It featured the work of Hyeryoung Kang, Mickaella Perina, and Emily S. Lee. Also, at the 2013 Pacific Division meeting, Halla Kim organized a panel “The Philosophy of YiJing and Its Contemporary Significances,” which included Tze-ki Hon, Chung-Ying Cheng, Eric Nelson, and Halla Kim. Also at this meeting, Prasanta Bandyopadhyay organized a panel, “Different Dimensions of Buddhism,” that featured the work of Sara Waller, William Deal, and Prasanta Bandyopadhyay. Many thanks to you all!

Finally, the committee typically shifts its membership over the summer. Concluding his term this summer is Yubraj Aryal. Thank you for your work on the committee, Yubraj! And joining us are Jay Garfield (as associate chair for 2013–14, to be followed by a term as chair from 2014–2017), Bina Gupta, and Leah Kalmanson.

Jay L. Garfield is Kwan Im Thong Hood Cho Temple Professor of Humanities at Yale-NUS College in Singapore and Doris Silbert Professor in the Humanities at Smith College. He also teaches at the National University of Singapore, Yale University, the University of Melbourne, and the Central University of Tibetan Studies in India. Jay works on Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, nineteenth and early twentieth-century Indian philosophy, and cross-cultural hermeneutics, focusing on various topics in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, logic, and ethics.

Bina Gupta is a Curators’ Distinguished Research Professor, Professor of Philosophy, and Director of the South Asia Language and Area program at University of Missouri, Columbia, in the United States. She is the author or editor of several books, over eighty articles, and numerous book reviews on subjects including Indian philosophy, Buddhism, feminism, and comparative philosophy. Some of her important works are Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta (Bucknell University Press, 1991), The Disinterested Witness: A Fragment of Advaita Vedanta Phenomenology (Northwestern University Press, 1998), Cit (Consciousness), (Oxford University Press, 2000), Reason and Experience in Indian philosophy (Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2009), An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge, and Freedom (Routledge, 2012), and Consciousness, Knowledge, and Ignorance (American Institute of Buddhist Studies, Columbia University, in the series “Treasury of the Indic Sciences,” 2012).

Leah Kalmanson is an assistant professor in the department of philosophy and religion at Drake University. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa in 2010. She publishes in the area of comparative and continental philosophy, including the articles “Buddhism and bell hooks: Liberatory Aesthetics and Radical Subjectivity of No-Self (Hypatia, 2012), ”The Messiah and the Bodhisattva: Anti-Utopianism Re-Visited” (Shofar, 2012), and “Levinas in Japan: The Ethics of Alterity and the Philosophy of No-Self” (Continental Philosophy Review, 2010). She has also edited several collections, including Levinas and Asian Thought with Frank Garrett and Sarah Mattice (Duquesne University Press, forthcoming), Buddhist Responses to Globalization with James Mark Shields (Lexington Press, forthcoming), and Confucianism in Context with Wonsuk Chang (SUNY, 2010). In future research, she is especially interested in thinking through the connections between postcolonial and cross-cultural philosophy, studying the role of ritual efficacy in the construction of identity, and articulating Buddhist resources for socio-political activism.

Welcome Jay, Bina, and Leah!

ARTICLES

Neuroscience, Moral Sentimentalism, and Confucian Philosophy: Moral Psychology of the Body and Emotion

Bongrae Seok
ALVERNIA UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

As an empirical study of the human mind and behavior, “moral psychology” refers to the psychological investigation of human conduct regarding moral values and principles. Lawrence Kohlberg’s and Jean Piaget’s studies of moral development are classical examples.1 There are, however, significant traditions in philosophy that consider cognitive and affective abilities of the mind in their analyses of moral judgments and principles. For example, philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Mencius discuss moral judgments and dispositions not from the perspective of absolute moral principles but of the specialized functions and abilities of the mind. In this paper, by combining psychological studies of moral cognition and philosophical reflection on the nature of the moral mind, I will develop an empirically informed and philosophically inspired analysis of embodied moral emotion. From the perspectives of neuroscience, moral sentimentalism, and Confucian philosophy, I will discuss the role embodied emotion plays in our moral judgments and actions, and argue that the body is an essential part of our moral ability. Particularly, I will illustrate how an interdisciplinary (philosophy and psychology) and comparative (Eastern and Western moral traditions) approach to moral psychology helps us to understand the nature of the moral mind and how Asian philosophy, specifically Confucian philosophy, provides insight into our investigation of embodied moral affection.

MORAL EMOTION

For decades, philosophers and psychologists have investigated the nature and function of emotion in its contribution to moral judgments and actions. Some psychologists report that a group of emotions—such as disgust, anger, and contempt—initiate, affect, and motivate moral judgments and actions.2 Others focus on prosocial emotions—such as empathy, care, and concern—and their contributions to our other-regarding or other-caring moral sense.3 In philosophy, moral sentimentalism promotes the view that our moral judgments are greatly influenced or effectively caused by a particular type of affective sense that arises when we observe others’ behavior and dispositions.4 Just as we appreciate the beauty (the aesthetic qualities) of a sculpture when we see its color, shape, and composition, we evaluate the morality (the moral qualities) of actions and dispositions through our affective moral sense. This process of moral cognition (identification of norms and
versions of moral sentimentalism, particularly Hume's, functions to serve moral judgments and actions. In many them, particularly between socio-cognitive and affective-components, and close cooperation or interaction among important to note that a moral sentiment has separate as the essential nature of our moral abilities. It is, however, certain actions and dispositions. In moral sentimentalism, other-caring affection, we feel approval or disapproval over a sense and affection: out of an other-regarding sense and moral sentiment (i.e., a mental state with an other-regarding sense). One way to interpret moral emotion is to interpret it as the extension and refinement of emotions such as empathy.

The nature of moral emotion, however, needs careful analysis. One way to understand moral emotion is to interpret it as a moral sentiment (i.e., a mental state with an other-regarding sense and affection: out of an other-regarding sense and other-caring affection, we feel approval or disapproval over certain actions and dispositions). In moral sentimentalism, these empathetic and motivational processes are regarded as the essential nature of our moral abilities. It is, however, important to note that a moral sentiment has separate components, and close cooperation or interaction among them, particularly between socio-cognitive and affective-motivational components, is critical for its successful functions to serve moral judgments and actions. In many versions of moral sentimentalism, particularly Hume's, empathetic concern and caring affection are intrinsically related to or include our understanding of others' inner states. According to Hume, our moral actions and decisions come out of our ability to understand others' behaviors by representing their inner states in our minds and our ability to be affected by and to react to them with approval or disapproval. Since being moral, in this context, means being able to sense, feel, and be affected by others' beliefs, intentions, feelings, and dispositions, a Humean moral agent needs to have the moral psychological ability to recognize, understand, and share others' inner psychological states in addition to having feelings of attraction (moral approval) and rejection (moral disapproval) toward them.

This seemingly strong association between social cognition (i.e., knowing what others think and feel) and moral cognition (i.e., knowing what is right and good for oneself and others) is typically observed in such moral sentiments as pity and concern. But the association is not absolute. The Social Intelligence Hypothesis, also referred to as "The Machiavellian Hypothesis," suggests that knowing what others think and feel does not necessarily motivate caring moral behavior. Many individuals are disposed to use their understanding and knowledge of others' cognitive and affective states to manipulate and affect others. Perhaps human intelligence has evolved to develop and to deal with the potentially manipulative nature of social cognition. On the one hand, psychopaths (individuals who suffer from a particular form of anti-social personality disorder) are often characterized as manipulative Machiavellian individuals. Psychopaths know what others believe, desire, and feel, but, despite their intact social cognition, most of them engage in anti-social or anti-moral behavior. Perhaps the link between social cognition and moral motivation (an essential psychological association that characterizes such moral emotions as empathy, care, and concern) is broken in their minds. On the other hand, lack of social cognition does not necessarily prevent individuals from acting morally or prosocially to others. Many autistic individuals are responsible and compassionate moral agents, even though their impaired social cognition allows only limited ability to understand others' inner representational states.

One way to respond to this challenge, given that the Social Intelligence Hypothesis is true, is to accept the psychological dissociation between social cognition and moral cognition (moral affect and moral motivation, in particular) and to abandon or modify the sentimentalist approach to the intrinsic or at least close connection between social cognition and moral cognition in some moral emotions, such as pity and concern. If pity or concern consists of a set of dissociable (i.e., independently operating) psychological components, moral sentimentalism, as a theory concerning the nature and function of moral emotion, needs to provide an explanation of why and how these dissociable components are combined in our other-regarding or other-caring affections or to consider the possibility of asocial moral sentiments, i.e., moral affect with minimal social cognition. Even if the Social Intelligence Hypothesis is not true, there still remain questions about the nature of moral emotion, its relation to social and moral cognition, and its power to motivate prosocial behavior. How do emotions affect our moral judgments and motivate moral actions? Can moral sentimentalists answer these questions and deal with their moral psychological challenges?

**SOCIAL COGNITION AND MORAL COGNITION**

According to Hume, a virtuous disposition or morally praiseworthy action is the one that generates positive (satisfactory) feelings and a vicious disposition or morally blameworthy action is the one that generates negative (uneasy) feelings. These feelings motivate moral approbation and disapprobation. He says that "we partake of their [the suffering victims'] uneasiness by sympathy, and as every thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call'd Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue." He also adds that "reflecting on the tendency of characters and mental qualities is sufficient to give us the sentiments of approbation and blame." Here, Humean sympathy plays a dual role. One is the reflection of another's mind (mental states, intentions, and dispositions), and the other is the feeling of moral approbation (satisfaction) or disapprobation (uneasiness). In Hume's sentimentalism, therefore, moral cognition combines moral sense (the sense of what is morally right and wrong) and social sense (the sense of...
Emotions such as disgust and anger are regarded as moral emotions because they discourage moral violations and promote remedial behavior. But these emotions are not necessarily empathy-driven and prosocial: they are typically directed at moral violations but do not necessarily require detailed understanding of agents' or victims' inner states (intentions, beliefs, desires, and emotions) and their conditions of well-being. Nor do they necessarily motivate prosocial and other-caring behavior. We can be disgusted by certain actions without fully understanding an agent's thoughts and feelings. We can be disgusted and stand up against their moral violations before we even consider their special circumstances. We can even get angry at things that do not have inner intentional states, like discriminatory social policies, corrupt political regimes, or malfunctioning systems of economy. Yet these emotions play important roles in our moral judgments and actions. It seems that Humean moral sentiments, particularly sympathy, constitute only one type of affective moral ability, namely, one where the sense of morality essentially combines consideration or accommodation of others' inner states with affective interest in their well-being. Other moral emotions, however, do not necessarily come out of this ideal combination. Particularly, some moral emotions that serve moral judgments and actions do not require full understanding of others' (agents' or victims') inner states.

Even within the framework of Humean moral sentiment, the link between other-regarding social sense and other-directed affective reaction is not always sustained. Typically, a sentimental moral agent has the abilities of sharing others' feelings and being motivated to act for or against others. But this association of social cognition (via imaginary projection, simulation, affective contagion, or theoretical inference) and moral cognition (via affective reaction and motivation), which Hume observed in the natural and casual occurrences of human sympathy, falls apart frequently under various conditions, even in some empathetic states of the mind. As I will discuss shortly, a moral agent can notice others' pain, be affected by their suffering, assess moral violations, and act for their well-being without necessarily knowing their inner thoughts and feelings. Because it is rarely observed and reported, the dissociation between other-directed affective interest and other-regarding social understanding has not been fully understood and analyzed. With the advancement of cognitive science, however, we now have a few compelling cases of such dissociation. As we shall see, cognitive science also offers us general cases of the dissociation between sensory discriminatory and affective motivational processes in perception.

**DISSOCIATION OF SENSORY AND AFFECTIVE PROCESSES IN PERCEPTION**

Some blindsight patients whose primary visual cortices are damaged or removed can still discriminate emotional expressions of human faces. These patients, most notably patient G. Y., denied having conscious visual experience in their impaired visual fields, but could discriminate (i.e., guess correctly above the level of chance) emotional expressions (such as the expressions of fear or sadness) of the facial images presented in their impaired visual fields. As reported by several psychologists and neuroscientists, the peculiar neurocognitive profile of blindsight demonstrates that there exist anatomically and functionally distinct pathways in the brain that serve conscious (sensory) and subconscious (affective) processes of visual perception. On the one hand, typical visual identification takes place in the cortical areas (such as the primary visual cortices) of the brain. The color, shape, and size of a visually presented object are identified and consciously experienced by these processes. On the other hand, some processes of visual discrimination can function independently. They are subconscious processes that serve our affective sense of visually presented stimuli (e.g., emotional facial expressions).

Unlike blindsight patients, Capgras patients do not undergo any major visual deficit. They can see and discriminate visually presented objects (including faces). But they do not seem to sense the genuine presence and identity of objects that they see. To Capgras patients, the visually presented world is cold, flat, impersonal, and faded. Particularly, familiar human faces (faces of family members and friends) look strange and alien to them. They often complain that their parents and friends are replaced by body doubles or impersonators. According to a well-received hypothesis, the delusional visual experience of Capgras patients is caused by insufficient and inappropriate affective bodily reactions to faces or familiar objects. Their bodily reactions to familiar faces are measured by tracking such physiological changes as heartbeat and perspiration and are observed to be below the typical levels of physiological and affective reactions people generally have to familiar objects. That is, the deprived sense of personal relatedness due to the underlying physiological deficit is the cause of Capgras patients’ delusional experiences. From the differential visual abilities of blindsight patients and Capgras patients, one can infer that sensory-discriminatory processes and affective-motivational processes of visual perception are fully dissociable (i.e., separable). These processes may interact with each other by enhancing or interfering with certain aspects of visual experience, but they can function independently of each other in different brain pathways.

The same pattern of dissociation can be observed in sensory modalities other than vision. In human nociception (i.e., pain perception), sensation of and affective reaction to pain are typically related and occur together. If a person feels pain in her pinpricked thumb, she attends to her thumb and quickly moves it away from the cause of her pain. But these typically co-occurring processes of pain can be separated: pain (pain sensation) can come with or without painfulness. Consider asymbolia. Patients with asymbolia can sense their pain (its location, intensity, and duration) and know that their bodies, under a sustained condition of pain, are physically damaged. But they seem to be unaffected by such sensation and knowledge. They do not protect their bodies from painful stimuli and are not motivated to avoid them. That is, they know the relevant physical conditions of their bodies, but their sensory knowledge is not linked to appropriate reaction or motivation. Simply, pain sensation (the identification
and recognition of pain stimuli) is not accompanied by painfulness (an affective state and motivational reaction to pain stimuli).

Schilder and Stengel report that one of their asymbolic patients stabbed herself with needles and jammed objects into her eyelids with little or no hesitation. Berthier and colleagues’ asymbolic patient did not attempt to escape or avoid severe burn. Grahek, in his analysis of asymbolia, generalizes that “pain . . . is actually a complex experience comprising sensory-discriminatory, emotional-cognitive, and behavioral components that commonly go together but may well be disconnected and thus exist, to our great astonishment, separately.” Among these separable components, he focuses on the dissociation between “feeling pain” (pain sensation) and “being in pain” (painfulness) in asymbolic pain experiences.

If Grahek is right, we can, in principle, find another possible configuration of the same dissociation: the existence of pain-related affection-motivation without the sensation-discriminatory component of pain. In fact, there exist individuals who do not seem to sense pain but experience painfulness. Ploner, Freund, and Schnitzler report that laser stimuli to the hand of their patient, whose primary and secondary sensory cortices are damaged, did not elicit pain sensation but clearly generated unpleasant feeling and avoidance behavior. That is, these patients seemed to experience painfulness without pain sensation. To generalize, what Ploner and colleagues’ case along with Schilder and Stengel’s and Berthier and colleagues’ cases present is a strong case of double dissociation where pain sensation and pain affection are separated and served by different psychological processes with distinct functional and neurological characteristics. Like dissociable processes of vision, dissociable processes of pain exist.

From these cases one can infer a general pattern of dissociable perceptual processes: sensory-discriminatory and affective-motivational processes are typically interrelated but functionally and neurologically separate processes of perception. So far, this dissociation pattern is observed under some limited conditions of visual perception and pain perception, but it can be found in other perceptual modalities or abilities. Since many moral sentimentalists compare moral judgments to aesthetic or perceptual judgments with affective components, considerations of the same pattern of dissociation can be extended to sentimentalist moral sense, if this sense is interpreted as a special type of perception. That is, the pattern of dissociable sensory and affective processes of perception, if successfully and universally established, helps us to analyze and separate two interrelated but independently functioning processes of moral sentiments.

If this dissociation pattern exists in moral sentiments, one can differentiate a wide variety of moral emotions from typical moral sentiments. One of the possibilities is a moral emotion that emerges from strong affective and motivational processes without sensory discriminatory processes of the moral sense. That is, when a moral agent, A, observes an actor, B, hit an innocent-looking victim, C, for no apparent reason, A identifies B’s abrupt behavior as a moral violation and develops an affective and caring sense towards C’s painfulness and reactive disapproval of B’s action, with minimum knowledge of C’s or B’s inner psychological states or dispositions. If this type of emotion serves moral judgments (such as “B’s behavior is unacceptable”) and actions (such as A’s motivation to care for C) based on A’s empathetic sense of C’s painfulness (not pain sensation), it can provide a new opportunity to challenge or enrich moral sentimentalism (depending on how one interprets moral sentimentalism and characterizes moral sentiments). As I shall discuss shortly, based on my analysis of the recent discovery of mirror neuron activities, this type of basic moral affection (with full affective and motivational, but minimum sensory and discriminatory, processes of pain perception) not only exists but also serves our quick but sensible moral judgments and decisions.

Additionally, several psychologists report that this type of affective moral sense comes out of the regulatory homeostatic functions of the body. If moral affection is heavily embodied, it opens up new territory for moral psychology. In contrast to the traditional interpretation where moral emotions are understood as classical moral sentiments (i.e., psychological complexes of sensory discriminatory and affective motivational processes), this new approach takes a minimalist path, focusing only on affective-motivational processes of moral emotions and analyzing them from the perspective of the regulatory functions of the body. In the following sections, I will analyze this aspect of embodied moral psychology by providing empirical evidence (from psychology and neuroscience) and philosophical argument (from Confucian philosophy) that some affective states (e.g., embodied moral affection) assess others’ suffering (painfulness), detect moral violations, and facilitate other-caring behavior through mirroring regulatory functions of the body but are not dependent upon sensory-discriminatory processes of empathetic pain perception, where understanding of others’ inner psychological states is important or necessary.

MIRROR EMOTION AND EMBODIED MORAL AFFECTION

Many brain-imaging studies show that when a person observes another’s pain behavior, her brain activates as if it were her own pain: neural substrates that are active when one feels one’s own pain overlap with those that are active when one observes another’s pain. When one feels another’s pain as if one feels one’s own pain, one’s mind seems to be blind to the true ownership of the pain. Often this amazing ability of empathetic nociception is explained by mirroring processes. When we observe others’ pain, we instantly replicate (if not exactly copy) it in our mind and are motivated to help and care. Probably, as many psychologists hypothesize, this type of vicarious experience is a very effective way we can understand others’ pain (its location, intensity, and duration) and even their other psychological states (thoughts and feelings).

It is reported that there exist three different mirroring processes: mirror action (understanding of others’ goal-directed motor behavior via vicarious experience of their behavior, supported by mirror neurons), mirror sensation (surrogate pain sensation derived from the observation of others in painful situations, supported by the primary and
secondary sensory cortices), and mirror emotion (affective reaction to others’ pain and suffering, supported mostly by the anterior insula). In several studies of vicarious nociception, subjects report disturbing sensations in their bodies (mirror sensation) and strong reactive feelings and prosocial motivations (mirror emotion) when they see images of sharp needles or knives penetrating or coming close to others’ bodies or hands.

Among these mirroring processes, I will focus on mirror emotion and its relation to embodied moral affection. Mirror emotion is one of the nociceptive states of the mind where others’ pain behavior is observed and their painfulness is sensed. It interacts with mirror action and mirror sensation, but it is a distinct mirroring state with its unique psychological nature: mirror emotion is more naturally associated with affective moral functions (feeling the painfulness of victims, assessing their sufferings, distinguishing moral violations from conventional violations, preparing caring actions, avoidance of harmful environments, etc.) than sensory-discriminatory social functions of nociception (identifying location and intensity of pain, etc.).

Unlike other mirroring functions of the brain, mirror emotion is reliably associated with a distinct set of neural substrates (the anterior insula and the rostral cortex). One of these substrates, the anterior insula, is well-known for its regulative functions of interoception (the sense of inner bodily conditions) and homeostatic balance of the body. When the body of a person undergoes sudden physiological changes caused by such disturbing stimuli as others’ pain behavior, particularly ones that are caused by moral violations, the anterior insula controls and generates counterbalancing measures (such as changing heartbeat or blood pressure) to stabilize physical processes of the body.

Since the activity of mirror emotion is correlated with that of the anterior insula, one can hypothesize that nociceptive mirror emotion comes out of the essentially embodied processes of the anterior insula. Surprisingly or perhaps intriguingly, the anterior insula is also involved in empathy. The activities of the anterior insula have been correlated with self-evaluated empathy scales. What this correlation means is that embodied empathy, supported by the activities of the anterior insula, is the underlying psychological nature of nociceptive mirror emotion: our empathy toward others’ painfulness is intrinsically related to our mirroring bodily reactions. But it is important to note that mirror emotion is not directly involved with sensory and discriminatory functions of nociception that derives mostly from social cognitive functions of mirror action or mirror sensation. That is, this type of nociceptive empathy intrinsically includes an embodied, other-directed affection but not necessarily other-regarding social cognition that typically serves the identification process of others’ pain sensation.

These psychological and neurological studies of nociceptive mirror emotion demonstrate that mirror emotion serves a distinct nociceptive function with unique affective and motivational characteristics. With embodied affection that comes out of mirror emotion, one can sense the painfulness (not pain) of others’ suffering and be motivated to act caringly without fully understanding the sensory and perceptual conditions of their pain. Even though this characterization of embodied affection is limited to nociception, one can easily relate and generalize it to our basic affective moral ability. When we observe others’ (victims’) suffering, we experience a special emotion that generates prosocial and caring behavior independently of sensory-discriminatory functions of other mirroring processes (cognitive identification of location, intensity, and duration of others’ pain through mirroring activities). If this is a moral emotion, it is an empathetic (perhaps, proto-empathetic) moral affection that promotes compassion and prohibits moral violations. The important thing to highlight here is that the whole process of sensing others’ painfulness (not necessarily sensing their pain) and reacting to it with caring motivation requires minimal social cognition but essentially involves the body, the body’s affective and motivational reaction to the wrongful suffering of innocent victims. In sum, embodied, affective, empathetic, and moral emotion is empirically observed and reported. Can it be a philosophically viable characterization of the moral mind?

THE BODY AND EMOTION IN CONFUCIAN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

In Western intellectual traditions, the moral mind, with its intellectual and affective functions, is typically characterized in terms of Kantian moral deliberation and rational will, Humean moral sentiment, or Rawlsian moral faculty. In these traditions, the body is regarded as physical hardware or a life-sustaining structure that serves cognitive or affective functions of the mind: neither the body nor embodied emotion is sufficiently discussed in many Western moral traditions. Simply, embodied moral emotion with minimal socio-cognitive or sensory-discriminatory functions is an unexplored territory of Western moral psychology and moral philosophy.

An ancient Chinese Confucian philosopher Mencius, however, saw the great potential in this less investigated or less appreciated ability of the moral mind. He developed Confucian moral philosophy from the perspective of our embodied affection to others’ painfulness. He carefully described and discussed this natural inclination of the human mind (Confucian heartmind, xin) and recognized it as an important foundation of Confucian moral virtue.

In the following passage Mencius describes how this embodied affection to others’ painfulness arises.

All men have the heartmind that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. Suppose a man suddenly sees a child about to fall into a well, he will invariably have a feeling of alarm and distress. He feels this way not because he wants to get along well with the child’s parents, not because he wants to get fame from his neighbors and friends, and not because he is bothered by the sound of the child’s cries. Without the heartmind of pity and compassion, we are not even human beings.

In this passage, Mencius believes that our basic moral emotion comes out of a spontaneous and reactive, but other-directed and affective state that motivates caring actions without detailed understanding of what other people
think and feel. He called this moral emotion *ceyinzhixin* (the heartmind of pity and compassion) and recognized it as the foundation of *ren* (the central Confucian virtue of benevolence or humanheartedness). In another passage, Mencius describes a situation where this type of sudden and strong awareness of and reaction to others’ painfulness (or potential harm) comes from the body—i.e., spontaneous and abrupt physical changes in the body in reaction to unacceptable behavior (e.g., inappropriate burial practice).

In great antiquity there were some who did not bury their parents. When their parents died, they took them up and threw them into a ditch. Later when they passed by them and saw foxes and wild cats eating them, and flies and gnats eating them, their perspiration started out upon their foreheads, they looked askance and could not bear to look straight. Now the perspiration was not for the sake of other people. It was something at the bottom of their hearts that showed in their expressions. They immediately went home and returned with baskets and spades and covered the bodies. If it was indeed right to cover them, then there must be certain moral principles which made filial sons and men of humanity inter their parents.15

Mencius points out that the bodily reaction is an essential part of our affective rejection of improper behavior and moral violations. Typically, perspiration, eye direction, and body movement are not discussed in philosophical debates of moral issues, but Mencius argues that these bodily reactions reflect our *genuine* moral interest. They are not accidental or optional expressions of preceding judgments or decisions but direct reflections of the genuine moral mind, which, in its foundation, is essentially embodied. He clearly declares that these bodily reactions come from the bottom of the human heart. That is, the body is an essential part of the affective moral mind.16

From the studies of nociceptive mirror emotion and Mencius’s insightful discussion of embodied emotion, one can generalize that embodied moral affection represents a psychologically possible and philosophically viable option in moral psychology that adds a new flavor or poses a new challenge to moral sentimentalism. This new moral psychological approach highlights the value of interdisciplinary and comparative study of the moral mind, where cognitive science of the West meets ancient philosophy of the East to provide inspiring new observations of other people. It was something at the bottom of the human heart. That is, the body is an essential part of the affective moral mind.16

As the violations against the ethics of community, autonomy and divinity, respectively. See Rozin et al., “CAD Triad Hypothesis,” and Shweder et al., “Big Three,” for further details.

3. Noddings focuses on these prosocial emotions and disposition in Caring. Prinz discusses some challenges to this type of empathy based approach to morality in “Empathy,” but he generally agrees that emotions are essential for moral judgment and moral motivation (Emotional Construction).

4. There are diverse orientations and interpretations of moral sentimentalism. In this paper, I focus mostly on Hume’s moral sentimentalism (*Treatise*). For a discussion of moral sentimentalism, see Darwell, *British Moralists*; Slot, *Ethics of Care*; and Slot, *Moral Sentimentalism*.

5. Greene, “Secret Joke.”


15. Perhaps Hume can explain these cases by introducing reflective extension of our sympathy to those people who are potentially affected by negative social and political structures. But, even in this broad extension of sympathy to total strangers or to the whole society, understanding of other minds (their traits and dispositions, and their happiness and pleasure) is still required because that is how our affective approval or disapproval arises.

16. Sympathy, in the context of moral sentimentalism, can be interpreted in several different ways. (1) It can be a particular emotion, like compassion or pity or a general psychological function. (2) It can be an occurrent state (an emotional state tokened in a particular time and space) or a general disposition or a psychological ability. (3) It can be one’s (vicarious) feeling another’s inner state of or feeling for another’s well-being (or both). (4) It can be part of social cognition or a combination of social cognition and moral/evaluative cognition. In my discussion of sympathy, I will focus on (3) and (4). In Hume’s discussion of sympathy, it is typically described as a more general psychological function or process in which others agreeable or disagreeable behaviors or traits generate approval or disapproval in our mind. It seems that sympathy includes social cognitive and evaluative processes. In contrast, Adam Smith’s “fellow feeling,” even though it is mostly used synonymously with sympathy, seems to focus more on a social cognitive ability to represent another’s inner thoughts and feelings (from another’s point of view) in one’s own mind. Hume, *Treatise*; Smith, *Moral Sentiments*.

17. For example, disgust, as a moral emotion that inhibits or controls certain moral violations, does not necessarily require full knowledge of actors’ or victims’ inner states (thoughts and feelings). In his recent article, Prinz discusses affective moral judgments without empathy and critically evaluate empathy based approaches of ethics. Prinz, “Is empathy Necessary for Morality?”


20. These processes are functionally and neurologically independent but may interact with each other. See Tamietto and de Gelder, “Affective blindsight”, and Tamietto et al., “Emotional Reactions.”

21. In a coauthored paper with Rebull-Lachaux, Joseph Capgras reports a case of a French woman who complained that her husband and other people she knew had been replaced by doubles. Capgras and Rebull-Lachaux, “Illusion.”

NOTES


2. For example, CAD hypothesis relates a group of negative emotions (contempt, anger, and disgust) with specific moral violations (such
22. Ellis and Young. "Delusional Misidentifications"; Ellis et al., "Reduced Autonomic Responses."


27. Perhaps, autistic moral agency can be understood from the perspective of embodied moral affection. See Seko, Embodied Moral Psychology, 81–82.

28. Singer et al., "Empathy for Pain."


30. More recently, it has been suggested that brain areas involved in emotion processing, including the anterior insula and the rostral cingulate cortex (rCC), might perform an 'emotional simulation' of other individuals' experiences, showing activity not only when we experience positive and negative emotions but also when we witness those of others. Keysers, Kaas, and Gazzola, "Somatosensory," 417; Gu et al., "Functional Dissociation"; Singer et al., "Empathy for Pain."

31. Singer et al., "Empathy for Pain"; Jackson, Melzoff, and Decety, "How Do We Perceive the Pain of Others?"; Lamm, Batson, and Decety, "Neural Substrate."

32. Hauser, Moral Minds; Miller, "Roots of Morality"; Pinker, "Moral Instinct."

33. Xin is translated here as heartmind to stress its unique psychological nature in the combination of the intellectual and affective characteristics of the Confucian mind.

34. Mencius, 2A6. This is my translation.

35. Mencius, 3A5; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 71, emphases added.

36. For a full exposition of embodied Confucian moral psychology, see Seek, Embodied Moral Psychology.

37. Damasio, Descartes' Error, 226.

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The Resonant Mind: Daoism and Situated-Embodied Cognition

Bradley Douglas Park

ST. MARY’S COLLEGE OF MARYLAND

Situated and embodied views about mind are gaining increasing currency both in and outside of philosophy. Clearly, there is broad sympathy for the task of critically liberating ourselves from the spell of an Enlightenment conception of subjectivity. The embodied, extended, embodied, and enactive perspectives on cognition and mind (hereafter, the 4-Es) have articulated key vantages for revealing how deeply these modernist presuppositions have informed our notions of cognition, consciousness, affect, and intersubjectivity. The dovetailing of these perspectives provides a powerful set of discourses for critically disentangling ourselves from the received, and oftentimes untenable, assumptions about who we are.

Despite the general alignment with respect to the situated body, however, this new philosophy of mind has failed to coalesce around a general organizing model, metaphor, prototype, or paradigm of mind. The primary aim of this paper is to recommend the Daoist conception of the “resonant mind” as a viable candidate for coordinating the 4-E approaches to cognition, because it stands in the right critical relation to the current organizing model of mind, namely, the “mind as container.” Moreover, on the positive side, it rather directly entails many of the core commitments distinguishing the 4-E approaches from classical cognitive science. Given the scope of this venue, however, my discussion will have to be largely suggestive in this regard. The bulk of the essay will concentrate on explicating and clarifying the Daoist conception of mind qua sympathetic resonance (ganying, 感應), though I will schematically introduce some of the obvious points of contact vis-à-vis situated, embodied cognition.

THE MIND: EMPTY AND FLOWING

Daoist notions about mind are ultimately rooted in the experiences of meditative consciousness and skilful flow. The radical openness, stability, and lucidity of meditative poise represents a cultivated state that is simultaneously a return (fan, 反) to the natural (ziran, 自然) or genuine (zhên, 真) mind. Likewise, the experience of a flow state in dynamic poise marks the optimal cognition and efficacy of skilful deployed embodiment. The fact that meditative consciousness and bodily flow—as opposed to chess playing and abstract problem-solving, for example—are taken to be exemplary forms of cognition is significant because they operate as phenomenologically and cognitively normative experiences for the Daoist understanding of mind. On both counts it is easy to see what recommends these experiences. Meditative poise marks a kind of phenomenological limit-point of mental presence qua attention, perception, and affect. It is experienced as optimal awareness, wherein a highly-integrated coherence across the broader cognitive system emerges. It is phenomenologically given as a profound poise amidst experience, and even realized in pre-personal biological registers, which is evidenced by the growing empirical data about the neurobiological coherences, synchronies, and recalibrations enacted through meditative practice. The achievement of meditative poise is vividly attested to by the nondual structure of awareness, wherein nothing stands against, or within, the empty expanse of this subjectivity (ming, 明). This field of emptiness is also a field of radical openness that is not bounded on any side by either a subject or an object. Similarly, the dynamic poise of effortless action (wuwéi, 無為) achieves what is typically identified within the psychological literature as “flow,” “optimal experience,” or “effortless attention.” It is characterized by six primary features: stable awareness, the unity of perception and action, the absence of reflective or executive self-monitoring, an increased sense of efficacy, a total absorption in the present, and the fact that the flow experience per se is given as intrinsically rewarding, or autotelic. The effortless attention characteristic of flow not only expresses optimal experience for the subject, but it also correlates with assessments of optimal performance from both first and third-person standpoints. Public appraisals of exemplary performance in sports and music, for instance, tend to correlate with first-person agentive accounts of flow, often characterized in popular parlance as having been “in the zone,” “in the groove” or “on a roll.”

Another advantage of emphasizing flow as normative of mind is that it is not restricted to a narrow class of cognitive activity. Indeed, flow experience can be realized across the entire spectrum of mindness, from seated meditation to playing basketball and even to highly abstract modes of reasoning; furthermore, it can be realized individually or within group endeavors, as in the case of sports teams or musical groups. Rather than narrowing the questions of mind to a privileged subset of cognitive activity (e.g., chess playing), the Daoist appeals to the quality of performance enacted within a given domain of activity as the measure of its intelligence. In other words, flow and its attending markers are taken as indicators of optimal cognitive performance, and thereby as representing the clearest manifestation of mind.