not enough, by itself, to show that the those judgments are epistemically unreasonable. We must locate what's problematic about implicit biases in another place.
Mortality, Finitude, and the Temporal Structure of Agency (6:10-7:40pm, pt. 2 of a Joint HMC+TFAP Symposium)
Speaker: Luca Ferrero
From: UW-Milwaukee
URL: https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/ferrero/www/
Abstract: Many contemporary analytic philosophers have followed Bernard Williams in arguing that, for beings like us, an immortal life is either inconceivable or undesirable. This is for two reasons: we can only conceive of our life only as temporally bounded, and the things we cherish most are essentially tied to finite lives. In this paper, I will consider the question of how the finite and bounded character of affects the basic structure of our temporal agency, ends, and values. I will argue that there are different ways in which we might talk of our temporal existence as being finite or bounded. These ways concern its temporal extension, the temporal horizon of identification, the distribution and accessibility of opportunities for action, and the structure of ends. Human lives appear to be finite along all of these dimensions. However, these dimensions are in principle independent of each other and they bear differently on the structure of our agency and axiology. In particular, I will argue that the kind of finitude that is most intimately connected with our distinctive form of extended agency and existence is not the necessity of death but the limitation in the distribution and accessibility of opportunities for action. I will then consider how this finitude might affect the basic principles of diachronic practical rationality and why it might still make the prospects of an indefinitely long life unappealing.
Proper Functionalism and the Proper Theory of Functions (4:40-6:10pm, pt. 1 of a Joint HMC+TFAP Symposium)
Speaker: Peter Graham
From: University of California, Riverside
URL: http://faculty.ucr.edu/~peterg/
Abstract: ---
Decision-Theoretic Models of Moral Agents
Speaker: Mark Colyvan
From: University of Sydney
URL: http://www.colyvan.com/
Abstract: In this paper I will discuss some of the work on formal models of moral decision making (Colyvan, Cox and Steele 2010; Jackson 2001; Jackson manuscript; Jackson and Smith 2006). These models all adopt a decision theoretic, and hence consequentialist, framework. Despite apparently stacking the deck in favour of consequentialist moral theories, I will argue that there is nothing improper about using this framework for moral decision making, even for the moral decisions of virtue ethical agents or deontological agents. Virtue theorists and deontologists may well reject models formulated using this framework as models of the relevant moral psychologies, but there is no need to reject the models in question as models of the behaviour of the relevant agents.
Minimal Commitment -- 4:00-5:30 pm
Speaker: John Michael
From: Central European University (Budapest)
URL: http://ceu.academia.edu/JohnMichael
Abstract: This paper sets out a framework that specifies the psychological mechanisms with which agents identify and assess the level of their own and others' interpersonal commitments. I begin by formulating three desiderata for a theoretical account of commitment: to identify the motivational factors that lead agents to honor commitments and which thereby make those commitments credible, to pick out the psychological mechanisms and situational factors that lead agents to sense that implicit commitments are in place, and to illuminate the onto- and phylogenetic origins of commitment. In order to satisfy these three desiderata, I propose to conceptualize a broad category of phenomena of which commitment in the strict sense is a special case, and introduce the term 'minimal commitment' to designate this broad category. The conditions are then specified under which minimal commitments obtain, and five factors are identified that modulate the level of minimal commitment. Finally, I relate the minimal approach offered here to standard accounts of commitment found in the literature, in particular in Bratman and Gilbert.
Collective Commitments: Instrumental vs Communal -- 5:30-7:00 pm
Speaker: Alessandro Salice
From: Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen
URL: http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/?pure=en/persons/460617
Abstract: This talk tackles the notion of collective commitment. One influential view about collective commitments maintains that these commitments come only in one kind: if you and I are committed to a goal so that my commitment is conditional on yours and yours is conditional on mine, then there is a collective commitment at place. In the present paper, we intend to resist this view and to defend the claim that collective commitments come in, at least, two different forms.
The first occurs when two or more individuals decide to join their forces based on instrumental considerations. If I intend to reach a goal by means of a specific strategy in which you figures as a contributor and if you intend to reach the same goal by means of a strategy in which I figure as a contributor, then you and I have a collective 'strategic' commitment to reach that goal.
A different kind of collective commitment (call this a 'communal' or a 'we-' commitment) is created when a we-group (i.e., a group with a social identity or a we-perspective) is committed to a given goal. Here, individual commitments arise due to the individuals belonging to the we-group at stake.
After distinguishing, describing and elucidating these two kinds of commitments in the first part of the talk, some conclusions for social ontology and the theory of collective intentionality will be drawn in its second and last part.
Montague Reduction, Confirmation, and the Syntax-Semantics Relation (joint work with Stephan Hartmann, MCMP)
Speaker: Kristina Liefke
From: Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
URL: http://www.mcmp.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/people/faculty/liefke/index.html
Abstract: Intertheoretic relations are an important topic in the philosophy of science. However, since their classical discussion by Ernest Nagel, such relations have mostly been restricted to relations between pairs of theories in the natural sciences. In this talk, I will present a model of a new type of intertheoretic relation, called *Montague Reduction*, which is inspired by Montague's framework for the analysis and interpretation of natural language syntax. To motivate the adoption of this new model, I show that this model extends the scope of application of the Nagelian (or related) models, and that it shares the epistemological advantages of the Nagelian model. The latter is achieved in a Bayesian framework.
A Descriptivist Refutation of Kripke's Modal Argument of Soames's Defence
Speaker: Chen Bo
From: Peking University
URL: http://www.phil.pku.edu.cn/personal/chenbo/resume.htm
Abstract: This talk systematically challenges Kripke's modal argument and Soames's defence of this argument by arguing that, just like descriptions, names can take narrow or wide scopes over modalities, and that there is a big difference between the wide scope reading and the narrow scope reading of a modal sentence with a name. Its final conclusions are that all of Kripke's and Soames's arguments are untenable due to some fallacies or mistakes; names are not "rigid designators"; if there were rigid designators, description(s) could be rigidified to refer fixedly to objects; so names cannot be distinguished in this way from the corresponding descriptions. A descriptivist account of names is still correct; and there is no justification for Kripke's theory of rigid designation and its consequences.
Moral Explanations, Expressivism and Normative Theorising
Speaker: Ryo Chonabayashi
From:
URL: http://independent.academia.edu/RyoChonabayashi
Abstract: Neil Sinclair has recently proposed an expressivist account of moral explanations which is an attempt to defend the old noncognitivist project of accommodating moral explanations without moral realism. Sinclair's suggestion is worth being assessed. If the expressivist can successfully accommodate moral explanations within an expressivist picture of morality, then one popular argument for moral realism which appeals to moral explanations loses its grounds. According to this argument, one brand of naturalistic moral realism is established if the explanatory virtue of moral explanations is accepted. Sinclair's expressivist account of moral explanations might block this reasoning: even if the explanatory virtue of moral explanations is accepted, we may not be able to reach the conclusion that naturalistic moral realism is true due to an alternative account of moral explanations, namely the expressivist account of moral explanations which denies the referential role of moral predicates in those moral explanations. In this paper I shall argue that Sinclair's attempt fails because Sinclair's account cannot appreciate an important role moral explanations play in our normative theorising. The role of moral explanations I shall highlight in this paper is that the change of our moral views often occurs due to our convictions in those moral explanations.
Aristotle's Insight and the Modest Conception of Truth
Speaker: Benjamin Schnieder
From: University of Hamburg
URL: http://www.philosophie.uni-hamburg.de/Team/Schnieder/
Abstract: Aristotle famously remarked: That you are pale is true because you are pale--but not vice versa. This Aristotelian Insight on truth plays a major role in the recent debate about truth. But it is controversial of how the Aristotelian Insight can be accounted for. After discussing some existing proposals, I will develop a justification of Aristotle's Insight that builds on the recent debate about grounding, to which philosophers such as Kit Fine or Jonathan Schaffer made prominent contributions.
Perceivers, Circumstances, Seeing Color (Part of the 1st TODAI PERCEPTION WORKSHOP; for the FULL PROGRAM, see: http://tinyurl.com/mgwpsym).
Speaker: David Hilbert
From: University of Illinois at Chicago
URL: http://tigger.uic.edu/~hilbert/
Abstract: The fact that perceived color varies with both the circumstances of perception and with the characteristics of the perceiver is often thought to have important consequences for the ontology of color. The precise nature of these consequences is a disputed matter but nearly all agree that the ontological consequences of variability in perceived color are important. All such arguments, however, rely on substantial and controversial assumptions about perception and ontology. Consequently, it is possible to evade the force of these arguments by denying the perceptual and metaphysical assumptions implicit in the argument. In other words, these arguments primarily serve to highlight disagreements about perception in general and metaphysics in general and are only secondarily of significance for color. Facts about perceptual variation should take their place among the many interesting facts about color and color perception that any theory of color should account for and lose the special significance they have had in recent discussions of color.
Commitment, Closure, Consequence
Speaker: Colin Caret
From: Yonsei University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/colincaret/
Abstract: The recent literature on logic and paradox divides between advocates of non-transitive and non-contractive theories. In this paper, I argue that the only viable option in this debate is to reject contraction. The argument turns on the normative role of logic in the cognitive economy. Logical consequence codifies the relation between belief and commitment, i.e. the operation that determines what an agent is committed to in virtue of what she believes. I argue that such commitments are complete in an important sense. The driving intuition is that the normative force of doxastic commitment ramifies counterfactually, in that an agent cannot rationally disbelieve any of the commitments she would have if she were to believe all of her commitments. As a result, doxastic commitment is what Tarski called a closure operation. The relation of logical consequence, in turn, is a closure relation on belief states. On any generalization of logical consequence qua closure relation on beliefs, it must be a transitive relation. However, if beliefs aggregate in more fine-grained collections than ordinary sets, then there are counterexamples to contraction that are consonant with the conceptual role of logical consequence. I argue that there is a conception of propositional content on which beliefs aggregate into multisets rather than sets. This shows that transitivity is a constitutive feature of logical consequence, while contraction is not.
Truth, Omega-Inconsistency and Harmony (Part 1 of a joint HMC + TFAP event on the Philosophy of Logic)
Speaker: Shunsuke Yatabe
From: Kyoto University
URL: http://researchmap.jp/ytb/?lang=english
Abstract: See attachment.
Truth as Composite Correspondence (Part 2 of a joint HMC + TFAP event on the Philosophy of Logic)
Speaker: Gila Sher
From: University of California, San Diego
URL: http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/gsher/
Abstract: Given the complexity of the world on the one hand and the intricacy (capacities, limitations) of the human mind on the other, the question arises what standard of truth is appropriate for our theories. I propose a "composite correspondence" standard. The idea is that the correspondence relation between sentences (theories) and reality may assume diverse patterns, some simpler, others more complex. I apply this approach to a traditionally problematic field of truth - mathematics, show its advantages in solving well-known problems for traditional correspondence theory, connect it to other historical and current approaches, and point to further extensions.
Can Number Concepts Be Bootstrapped?
Speaker: Richard Samuels
From: Ohio State University
URL:
Abstract: Susan Carey has recently argued that our number concepts, including those acquired by very young children, can be learned via processes she refers to as "boot-strapping". While this account has been immensely influential, its evidential support is entirely unclear. In this talk I raise doubts about the adequacy of Carey's boot-strapping account of number concept acquisition as well as an accompanying mechanistic specification of the account advocated by Joshua Tenenbaum.
Is `Cat' A Proper Name?: An Argument Against Millianism (Part 1 of a joint HMC + TFAP event on the Philosophy of Language and Metaphysics)
Speaker: Yu Izumi
From: Osaka University and Takarazuka University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/yuizumi/
Abstract: In recent years, the view that proper names, such as `Mary,' are monadic predicates in their own right has received renewed attention in the philosophical literature (for example, Graff 2013 and Jeshion 2014). In order to defend this view, predicativism, I develop a reductio argument against the opposing position, Millianism, according to which the semantic contents of proper names are exhausted by their referents. The reductio argument extends Millianism to clearly predicative expressions in natural language, such as `cat,' and `car,' by drawing on the data from Japanese, which lacks the article system and highlights the parallelism between proper and common nouns. I examine some of the considerations that are alleged to support Millianism, and argue that they support `Millianism about common nouns' equally well. Any attempt to resist `Millianism about common nouns' will undermine the standard Millian view about proper names. When we take an articleless language as a point of departure for the semantics of proper names, Millianism loses its intuitive appeal.
Brutal Propositions (joint work with Chris Tillman) (Part 2 of a joint HMC + TFAP event on the Philosophy of Language and Metaphysics)
Speaker: Ben Caplan
From: Ohio State University
URL: http://philosophy.osu.edu/people/caplan
Abstract: There are propositions. For example, the sentence `Ethan abides' expresses the proposition that Ethan abides. Propositions have truth-conditional properties. For example, the proposition that Ethan abides has the property being true if and only if Ethan abides. And propositions have objects, properties, and relations as parts. For example, the proposition that Ethan abides has Ethan and the property abiding as parts. None of these claims is particularly surprising on its own. But, as Trenton Merricks has recently pointed out, there seems to be some kind of strange harmony between the truth-conditional facts and the parthood facts. For example. the proposition that Ethan abides has being true if and only if Ethan abides, and Ethan andabiding are parts of it. In this paper, we work out what one kind of explanation of this harmony would look like. The explanation that we pursue appeals to a brute fact about the complicated essence of a primitive entity.
Iconic Memory and Non-Conceptualism
Speaker: Seishu Nishimura
From: Shiga University
URL: http://kenkyu-web.biwako.shiga-u.ac.jp/Profiles/15/0001434/profile.html
Abstract: Since 1980s, it has been rigorously discussed whether or not perceptual content is conceptual. Conceptualism is the view that answers this question positively. Nonconceptualism is a view that denies conceptualism. Recently, assuming that nonconceptual content exists, a couple of philosophers have argued that nonconceptualism is supported by scientific studies of visual memory. For instance, Athanassios Raftopoulos maintains that perceptual content is nonconceptual because the information stored in iconic memory is pre-attentional so that it is not cognitively accessible. Iconic memory is a visual system in the earliest stage of ventral pathway, in which pre-categorical images are stored for a very short time. According to Raftopoulos, the information stored here becomes conceptual only when it is sent to working memory via attention where it receives an informational feedback from the higher executive areas in brain. Therefore, the information stored in iconic memory is nonconceptual. Jesse J. Prinz also suggests that the information which still has not been encoded in working memory, though it is attended, cannot be regarded as conceptual. According to Prinz, this nonconceptual information is stored in iconic memory which is prior to working memory. In today's talk, I defend a version of conceptualism by arguing that these philosophers do not fully succeed in establishing that the content of iconic memory is nonconceptual.
Irony, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of Detachment
Speaker: Mandel Cabrera
From: Yonsei University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/mandelcabrera/
Abstract: Although Kierkegaard only mentions irony in passing in "The Present Age," it is in effect an indictment of the role that perverse forms of irony play in modern life -- one that prefigures critiques of irony in contemporary culture. In this essay, I sketch and argue for the philosophical picture of personal identity and human agency that underlies Kierkegaard's polemic. In particular, I argue that the central distinction of the essay -- that between Passion and Reflection -- is a distinction between two fundamental capacities: respectively, the capacity for identification and the capacity for detachment. After clarifying this distinction in terms of Kierkegaard's conception of personal identity, I use it to interpret the ideal of 'the single individual' as found in "The Present Age," and use this interpretation to understand the philosophical stakes of Kierkegaard's criticisms of modern culture in that work.
Virtue Epistemology Multiplied
Speaker: Masashi Kasaki
From: Kyoto University and Osaka University
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/masashikasaki/
Abstract: It is well-known that virtue epistemology, as Ernest Sosa and John Greco, among others, propose, faces a notorious dilemma: the virtue-theoretic conditions for knowledge must be strong enough to evade counterexamples of one kind, whereas it must be weak enough to evade counterexamples of another kind. In my forthcoming paper (Virtue Epistemology and Environmental Luck, the Journal of Philosophical Research), I have argued that at least alleged counterexamples of the first kind are no threat to virtue epistemology. Although I have suggested possible ways to deal with the dilemma, I grant that my defense of virtue epistemology against the dilemma is at best incomplete. The key for my defense of virtue epistemology is to allow that multiple virtues, rather than a single one, may be in play in producing true belief. With this idea at hand, in this paper, I attempt to extend my defense to counterexamples of the second kind and complete my defense of virtue epistemology against the dilemma. First, I describe the putative dilemma for virtue epistemology. Second, I explain how multiple virtues work together in alleged counterexamples of the first kind. Third, I introduce the virtue of trust, and argue that it gives resources to handle alleged counterexamples of the second kind, if combined with other virtues.
How to Handle Actions?
Speaker: Istvan Zardai
From: Oxford Brookes University
URL: http://www.history.brookes.ac.uk/students/students_history_iZoltanZardai.asp
Abstract: It is a tough task to tell what actions are. Many theories have been put forward, the most prominent of them claiming that actions are events. After 50 years of debate on this question - since Donald Davidson's publication of "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" - we can say that although event views have been widely endorsed there seem to be problems which they cannot solve, like providing adequate identity criteria for events. In three recent publications Jennifer Hornsby put forward a new theory that places a large emphasis on the distinction between processes and events. Hornsby claims that the combination of processes and events can help us to accommodate a substantial notion of agency and solve some problems that plague event accounts of action and acting. In my presentation I offer a concise overview of the debate on what actions are and in light of that comment on the strengths and weaknesses of Hornsby's new view.
Does Motion Make Visual Perception Three-Dimensional?
Speaker: Shogo Shimizu
From: University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy (UTCP)
URL: http://utcp.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/members/data/shimizu_shogo/index_en.php
Abstract: Imagine that the image of a cubical box is projected onto a screen. It appears to a subject as though there is a black polygonal shape on the screen. Then the box is rotated, and it appears to the subject as though the shape on the screen is cubical (and therefore three-dimensional). It might be plausible to say that such is the case even when the object of sight is not one on a screen - that although visual perception is originally two-dimensional, motion by which we view an object from many points of view enables us to see it three-dimensionally. Laura Berchielli attributes to Locke an account of this kind. I will argue that the view Berchielli attributes to Locke is incompatible with Locke's basic assumption that perception is passive. Through this argument, I will show that the account in question is equivocal in the sense that it can be construed to imply either that the mind performs cognitive activity at a higher stage than the stage of visual perception, or that visual perception itself includes the result of the mind's cognitive activity. I will conclude my talk by suggesting that the cognitive activity required by the account would be primarily related to congruence rather than to depth or the third dimension, and that the question should be why the cognition of congruence entails that of depth.
A Missing Shade of Grue: Resemblance, Induction and General Representation
Speaker: Kazuhiro Watanabe
From: University of Tokyo
URL:
Abstract: Imagine a person who has enjoyed her vision for reasonably long time and thus been acquainted with all kinds of color but one particular shade of blue. Suppose that we present to her a sequence of all different shades of blue, starting from the lightest to the darkest, except the one that she has never encountered. No doubt she will perceive a gap, or a blank, in the various gradations of blue. Question: is she capable of filling the gap by making up, of her own, a mental representation of the missing shade of blue? David Hume answered yes, admitting that it is against a fundamental principle for his theory of ideas that every simple idea has its corresponding simple impression. This is a brief version of 'the problem of a missing shade of blue' that has been a perplexity for Hume scholars and aroused debates aimed at a coherent interpretation of apparently incoherent passages of A Treatise of Human Nature where Hume discusses abstract or general ideas. In this talk, I am going to take a problem of broader philosophical significance out of the interpretational debate over the original problem of a missing shade of blue, which I believe would be of general interest for philosophers today. It shall first be pointed out that the past attempts at solving the original puzzle will make Hume merit Nelson Goodman's famous stricture on similarity. I will then contend that the problem does involve Goodman's new riddle of induction, or the so-called grue problem. My goal in this talk is to provide a Goodmanean way to deal with this new yet classic problem that lies deep beneath both inductions and general representations.
Kant's Dual Track Account of Things in Themselves and Appearances
Speaker: Wolfgang Ertl
From: Keio University
URL: http://www.flet.keio.ac.jp/~w.ertl/page0/page0.html
Abstract: The distinction of things in themselves and appearances, though not particularly popular in some quarters of philosophy, is an integral element of Kant's transcendental idealism. In his critical works, there are basically two different models in which Kant elucidates this distinction. Most commonly, these models are labelled "two-aspect" (TA) and "two-world view" (TW) respectively. It is not entirely clear, however, what the point of disagreement between these two views is, but most commonly it is assumed that according to a TA view things in themselves and appearances are numerically identical, while according to a TW view they are not only numerically distinct, but occupy different realms of being. Although it has long been assumed that one model is sufficient to account for the philosophical points at issue, a number of scholars have started suggesting that this dual track account is itself an integral part of Kant's strategy. However, if this is indeed the case, and since the two models appear to be downright incompatible, such an approach raises important problems in its own right, for example with regard to the methodological status of these models in the first place.
In my talk, I will try to offer an alternative account of the two models in question, and sketch a new way of reconciling them, i.e. of rendering them compatible. In doing so, I will draw on discussions connecting the concept of things in themselves with divine cognition and examine in some detail Kant's doctrine of the divine intellect which, as surprising as it may seem, bears striking similarities to early modern scholastic accounts. The main question will be as to whether the assumptions made in these doctrines can be reconciled with the strictures of Kant's critical programme as a whole.
Reconsidering "What is a Theory of Meaning? (I)"
Speaker: Takeshi Yamada
From: University of Tokyo
URL:
Abstract: Dummett has long criticized the Davidsonian conception of a theory of meaning as a Tarskian truth theory, and his famous paper "What is a Theory of Meaning? (I)" (1975) marks the beginning of the debate between them. He introduced here the notion of modest / full-blooded theories of meaning, and argued that Davidsonian conception yields only a modest theory and that a theory of meaning should be full-blooded. His points, however, have not been well understood. McDowell has offered an influential interpretation of the paper, but his interpretation neglect the structure of Dummett's argument and does not reveal how Dummett criticized Davidson. In this talk, I give a detailed reconstruction of Dummett's critique of Davidson in his 1975, elucidating the theoretical framework behind the critique, and discuss how the critique relates to the later debate between Dummett and Davidson.
Logical Objects by Abstraction and their Criteria of Identity
Speaker: Matthias Schirn
From: Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
URL: http://www.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/lehreinheiten/wissenschaftstheorie/personen/ehemalige/schirn/index.html
Abstract: In Grundlagen, Frege suggests the following strategy for the envisaged introduction of the real and complex numbers as logical objects: it should proceed along the lines of his introduction of the cardinals, namely by starting with a tentative contextual definition of a suitable number operator in terms of an abstraction principle whose right-hand side (a second-order or higher-order equivalence relation) was couched in purely logical terms, and by finally defining these numbers as equivalence classes of the relevant equivalence relation. In this talk, I discuss Frege's introduction of the cardinals as well as his projected introduction of the "higher" numbers with special emphasis on the so-called Julius Caesar problem. Moreover, I analyze the variant of this problem that Frege faces in Grundgesetze when he comes to introduce his prototype of logical objects, namely courses-of-values, by means of a stipulation later to be embodied in Basic Law V. The problem is now clad in formal garb. A second main issue, closely related to the first, is the nature and role of Frege's criteria of identity for logical objects. I argue (i) that pursuing the above strategy for the introduction of the higher numbers would inevitably lead to a whole family of possibly intractable Caesar problems; (ii) that in Grundlagen Frege considers the domain of the first order variables to be all-encompassing, while in Grundgesetze there is a serious conflict between (a) his practice of taking the first-order domain to be all-inclusive when he elucidates and defines first-level functions and (b) the assumption underlying his proof of referentiality in sect. 31 that the domain is restricted to the two truth-values and courses-of-values; (iii) that the range of applicability of the criteria of identity inherent in Hume's Principle and in Axiom V --- equinumerosity and coextensiveness of first-level concepts (functions) --- lack the requisite unbounded generality even after having undergone considerable extension; (iv) that regarding the Caesar problem for cardinal numbers and its alleged solution the situation in Grundgesetze differs significantly from that in Grundlagen; (v) that despite the identification of cardinals with courses-of-values in Grundgesetze equinumerosity is, to some extent, still needed in its function as governing the identity conditions of cardinals. If time allows, I shall also respond to the hypothetical question whether under certain conditions and especially in the aftermath of Russell's Paradox Frege could have introduced the real numbers via an appropriate abstraction principle without offending against his logicist credo. I conclude with remarks on the status of Frege's logicism with respect to both cardinal arithmetic and real analysis.
Conflicts of Justice
Speaker: Martijn Boot
From: Waseda University
URL: http://martijnboot.wordpress.com/
Abstract: The paper which I will present discusses conflicts of justice rather than interpersonal conflicts on justice: it analyses possible tensions within justice itself (conflicting demands of justice) and between justice and other weighty human interests. Justice may be regarded as a multifaceted concept of which the aspects are related to plural ethical values, such as basic liberties, equal opportunities, distribution of advantages according to need/equality/desert, and right to privacy. Some of these values may conflict mutually and/or with other important human values such as welfare-maximization, efficient use of scarce resources and public security. As a corollary, requirements of justice may conflict mutually ('internal conflicts of justice') and with other human interests ('external conflicts of justice'). Usually one supposes that conflicts of values can be resolved by assignment of weights. However, in some internal and external conflicts of justice incommensurability of the relevant values prevents a determinate and impartial weighing of competing demands. In those cases the justification of either decision between two rival claims can only be partial in the double sense of incomplete and biased: either decision acts against reasons which are not outweighed by the reasons in favour of which the decision is taken. The result is an ethical dilemma in which neither decision seems capable of avoiding an injustice or other 'ethical deficit'.
Quine vs Statistics Revisited
Speaker: Yasuo Deguchi
From: Kyoto University
URL: http://homepage2.nifty.com/ydeguchi/index_e.html
Abstract: How are evidence and our theory about the world interrelated? This is one of the central questions of Quine's philosophy. Then what is evidence? How is it produced? Quine would reply; a direct witness of what is going on just in front of our eye is a typical example of evidence. But this is not the case in today's science. Such a direct witness is too naive to generate scientific evidence. Rather scientific evidence is to be produced only through applications of one or another of highly elaborated statistical methodologies. Then, if those methodologies are taken into account, I argue, we should revise Quine's schema of empirical refutation; H1 & ...& Hn -> O, not-O -> not-H1 v ...v not-Hn. The revision has the following three significant epistemological consequences. First, a subtle but crucial distinction should be made among scientific observations that would trigger modification of our scientific theory; observation as evidence or reason and observation as occasion or cause. This distinction leads us to sort empirical refutation into two kinds; evidence based rejection and observation motivated change. Finally, based on those distinctions, we claim that Quinean holism should be replaced by a sort of methodological transcendentalism.
Dealing with Underdetermination: Inverse Problems and the Epistemology of Seismology
Speaker: Teru Miyake
From: Nanyang Technological University (Singapore)
URL: http://philosophy.hss.ntu.edu.sg/Pages/TeruMiyake.aspx
Abstract: This talk examines the epistemological implications of underdetermination in the determination of properties of the deep interior of the earth. Since at least the late 1960's, geophysicists have explicitly recognized this underdetermination and its associated epistemological problems, and have developed methods for dealing with it. I argue that there are at least two different kinds of underdetermination at work here, each of which have been dealt with in different ways by geophysicists. I find that actual underdetermination problems can be vastly complex, with different sources of underdetermination having different epistemological implications. A better understanding of actual cases of underdetermination is needed before we can make epistemological conclusions based on underdetermination.
Past Desires and Well-Being
Speaker: Kazunobu Narita
From: Keio University
URL: http://k-ris.keio.ac.jp/Profiles/0050/0006068/prof_e.html
Abstract: I take it that a person's well-being is the state of things going well for him. There are several views about what this sense of well-being consists of. The desire fulfillment theory is one of them. The basic tenet of this theory is that a person's well-being consists only of fulfillment of his desires. According to this theory, things go well for a person to the extent that his desires are fulfilled, and things go badly for him to the extent that his desires are frustrated.
Some desires are conditional on their persistence and some are not. Call the former 'p-conditional desires' and the latter 'p-unconditional desires.' There are desires that a person had in the past but has already lost. Call these desires 'past desires.' There are past desires that have as their object what happens at present. Call them 'past desires for the present.' Some desire fulfillment theorists take the view that fulfillment of a person's past p-unconditional desires for the present contributes to her well-being. The aim of this presentation is to show that desire theorists have a compelling reason to concede that this view is false.
Circles of Ground
Speaker: Ricki Bliss
From: Kyoto University
URL: http://kyoto-u.academia.edu/RickiBliss
Abstract: Philosophers interested in the notion of ground tend to be of the view that it is just obvious that no fact can be self-grounded, or patently absurd to think that any fact can exist in this way. This attitude is quite striking in the face of what appear to be a substantial number of example instances of self-groundedness. In this talk, I consider possible reasons we might have for supposing that there can be no circles of ground. I argue that, contrary to the more common view, any issue we might have with self-groundedness is explanatory rather than metaphysical.
Intrinsic Finks and the Individuation of Dispositions
Speaker: Daisuke Kaida
From: Kyoto University
URL:
Abstract: Sungho Choi (2005) claims that dispositions are not intrinsically
finkable, whereas categorical properties are. He also suggests that the
intrinsic finkability should serve as a criterion for the dispositional/
categorical distinction. In this talk, I will try to argue, against Choi,
that both dispositions and categorical properties are intrinsically
finkable. I contemplate the individuation of dispositions and argue that,
although Choi's claim has intuitive plausibility, nothing in the concept
of dispositions would bar dispositions (at least fundamental ones) from
having their intrinsic finks or masks.
Knowledge First Semantics and Linguistic Normativity
Speaker: Masaharu Mizumoto
From: Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST)
URL: http://www.jaist.ac.jp/profiles/info.php?profile_id=600
Abstract: Question 1: What is it to accept linguistic norms?
Question 2: How are linguistic norms different from other (typically, moral) norms?
The answer to Question 1 must be a middle way between two extremes, merely saying or believing that one accepts some linguistic norms, and always actually following the norms. In this talk I will present an explanation of such a middle way, which will then constitute a naturalistic account of the linguistic content. But this answer will also require the answer to Question 2.
What I call knowledge-first semantics, obviously alluding to T. Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology, is an attempt to explain the linguistic content in terms of the speaker's content of knowledge (rather than that of belief), in particular practical knowledge in Anscombe's sense, knowledge of what one is saying by the sentence (knowing if implicitly what rules one is following). It gives the meaning of a statement in terms of what I called elsewhere knowledge-condition, which, just like the case of truth condition, is not necessarily what is actually known.
Unlike Williamson, however, I do not think that the analysis of knowledge is impossible, and I even submit that Williamson's "knowledge account of assertion" should be rather a consequence of knowledge-first semantics. Allowing the analysis is compatible with the sense of "knowledge-first", in that the content of knowledge plays a primitive and primary role in explaining linguistic contents. Then the analysis of knowledge I assume here will help us give a (partially) reductive account of linguistic normativity by giving a naturalistic answer to Question 1.
I will first sketch a general framework of this semantics and then give some specific examples, especially 1) the linguistic content involving both the truth-conditional content and pragmatic content (mainly conventional implicature) as a primitive whole, and 2) the reference of proper names and natural kind terms or semantic externalism in general, in terms of the knowledge condition.
Such considerations will reveal the importance of Wittgenstein's notion of form of life to semantics, and will answer to several worries about the present approach ("Only speaker meaning?", "Only propositional content?", etc.) based on misunderstandings. Finally, I will briefly comment on the implication of this view of meaning to the role or status of experimental philosophy, and the importance of cross-linguistic considerations in philosophy in general.
The Knower Paradox Revisited
Speaker: Hidenori Kurokawa
From: Kobe University
URL:
Abstract: The Paradox of the Knower was originally presented by Montague & Ka-
plan in 1960 as a puzzle about the status of the naive" or everyday notion of
knowledge in the face of self-reference. The paradox shows that any theory con-
taining Robinson arithmetic and a predicate K(x) which is assumed to satisfy
the factivity principle customarily associated with knowledge (i.e. K(A) -> A)
as well as a few other epistemically plausible principles is inconsistent.
A variety of resolutions to the Knower have been proposed in the intervening
years -- e.g. a adopting a hierarchy of knowledge predicates, or denying that
knowledge should be treated as a predicate at all. Rather than surveying these
developments systematically, this talk will focus on a series of papers by Charles
Cross and Gabriel Uzquiano which have recently appeared in Mind about the
role of epistemic closure principles in the Knower.
We will suggest this debate sheds new light on the concept of knowledge
which is at issue in the paradox -- i.e. is it a `thin' notion divorced from concepts
such as evidence or justi cation, or is it a `thick' notion more closely resembling
mathematical proof? We will argue that the latter option is more plausible.
On this basis we will provide both a reconstruction of the paradox using a
quanti ed variant of Artemov's Logic of Proofs, as well as series of results
linking the original formulation of the paradox to formal re
ection principles for arithmetic. (This is joint work with Walter Dean).
Reasons to Believe and Reasons to Not
Speaker: Jake Chandler
From: University of Leuven
URL: http://www.jakechandler.com/
Abstract: The provision of a precise, formal treatment of the relation of evidential relevance--i.e. of providing a reason to hold or to withhold a belief--has arguably constituted the principal selling point of Bayesian modeling in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. By the same token, the lack of an analogous proposal in so-called AGM belief revision theory a powerful and elegant qualitative alternative to the Bayesian framework, is likely to have significantly contributed to its relatively marginal status in the philosophical mainstream.
In the present talk, I sketch out a corrective to this deficiency, offering a suggestion, within the context of belief revision theory, concerning the relation between beliefs about evidential relevance and commitments to certain policies of belief change. Aside from shedding light on the status of various important evidential `transmission' principles, this proposal also constitutes a promising basis for the elaboration of a logic of so-called epistemic defeaters.
Davidson's Triangle of Interpretation: Reconstruction and Appraisal
Speaker: Lajos Brons
From: Nihon University and Lakeland College (Japan Campus)
URL: http://www.lajosbrons.net/
Abstract: Donald Davidson first suggested "triangulation" as an analogy in "Rational Animals" (1982). The notion returned in two talks in 1988 and became a central concept in his papers of the 1990s. In those papers, triangulation appears in various forms, guises and contexts -- sometimes related to first language learning, sometimes in opposition to skepticism, sometimes in further, often subtly different contexts. Because of this, it is difficult to say what exactly Davidson's theory (or theories) of triangulation is (are). What is considerably less ambiguous, however, is the idea's reception: that is almost unanimously negative. But because of the ambiguity of the idea(s), some of this critique is difficult to judge on its merit -- as is the idea itself -- and some critics seem to have missed important points. Hence, to judge the theory/theories of triangulation and its/their critics, it is essential to first reconstruct it/them. This reconstruction will be the topic of this talk.
Personal Pronouns
Speaker: Youichi Matsusaka
From: Tokyo Metropolitan University
URL:
Abstract: Semantics for natural language has been conducted on the Fregean
assumption that a sentence, or an utterance of it, has a content that is
neutral to its speaker and hearer. In this talk I wish to pursue a
"Lockean" picture, according to which an utterance is, in the first
place, an externalization of the speaker's internal state. I will
propose to take the notion of speakers' internal, representational
states as primitive, and analyze the meanings of expressions in terms of
how a speaker uses them in verbalizing his relevant internal state. As
a case study I will take up personal pronouns such as "I", "you", and
"he/she", and consider how the analysis of these expressions on this
approach will differ from the classic study given by Kaplan.
Is There a Problem with the Causal Criterion of Event Identity?
Speaker: Rafael De Clercq
From: Lingnan University
URL: http://www.ln.edu.hk/visual/cvrafael.php
Abstract: In this paper, we take another look at the reasons for which the causal criterion of event identity has been abandoned. We argue that the reasons are not strong. First of all, there is a criterion in the neighborhood of the causal criterion---the counterfactual criterion---that is not vulnerable to any of the putative counterexamples brought up in the literature. Secondly, neither the causal criterion nor the counterfactual criterion suffers from any form of vicious circularity. Nonetheless, we do not recommend adopting either the causal or the counterfactual criterion because, given a sufficiently lax principle of event composition, neither criterion can be applied to complex events. This we regard as a (prima facie) undesirable restriction on their applicability.
Are All Impure Quotations Equally Impure?
Speaker: Jan Wislicki
From: University of Warsaw
URL:
Abstract: Suppose one read aloud a written passage. Did she say something informatively or not? On the one hand, the answer is no: she just reproduced someone's words. On the other hand, the answer is yes: she translated an utterance from one sign system to another. That kind of transformation can yield various utterances taking always the same string as an argument. Thus, it represents a set of functions, rather than a single function. Nevertheless, the difference between that kind of quotation and the standard impure quotation is fundamental: it is a sign system shift, not grammatical or semantic operation, that grounds the former. I call it Intersystemic Quotation (IQ). The aim of this talk is threefold. First, it is to present and endorse a theory of quotation proposed in 1938 by Czech logician Reach. Second, it is to discuss the most influential theories of quotation in light of both: Reach's concept and the problem of IQ. Three, it is to present a stronger version of Reach's theory that measures up to the demands of IQ and shows the influence of transformation type on information structure.
Does Perception Admit of Contradiction?
Speaker: MIneki Oguchi
From: Tamagawa University
URL: http://utcp.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/members/data/oguchi_mineki/index_en.php
Abstract: In this talk, I shall defend conceptualism of perceptual experience through responding to one of the classical arguments for nonconceptualism.
Nonconceptualists claim that, whereas belief has a conceptually structured content, perceptual experience has a different kind of content from belief, that is, nonconceptual content. Arguing in favor of nonconceptualism, Tim Crane states that the waterfall illusion (a kind of motion aftereffect) shows that perception is admissible of contradiction unlike belief. When we switch our gaze to a stationary object after taking a long look at a waterfall, the object will appear to move in the opposite direction to that of the waterfall. He said that, while the object appears to move, it also does not appear to move relative to the background of the scene.
If the waterfall illusion does contain a contradictory content such as 'the object moves and does not move at the same time,' it will serve as powerful evidence for nonconceptualism. For, if the content of perception is conceptually structured as that of belief, perceptual experience should not admit obviously contradictory contents.
The admissibility of contradiction in perceptual experience seems to pose a serious problem to conceptualists because they claim that the content of perceptual experience is conceptually structured. How can conceptualists respond to this argument? To my knowledge, no conceptualist has given a direct answer to this problem. In this talk, I shall try to answer this problem by applying 'the sensory classification theory' (Matthen 2005)
According to the sensory classification theory, our sensory system works as parallel classification mechanisms that process input sensory properties into distinct sensory classes. These sensory classes then constitute conceptually structured contents by being predicated to the relevant sensory objects. In this framework, different kinds of sensory properties are represented by corresponding 'feature maps. 'In each feature map,' irrelevant sensory properties are discarded in the sense of Dretske's argument about the digital coding of information. For instance, the information about motion is simply discarded in the location map, and conversely the information about location is simply discarded in the motion map. The sensory information that a certain motion direction is being detected, thus, does not imply the sensory information that a certain location change is being detected. Therefore, if the signal that a certain motion exists and the signal that no location change exists are integrated into a sensory object, the integrated information does not include any contradiction at least where the content of perception is concerned. These two signals come to contradict each other when they are incorporated into our belief system and are combined with our background belief that the motion of an object always accompanies its location change. The waterfall illusion is explained by the fact that the motion information and the location information can be dissociated without any implication about each other. If this interpretation is correct, the waterfall illusion does not include contradiction against Crane's claim.
I shall conclude that Crane's interpretation that the waterfall illusion shows the admissibility of contradiction in perceptual experience is not tenable. We should carefully consider (so to speak) 'the language of perception' when we try to explore what should be seen as contradictory in perceptual experience.
From Beliefs about Consciousness to Consciousness Itself
Speaker: Ryoji Sato
From: University of Tokyo
URL:
Abstract: There are many scientific theories of consciousness in the market. Some say activation of global workspace is important for consciousness, some say thalamocortical loops play a key role in consciousness, some say higher-order processes are responsible for consciousness , some say conscious representations are intermediate-level representations that are accessible to working memory and some say local feedback loops between sensory cortices are crucial for consciousness. How can we adjudicate between those theories?
One important difference lies in how to move from our beliefs about consciousness to brain activities that realize consciousness. Many theories look for brain activities that have properties we believe consciousness to have. For example, Block takes on an intuition that our phenomenal consciousness contains much more than we can report on, and claims local feedback loops in visual cortices, which he thinks store fine-grained visual details, are neural bases of visual consciousness. However, Dennett notoriously argues against this kind of uncritical stance toward our beliefs and all we need to explain is third person data: reports, introspective beliefs, and so on. I argue Dennett is right in thinking phenomenology of richness does not guarantee actual informationally rich processes in the brain but Dennett has gone too far. Chalmers criticizes Dennett in this respect and says "[T]he science of consciousness is not primarily about verbal reports or even about introspective judgments. It is about the experiences that the reports and judgments are reports and judgments of" (Chalmers 2010). I agree with Chalmers and argue there is a midway. What we need to find are some processes that are responsible for the phenomenology, and this will certainly narrow down the options.
Intellectualist Views on Know How and Philosophy of Mind
Speaker: Shun Tsugita
From: University of Tokyo
URL:
Abstract: Since Gilbert Ryle's works were published in 1940s, it has been widely accepted that know how and know that are fundamentally different sorts of our knowledge. Such a conception of know how is often called "anti-intellectualism." Whereas Ryle's solution to the mind-body problem is not at all mainstream now, his anti-intellectualism is still the received view. Many authors seem to think that anti-intellectualism fits with phenomenology of our action. However, intellectualism has been recently rehabilitated by some scholars. They argue that know how is a state of mind of the subject which involves her having some relevant propositional attitude. Indeed, they think Ryle's central argument against intellectualism (so-called "regress argument") is less persuasive. In this talk, I defend such intellectualist conception of know how. This talk discusses the psychological nature of know how and states of intelligence. I do not touch conceptual analysis of knowledge expressions; e.g., the linguistic approach to the ascription of know-how, which is related to the studies of formal semantics of wh-questions. The argument proceeds in the following way. Firstly, as a preparation, I provide a taxonomy to regiment the use of know how and other relevant notions (e.g., practical abilities, procedural knowledge, and so on). Secondly, I give a sketch of how to interpret Ryle's association between anti-intellectualism and behaviorism. I would like to suggest that the decline of behaviorism at least weakens the motivation for anti-intellectualism. Finally, I consider David Wiggins' latest article to defend Ryle's view.
Rethinking Survivor Guilt: An Attempt at a Philosophical Interpretation
Speaker: Satoshi Fukama
From: University of Tokyo
URL: http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/coe/english/achievements/report11.html
Abstract: In this paper I investigate the emotion of guilt, especially survivor guilt, to find its moral significance. The Phenomenon of survivor guilt has been mainly studied in the fields of psychology from pathological and/or evolutionary viewpoints. After the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami (March 11, 2011) and the subsequent large-scale radiation leak that occurred at the Fukushima No. 1 (Dai-Ichi) nuclear power plant, many Japanese became depressed, suffered from fatigue, and then felt a vague sense of fear about their own future. One cause of this mood may be feelings of uneasiness, regret, sorrow, and unbearableness; that is, feelings of guilt about the victims of the disaster and the refugees who were evacuated from Fukushima Prefecture. In general, this feeling of guilt is called survivor guilt.
Survivor guilt is narrowly defined as guilt over surviving the death of a loved one, or broadly defined as guilt about being better off than others. The important feature of this guilt is that it is not directly connected with our voluntary wrong actions. Guilt, especially moral guilt, is an emotion one feels over disobeying a rule or command whose authority one accepts; in this case, the guilt is characterized as the feeling one has about one's wrongdoing. Typically, wrongdoing that is under one's control and for which one can take responsibility is an appropriate object of one's feeling of guilt. However, according to this characterization of guilt, survivor guilt seems to be an inappropriate and irrational emotion. This is because the person who feels survivor guilt has really not done anything wrong.
But is this feeling of guilt really inappropriate and irrational? If the people who suffered depression from survivor guilt are actually inflicted with an inappropriate and irrational emotion, should they instead be regarded as suffering from a pathological condition? Some psychologists (and also some philosophers) think so. However, I cannot agree with them because their understanding of survivor guilt is unilateral and insufficient. In this paper I try to investigate the phenomenon of survivor guilt from a philosophical perspective and explicate its features and practical meaning to justify this feeling of guilt in terms of the fact that only moral superiors can have it rationally and appropriately.
Recovering Speaker Meanings
Speaker: Eric McCready
From: Aoyama Gakuin University
URL:
Abstract: Natural language contains many expressions with underspecified emotive content. This paper proposes a way to resolve such underspecification. Nonmonotonic inference over a knowledge base is used to derive an expected interpretation for emotive expressions in a particular context. This 'normal' meaning is then taken to influence the hearer's expectations about probable interpretations, and, because of these probable interpretations, the decisions of the speaker about when use of underspecified emotive terms is appropriate.
Logic Education for Philosophers: A Case in Japan
Speaker: Yuko Murakami
From: Tohoku University
URL: http://homepage3.nifty.com/yuko_murakami/
Abstract: It was a cliche that Japanese are not logical. Such a claim was heard almost every day on major newspapers twenty years ago. Many logic books in Japanese were published since then. Murakami (1998), a report of logic education in an American philosophy education system in the domestic context, focuses rather on pedagogical problem in higher education: lack of practice sessions due to just nominal TA system, for example.
Murakami (2009) proposes integrating logic component in philosophy education to PSSJ members with consideration of reality of Japanese higher education. The proposal is in fact under implementation with a partial support by JSPS Grant-in-aid Project "Promotion of Advanced Logic for Philosophers" (2011-2014) with Shunsuke Yatabe. The project aims to draft a teaching material of advanced logic in Japanese. Discussion has included coverage of topics and implementation of pedagogical training. Project members have given courses in proof theory and logic in philosophy as well as a short lecture series in Kyoto.
While such intermediate and advanced courses have been tried, an introductory course of logic became available as a massive open online course (MOOC). It may change the learning environment for everybody who can access online. Currently COURSERA does not offer a transcript in Japanese for courses of the first-year courses, but it is possible in a few years.
In this talk, findings from trial runs of such courses will be discussed. Comments are welcome.
Temporary Intrinsics and the Problem of Alienation
Speaker: Sung-il Han
From: Seoul National University
URL:
Abstract: It is widely agreed that Lewis's argument from temporary intrinsics against endurantism is a failed one and the problem of temporary intrinsics plays no significant role in the debate over persistence. In this paper, I argue that the near consensus is premature by achieving two aims. First, I aim to show that, contrary to the wide agreement, Lewis's argument works effectively against endurantism. The standard response to Lewis's argument is simply to dismiss one main premise as a question-begging restatement of Lewis's intuition - the premise that objects have their intrinsic properties simpliciter. I argue that, what Lewis means (or should mean) by the main premise, contrary to a popular understanding, is that if one accepts endurantism, on the face of the problem of temporary intrinsics, one cannot but "alienate" persisting objects from their temporary intrinsics. But, Lewis left unanswered what is wrong with the alienation of an object from its intrinsic properties. I fill in the justificatory blank by arguing that anyone who subscribes to the intra-object alienation faces what I call the problem of alienation. My second aim is to show that the consequences of accepting Lewis's argument are more radical than Lewis realized. While Lewis repudiates the intra-object alienation, he commits himself to the alienation of objects from other objects or the inter-object alienation. I argue that Lewis's argument can be extended to refute the inter-object alienation as well. The right moral to draw from the problem of temporary intrinsics is that an adequate account of persistence should be explored within the ontology of alienation-free time-bound objects.
On the Concept of a Token Generator
Speaker: Takashi Iida
From: Nihon University
URL: http://www.chs.nihon-u.ac.jp/philosophy/faculty/iida/index.html
Abstract: Type entities like words, songs, and novels are supposed to be abstract
in the sense that they do not have specific spatial and temporal
location, while their tokens are concrete entities that are located in
some specific place and time. We frequently speak, however, of a word
which existed twenty years ago but does not exist now, or a novel
written in Heian-era which no longer exists. Such a fact seems to
suggest that type entities are at least temporal entities. But then
several questions arise immediately: If a type entity is a temporal
entity, when does it exist? Does it exist only when some of its tokens exist?
Does a word as a type cease to exist in the period when none of its
tokens are uttered? If so, a type would exist only discontinuously in time,
but why can a type retain its identity in spite of such a discontinuity?
I would like to introduce the concept of a token generator, which is
some concrete entity which contains a specification of a procedure for
producing a token, and argue that we can answer the questions
like above by means of this concept. Further, I would like to extend
this concept in such a way that a speaker of a language can be seen as a
kind of a token generator.
Epistemic Diversity as a Means for Mutual Checking
Speaker: Tetsuji Iseda
From: Kyoto University
URL: http://www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~tiseda/
Abstract: In this presentation, I explore the role of epistemic
diversity in an academic field. An academic field (including natural
science, social science and humanities) can be diverse in many different
senses. Some diversities (such as theoretical diversity and
methodological diversity) are "epistemic" in the sense that they are
directly related to the research in the field. Such epistemic diversity
has been one of main concerns of social epistemology (Solomon 2006).
In Iseda 2011, I proposed a model of epistemic diversity, according to
which diversity can serve as a means for mutual checking under certain
circumstances (which I call Diversity for Mutual Checking, DMC for
short). This is of course an old idea originating Mill and developed by
Popper, but DMC is new in the sense that it tries to specify the
conditions for a diversity to be productive. In this presentation, I
will look at several paramaters that influence such productivity.
Sometimes You Just Got Lucky
Speaker: Masahiro Yamada
From: Claremont Graduate University
URL: http://www.cgu.edu/pages/3983.asp
Abstract: Our existence is said to require a fine-tuned universe. Some people think that therefore our own existence is evidence that there are multiple universes; others that our existence is evidence that there is an intelligent designer. Such views enjoy apparent support from probabilistic arguments. This paper argues that such views depend on an overly simplistic application of probability theory. In particular, a more careful approach to the assignment of relevant prior probabilities shows that our existence is no evidence for either multiple universes or an intelligent designer. One can rationally maintain that our existence is due to luck.
Experimental Philosophy and the Bankruptcy of the Great Tradition
Speaker: Stephen P. Stich
From: Rutgers University
URL: http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/
Abstract: From Plato to the present, appeal to intuition has played a central role in philosophy. However, recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that in many cases intuition cannot be a reliable source of evidence for philosophical theories. Without careful empirical work, there is no way of knowing which intuitions are unreliable. Thus the venerable tradition that views philosophy as a largely a priori discipline that can be pursued from the armchair is untenable. This talk will survey some of the ways in which intuition is used in philosophy, give an overview of the growing body of evidence indicating that intuition is often unreliable, and develop the argument that this evidence undermines the tradition of armchair philosophy. Several new studies focusing on the intuitions of professional philosophers will be discussed.
Cross Term Restrictions in the Theory of Logical Consequence
Speaker: Conrad Asmus
From: Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST)
URL: http://www.conradasmus.com/Default.aspx
Abstract: In The Concept of Logical Consequence, John Etchemendy argues against interpretational theories of consequence. An interpretational theory of consequence deems A to be a consequence of B if and only if, for every interpretation of the non-logical vocabulary in A and B, if B is true, so is A. Only the interpretation of non-logical vocabulary is allowed to vary; other than this, the way that the world is must remain constant. Etchemendy demonstrates that any interpretational theory of consequence for classical logic (where the domains of quantification vary) relies on cross term restrictions. A cross term restriction is a restriction on the variation of interpretations between logical categories. This is an unwarranted restriction on all possible interpretations and is, according to Etchemendy, unmotivated in the interpretational context. I will show that there are standard free logics that do motivate some cross term restriction. I will then discuss observations from Dummett's Frege: philosophy of language that provide different ways of motivating cross term restrictions in the non-free logic cases. If any of these motivations are acceptable, then classical logic can be recaptured. Finally, I will discuss the importance of this discussion for noninterpretational theories.
Grounding Alethic Pluralism
Speaker: Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
From: Yonsei University
URL: http://www.nikolajpedersen.com/
Abstract: According to alethic pluralism, the nature of truth varies from subject matter to subject matter. It might be that propositions concerning ordinary physical objects, say, are true in virtue of corresponding with reality while arithmetical propositions are true in virtue of cohering with the axioms of Peano Arithmetic. Most pluralist views are moderate in nature. While they incorporate the idea that propositions from different domains may be true in virtue of possessing di fferent properties, they likewise acknowledge the existence of a single truth property---truth-as-such---applicable within all domains of discourse. Thus, on moderate pluralist views truth is both One and Many. Moderate pluralists owe a story about the relationship between the One and the Many. In this paper I critically discuss two moderate pluralist accounts of the One-Many relationship. In light of this discussion I proceed to develop my own account.
An Attempt at the Logic of "Hypothetical Actualization of (Im/)Possibilities"
Speaker: Kengo Okamoto
From: Tokyo Metropolitan University
URL: http://www.tmu.ac.jp/stafflist/data/a/350.html
Abstract: Owing to unavailability of relevant information, we often hypothesize certain possibilities (or, as the case may be, even impossibilities) as "actualized in midst of our reality" and by so doing derive various consequences about "the reality extended with the hypothesized (im)possibilities", as e.g. in the following reasoning. (Lost in the mountains) Suppose we are not so far from where our guidebook would take us. Then, as the book instructs us, there is a spring nearby.
Among specific features of this kind of examples seem to be the following.
(1) Although this reasoning could be reformulated as asserting the conditional: If we are not far from ..., then, ..., this conditional neither can be classified as a material conditional, nor as a counterfactual conditional (since the antecedent might really turn out to be true), nor as a so-called indicative conditional (such as could be interpreted as expressing some appropriate conditional probability).
(2) On the other hand, it would not be proper simply to reduce the reasoning to an instance of the well known scheme of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, since we are here not hypothesizing certain lawlike general statements (indeed, these would correspond in our case to the content of the guidebook, whose reliability we are not questioning at all), deducing their consequences and thereby attempting to confirm or falsify them; rather we just augment our presupposed set of information of the reality by assuming actualizations of certain (im)possible facts and just look at what will actually come out of this extended set of our presuppositions and assumptions.
Ordinary modal logics, including epistemic logics, do not immediately provide us with means of dealing with this kind of reasoning sufficiently. So we will propose that we should make use of various ideas from hybrid logics, relevant logics and Izumi Takeuti's Logic of Hearsay.
The Job of 'Ethics Committees'
Speaker: Andrew Moore
From: Otago University
URL: http://www.otago.ac.nz/philosophy/Staff/andrew_moore.html
Abstract: Is it best to give ethics committees the job of review for consistency with duly established standards, or instead the job of review for ethical acceptability? I show that each of these two views is present in leading guidelines and scholarly writings. I present arguments for the established-standards view and arguments against the ethical-acceptability view. I also argue that the best criticisms of the established-standards view fail; arguments from: counter-example, committee independence, ethical judgment, anti-hypocrisy, criticism of 'rule of law' views, the name 'ethics committee', and the idea that there is really just one ethics committee job description here. Finally, I argue for revision of influential guidelines worldwide, on the name of the committees, their job description, and their membership requirements.
Imagining the Imaginable Causal Stories on the Basis of Causal Models: A Causal Structuralist Interpretation of Economic Theorization
Speaker: Szu-Ting Chen
From: National Tsing Hua University
URL: http://www.phil.nthu.edu.tw/index.php/faculty/show/id/9/typeid/1
Abstract: In this presentation, I illustrate that, as is manifested in the practices of economic theorization, a theoretical representation between a theory and the world can be decomposed into two component representations: a formal representation and a causal narrative representation. I further maintain that, with respect to both component representations, the concern of isomorphism is important in that it is the guiding idea that underlies economists' practice of identifying both an adequate formal model and a plausible causal story to represent the targeted phenomenon. As a result, it can be argued that the nature of the representational relation is manifested in the practices of economists as they imagine the imaginable causal stories on the basis of imaginative causal structures depicted in the causal models of the targeted phenomenon.
Imaginative Resistance and Higher-Lower Inconsistency
Speaker: Kengo Miyazono
From: University of Tokyo
URL: http://kengomiyazono.com/index-en.html
Abstract: What is the crucial feature of the stories evoking so-called "imaginative resistance"? In this article, I examine "Higher-Lower Inconsistency View (HLI)" according to which the crucial feature is the inconsistency between higher-level propositions and lower-level propositions in the stories (Weatherson). I compare two possible interpretations of HLI; HLI (1) regards the higher-lower inconsistency in explicitly written story-texts as crucial, while HLI (2) takes the higher-lower inconsistency in what I call "extended stories" as crucial. I argue for HLI (2) by showing that HLI (2) solves some problems for HLI (1). In this talk, I will also discuss the relationship between imaginative resistance (a philosophical puzzle) and moral/conventional task (a task used in moral psychological experiments). I will argue that these two can't be independent from each other since there is very interesting connections between the them.
Reason, Emotion, and Moral Judgment
Speaker: Yukihiro Nobuhara
From: University of Tokyo
URL: http://utcp.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/members/data/nobuhara_yukihiro/index_en.php
Abstract: Neuroscientific study on moral cognition has demonstrated that emotion plays an important role in moral judgment. But what role does emotion play in moral judgment? It would not be surprising if emotion only distorts moral judgments. The interesting question is whether emotion at least sometimes promotes rational moral judgments. To address this question, I examine two models of moral cognition. One is Greene's cognitive control model, in which emotion only distorts moral cognition. The other is Moll's cortico-limbic integration model, in which emotion cooperates with reason to promote adequate moral cognition. I argue that Moll's model is superior to Greene's. Finally, although Moll's model emphasizes the integration of reason and emotion in moral cognition, I argue that the phenomena of weakness of the moral will show the existence of a purely rational system.
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On the Very Idea of Imperative Inference
Speaker: Tomoyuki Yamada
From: Hokkaido University
URL: http://www.hucc.hokudai.ac.jp/~k15696/home/yamada/yamada.html
Abstract: Suppose you are on a team of researchers and the leader of the
group orders you to give a presentation of the results of the research
project the team has been engaged in at a one day international workshop
to be held in Sao Paulo on August 9 this year. Suppose, in
addition, you are also a member of a political group and you have
received a letter from the guru of the group in which she commands
you to join an important demonstration in Sapporo on the very same
day. Although the time in Sao Paulo is 12 hours behind the time in
Sapporo, you will not be able to attend the workshop in Sao Paulo if
you join the demonstration in Sapporo. The possibility of conflicts of
this kind among orders, commands, and so on clearly shows that there
are various logical relations among them, and the idea of imperative
inference looks attractive. But it is not clear how these relations are
to be captured in a systematic way. Are they relations between imperative
sentences? Or between imperative utterances? Or between what
are expressed by uttering imperative sentences? The purpose of this
paper is to examine what light a formal theory of directive speech acts
developed in the form of dynami ed deontic logic can shed on these
and related issues.
False `Explanantia' and the Enhanced Indispensability Argument
Speaker: Michael Sands
From: University of Pittsburgh
URL: http://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/graduates/sands.php
Abstract: In recent debates about mathematical ontology, the "enhanced
indispensability" argument has been advanced in favor of Platonism:
1. We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity that plays
an indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific theories.
2. Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science.
3. Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical
objects.
Much debate has surrounded the second premise, with debates about whether
genuine mathematical examples exist. However, I will criticize the first premise by arguing first that it relies on the supposition that every `explanans' must be true in an ontologically committing way. Second, I will undermine this supposition by presenting a plausible conception of explanation, championed by Robert Batterman and Mark Wilson, that permits false `explanantia'.
Is an "Objective" Description of Conscious Phenomenology Possible?
Speaker: John O'Dea
From: University of Tokyo
URL: http://jodea.net/
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the central premise in the so-called "Knowledge Argument" is not as well supported as many suppose. This is the premise that it will seem to Mary (the hypothetical ideal neuroscientist made famous by Frank Jackson) that she learns something about consciousness when she has a new experience, namely, what the experience "feels like". I elaborate on a recent response to the Knowledge Argument by Jackson himself to motivate the Dennettian view that Mary already knew what experiences feel like.
Wittgenstein and Arithmetical Proofs
Speaker: Mitsu Okada
From: Keio University
URL: http://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/person/mitsu/jindex.html
Abstract: In the transition period Wittgenstein often used examples from mathematics to experiment on his philosophical arguments. In this talk we focus on Wittgenstein's discussion of arithmetical "proofs" in his Big Typescript/Philosophical Grammar, in which he presented his own modified form of recursive proofs, now known as "uniqueness" proofs; this modification is not at all a trivial one. We explain why Wittgenstein considered this modified form of proofs to be particularly important, in terms of his "saying- showing" distinction a "proposition-as-proof" standpoint, and a (non-strict) finitism standpoint, among others. We also argue that this modified form marks an important difference between his philosophy of arithmetic in Tractatus and that of his later texts. We then discuss the influence from Skolem's equational arithmetic on Wittgenstein, and that of Wittgenstein on Goodstein's constructive arithmetic. We will then conclude with a discussion of the importance of Wittgenstein's ideas within contemporary philosophy of mathematics. (This work is partly a joint work with Mathieu Marion.)
A Deflationary Theory of Existence (Part 1)
Speaker: Takashi Yagisawa
From: California State University, Northridge
URL: http://www.csun.edu/~vcoao0fk/index.html
Abstract: I propose and defend a theory of existence according to which existence is a relation between a thing and a collection of things. A thing x exists relative to a collection C of things if and only if x belongs to C. This demystifies existence. Existence is brought down to earth and reduced to the non-exotic notions of collection and collection membership. In most cases of particular existence statements, the membership in a collection C is definable as `for any x, x is in C iff x is F,' where F is a fairly straightforward predicate. When this is the case, existence relative to C simply amounts to being F. This is the sense in which my proposal is deflationary; understanding existence does not go beyond understanding the membership in C, or being F.
My proposal allows many things to exist, including abstract things, Cartesian egos, merely possible things, and even impossible things, as long as the right collection is chosen as the second relatum. In this sense, my proposal is tolerant of ontological inflation. It offers a lean and reductive analysis of the notion of existence but allows anything to exist as long as an appropriate collection is chosen. It is a theory that is deflationary with respect to existence but tolerant of inflation with respect to existents, one might say.
NOTE: Part 2 will be given in the Hongo Metaphysics Club (Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Tokyo) on May 30, 4-7 PM. Further particulars on this event will be posted in due time under: http://www.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/philosophy/index-e.html
Affective Beliefs, Cognitive Desires, and Value Invariance
Speaker: David Etlin
From: University of Groningen
URL: http://sites.google.com/site/davidetlin2/
Abstract:
Endurance and Pure Becoming
Speaker: Daisuke Kachi
From: Saitama University
URL: http://www.kyy.saitama-u.ac.jp/~kachi/prof.html
Abstract: Firstly I characterize endurance with the concept of R. Taylor's pure becoming, believing that the reality of endurance is another side of the reality of becoming. Secondly I try to defend the endurantism based on pure becoming from the attack on the ground of its being incompatible with the theory of special relativity.
Knowledge and Dependence
Speaker: Nick Zangwill
From: Durham University
URL: http://www.dur.ac.uk/nick.zangwill
Abstract: I foreground principle of epistemic dependence. I isolate that relation and distinguish it from other relations and note what it does and does not entail. In particular, I insist on the distinction between dependence and necessitation. This has many interesting consequences. On the negative side, many standard arguments in epistemology are subverted. But, more positively, once we are liberated from the necessary and sufficient conditions project, many fruitful paths for future epistemological investigation open up.
Probabilistic Causality Revisited (Inaugural Talk)
Speaker: Masaki Ichinose
From: University of Tokyo
URL: http://www.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/philosophy/profichinose.html
Abstract: In this talk I will discuss the problem of how to specify a particular causal relation. After initially referring to a negative attitude towards causation proposed by Russell, I will confirm how indispensable causal judgement is to our lives through remembering the intrinsic connection between causality and responsibility. Then, I will examine an idea of what is called "probabilistic causality", as the idea seems to be quite dominant in the contemporary context on the philosophy of causation. Scrutinizing the Bayesian method and "Simpson's paradox" with mentioning Cartwright's argument, I eventually consider a normative nature that causation should be essentially involved in.