Tokyo Forum For Analytic Philosophy

Program

Monday 22 Jan 2018
Jesse Mulder

A Puzzle About Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Speaker: Jesse Mulder
From: University of Utrecht
URL: http://jessemulder.com/
Abstract: Higher-order theories of consciousness start from the thought that a conscious state is a state one is aware of being in. So they use the transitive notion "awareness of ..." in order to account for the intransitive idea of "being conscious" (which is glossed as "having conscious mental states"). I argue, however, that their explanatory notion, "awareness of", implies a form of ‘seeming’ that the higher-order approach requires, yet cannot account for. I show that (1) if the relevant kind of seeming is declared to be present in all representational states, the seeming in question is objectionably trivialized; that (2) using the higher-order strategy to capture the relevant kind of seeming together with intransitive consciousness in one fell swoop results in an infinite regress; and that (3) highlighting distinctive features of representations that explain why they display seeming amounts to abandoning the higher-order approach altogether. I end by considering the prospects of a higher-order theory of consciousness in the light of these considerations. They are dim.

 
 
Wednesday 4 Apr 2018
Clare Mac Cumhaill

TBA

Speaker: Clare Mac Cumhaill
From: Durham University
URL: https://www.dur.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/?id=11902
Abstract: TBA

 
 
Wednesday 25 Apr 2018
Istvan Zardai

Doings and Things Done

Speaker: Istvan Zardai
From: Keio University
URL: https://keio.academia.edu/IstvanZoltanZardai
Abstract: TBA

 
 
Wednesday 9 May 2018
Adam Marushak

TBA

Speaker: Adam Marushak
From: University of Pittsburgh
URL: http://www.adammarushak.com/
Abstract: TBA

 
 
Wednesday 7 Nov 2018
Salvatore Florio

TBA

Speaker: Salvatore Florio
From: University of Birmingham
URL: https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/philosophy/florio-salvatore.aspx
Abstract: TBA

 
 
Tuesday 4 Dec 2018
Aviv Hoffmann

Propositions and Their Constituent Facts: An Essay in Pointillist Metaphysics

Speaker: Aviv Hoffmann
From: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
URL:
Abstract: Consider two fundamental questions in the metaphysics of propositions. (1) What in the nature of a proposition enables it to be true (or false)? (2) What in the nature of a proposition enables it to be about a given thing (especially, what enables necessarily equivalent propositions to be about distinct things)? To answer these questions, I offer the biregional theory of propositions. According to this theory, propositions inhabit what I call exemplification space, where each point is either a positive or a negative world-specific fact (such as the fact that Sophia is sad at w1 and the fact that it is not the case that Sophia is sad at w2, respectively). Propositions are (some) ordered pairs of disjoint regions of exemplification space: the first component of a pair corresponds to the truth of the proposition, and the second component corresponds to the falsity of the proposition. A proposition is true (false) at a possible world iff some fact in the truth (falsity) region of the proposition is specific to that world. A proposition is about a thing iff some fact in either the truth or the falsity region of the proposition is about the thing. The biregional theory is part of a novel doctrine I call metaphysical pointillism, which also includes a theory of facts and a concomitant theory of truth-making (I expound these theories elsewhere).

 
 
Wednesday 12 Dec 2018
Anna Marmodoro

TBA

Speaker: Anna Marmodoro
From: Durham University
URL: https://www.dur.ac.uk/research/directory/staff/?mode=staff&id=15318
Abstract: TBA