TFAP
Tokyo Forum For Analytic Philosophy
Program
Why Reasoning Concludes in Action, and Why You Should Care
Speaker: Yair Levy
From: Tel Aviv University
URL: https://www.yairlevy.sites.tau.ac.il/
Abstract: Philosophers traditionally construe practical reasoning as a psychological process of transition between mental attitudes. The reasoning agent starts off with some aim she sets out to achieve and works out how to achieve it, or perhaps uses her reasoning to work out what to aim for in the first place. Either way, the thought is that her reasoning involves only mental attitudes, and specifically that it concludes in the agent’s intention to V or her judgment that V-ing is the thing to do. Here I defend the heterodox alternative position, originating in Aristotle, according to which practical reasoning concludes in action. While very much a minority view, I will aim to show that the Aristotelian doctrine is in fact much more faithful to the intuitive, pre-theoretical place of reasoning in our lives. This constitutes a rare constructive argument for the Aristotelian doctrine, in a debate dominated by objections and rejoinders to the very possibility that the thesis could be true.
The game of philosophy
Speaker: Alexandre Declos
From: Université de Neuchâtel
URL: https://www.unine.ch/philo/alexandre-declos/
Abstract: Is philosophy a game we are playing? This question may seem absurd at first glance. Yet, I shall argue that it is both worth considering and deserves an affirmative answer. I will begin by showing that philosophical practice can be a form of game-playing, by considering scholastic disputes, backward reasoning, and conditional reasoning. I will then offer an argument for the stronger claim that philosophical practice is a form of game-playing in Bernard Suits’ sense (i.e. the voluntary acceptance of unnecessary obstacles). This argument relies on a thought experiment: if we had access to a Super-Computer capable of providing true answers to all philosophical questions, would we use it? I argue that we would not, and that this reveals that we are (counterfactually) willing to accept unnecessary obstacles. If so, philosophical practice is a game: our goal is not merely to discover philosophical truths, but to reach them through our own intellectual efforts. I shall conclude by arguing that the lusory model does not diminish the value of philosophy.
Toward a Generative View of Testimonial Justification
Speaker: Sui Shimizu
From: Hokkaido University
URL:
Abstract: The debate between transmissive and generative views of testimony is usually framed in terms of knowledge. According to the generation view, testimony can generate knowledge even when neither the speaker nor the testimonial chain previously possessed that knowledge. However, Wright (2016) argues that the real issue underlying the dispute concerns justification rather than knowledge, particularly propositional justification. Despite the significance of this challenge, a generative account of testimonial justification remains largely unexplored.
Interestingly, a similar debate in the epistemology of memory has developed in a different direction. While early discussions focused on the generation of memorial knowledge, subsequent work has centred on whether memory preserves or generates propositional justification, yielding increasingly refined accounts of the preservative/generative distinction.
In this talk, I draw on these developments in the epistemology of memory to reconsider the testimonial case. Using the framework proposed by Miyazono and Tooming (2025), I examine existing generative accounts of testimony and sketch a more precise way of understanding the distinction between the transmission and generation of testimonial justification.
TBA
Speaker: Alan Baker
From: Swarthmore College
URL: https://www.swarthmore.edu/profile/alan-baker
Abstract: TBA
TBA
Speaker: Chris Letheby
From: University of Western Australia
URL: https://research-repository.uwa.edu.au/en/persons/chris-letheby/
Abstract: TBA
Bayesian Confirmation Without the Problems of Old Evidence and Circularity
Speaker: Frank Zenker
From: Nankai University
URL: https://phil.nankai.edu.cn/enn/2023/0301/c29847a505408/page.htm
Abstract: Bayesian Confirmation Theory faces two core challenges: the Problem of Old
Evidence, where known data fails to incrementally confirm a hypothesis, and the Circularity
Problem, where defining confirmation via posterior probabilities presupposes the very belief
state being evaluated. This paper dissolves both problems by defining confirmation through the
Likelihood Ratio, grounded in an agent’s hypothetical prior probability distribution—their
evidence-independent reasoning commitments. Because contingent evidence has a probability
between 0 and 1 in this prior distribution, the old evidence retains its actualized confirmational
power without counterfactual assumptions. Furthermore, because LR relies exclusively on
likelihoods, it avoids circularity by operating independently of posterior probabilities or initial
priors. Beyond resolving historical paradoxes, this framework provides a principled criterion for
scientific pursuitworthiness, allowing researchers to assess an experiment's potential epistemic
value prior to gathering data.
TBA
Speaker: Tomoya Kubota
From: University of Tokyo
URL: https://researchmap.jp/kubotatomoya?lang=en
Abstract: TBA
TBA
Speaker: Diana Craciun
From: University College London & Human Abilities Center, Berlin
URL: https://www.dianacraciun.co.uk
Abstract: TBA
TBA
Speaker: Gurpreet Rattan
From: University of Toronto
URL: https://discover.research.utoronto.ca/5751-gurpreet-rattan/about
Abstract: TBA
TBA
Speaker: Sam Clarke
From: University of Southern California
URL: https://sampclarke.net/
Abstract: TBA