

## Temporary Intrinsic and the Problem of Alienation

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Persisting objects change their intrinsic properties. When you sit, you have a bent shape. When you stand, you have a straightened shape. You change your shape by having incompatible shapes at different times. The problem of temporary intrinsic is the problem of how such change is possible. David Lewis has famously raised the problem as a principal argument against endurantism: given endurantism, the problem is unsolvable because any endurantist solution conflicts with the intuitive idea that objects have their intrinsic properties simpliciter.

When one argues against one's opponent by showing that the opponent's view has some counter-intuitive consequences, we often witness that the argument turns out to be unpersuasive because one fails to provide good reason for avoiding those consequences. It would be too sanguine to think that all our intuitive beliefs form a coherent set. In view of the fact that we might not be able to hold onto all intuitive beliefs, it is always open for the opponent simply to embrace the counter-intuitive consequences and revise the relevant intuition as required.

It seems to be widely agreed that Lewis's argument is just one such argument. Lewis rejects endurantism on the basis of the intuitive idea that objects have their intrinsic properties simpliciter. The standard response in defense of endurantism is simply to deny the intuitive idea, arguing that there is no compelling reason for holding on to the intuition. It would not be an overstatement to say that there is a consensus in the literature that Lewis's argument is no more than a restatement of his intuition in favor of his theory of persistence and that the problem of temporary intrinsic has no significant role in the debate over persistence.

In this paper, I aim to show that the near consensus is premature. The problem of temporary intrinsics cuts deeper than philosophers have realized. The defenders of endurantism, in a way, have (quite successfully) responded to Lewis's argument by rejecting the Lewisian intuition. But, their success is only a qualified one. If we understand the Lewisian intuition as they do, their rejection of the intuition is legitimate. But, they misunderstood it. What is behind the Lewisian intuition, on close examination, is that, if one accepts endurantism, on the face of the problem of temporary intrinsics, one cannot but "alienate" persisting objects from their temporary intrinsics. But, anyone who subscribes to the alienation of objects from their intrinsic properties must confront what I call the problem of alienation. The role of the problem of temporary intrinsics is to highlight that endurantism faces the problem of alienation.

But, the consequences of accepting Lewis's argument are more radical than Lewis realized. While Lewis repudiates the alienation of objects from their intrinsic properties or, for short, the intra-object alienation, Lewis admits the alienation of objects from other objects or, for short, the inter-object alienation. My second aim is to show that Lewis's argument can be extended to refute the inter-object alienation as well. If my argument is not wrong, the right moral we should draw from Lewis's argument is that an adequate account of persistence should be explored within the ontology of alienation-free time-bound objects.

My plan is as follows. In §1, I will consider the standard response to Lewis's argument and pick out a specific understanding of Lewis's central premise presupposed in the standard response. In §2, I will explicate the premise by articulating the notion of alienation Lewis casually uses, which will show that the premise has not been properly understood. In §3, I will defend the central premise on Lewis's behalf by identifying the problem of alienation as the price of denying the premise. In §4, generalizing the problem of alienation, I will argue that, as

opposed to Lewis's ontology of alienated time-bound objects, we should adopt the ontology of alienation-free time-bound objects. In §5, I will close by hinting at a direction in which the ontology of alienation-free time-bound objects can be pursued.

## §1.

The problem of temporary intrinsics is a general problem any adequate account of persistence must solve. But, the problem is especially pressing for endurantism. When you change your shape, you have a bent shape at one time and a straightened shape at another. If, however, you persist by enduring – i.e. by being wholly present at different times, the whole of you is located at one time and has a bent shape, and the very same whole of you is located at another and has a straightened shape. But how can that be?

According to one well-known solution, shapes are not monadic properties but relations to times. When you sit, the whole of you bears a bent-shape relation to some time. When you stand, the whole of you bears a straight-shape relation to another. There is no problem with the idea that you – one and the same object – are bigger than a cat and smaller than an elephant. Similarly, on this answer, there is no problem with the idea that you – one and the same object – are in a bent-shape relation to some time and in a straight-shape relation to another.<sup>1</sup>

But, contrary to the “temporary intrinsics are disguised relations” solution, if we assume shapes are monadic properties, how can one solve the problem in defense of endurantism? One prominent solution is to claim that it is not shapes but the having of them that is a relation. When you are bent at some time, it is not that a bent shape relates you and the time but that the having relation referred to by the copula ‘are’ relates you and the bent shape relative to the time. When

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<sup>1</sup>For a notable espouser of this solution, see van Inwagen (1990).

you change your shape, on this solution, it is not that you are both bent and straight but that you bears a having relation to a bent shape (at some time) and a straightened shape (at another).<sup>2</sup>

There are other endurantist solutions that have been proposed in the literature. But, I will take this solution as a canonical one among others and focus on Lewis's argument against it. Once we understand Lewis's argument against this solution properly, we will be able to see that other endurantist solutions in some or other way fall prey to the argument as well. So, let me provide a label "the canonical solution" for this solution.

Lewis argues against the canonical solution as follows:

I protest that there is still nothing in the picture that has *bent* or *straight simpliciter*. Not you; not your nonexistent temporal parts. Instead of having *bent simpliciter*, you bear the *having-at* relation to it and  $t_1$ . But it is one thing to have a property, it is something else to bear some relation to it. If a relation stands between you and your properties, you are alienated from your properties. (Lewis 2002, p. 5)

Lewis's argument is simple: on the canonical solution, you have a shape in the derivative sense that you bears a having relation to the shape, but a shape can never be had *simpliciter* by you or anything else; but, that can't be right.

It is a tempting idea to think that Lewis's objection is based on the idea that ordinary objects have their intrinsic properties *simpliciter*. However, as others pointed out, we should resist the tempting idea.<sup>3</sup> For Lewis, ordinary objects persist by perduring – i.e. by having temporal parts at different times: ordinary objects are mereological sums of their temporal parts.

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<sup>2</sup> This solution is the one Lewis ascribes to Johnston (1987).

<sup>3</sup> See Haslanger (1989a, pp. 119-20); Wasserman (2003, p. 417).

So, even for Lewis, ordinary objects do not have intrinsic properties simpliciter because it is not ordinary objects but their temporal parts that have intrinsic properties simpliciter. You have a bent shape only by bearing a part-whole relation to your bent temporal part; a straightened shape to your straightened temporal part. But, for Lewis, you never have a shape simpliciter.

Nonetheless, there is a good sense in which, on Lewis's view, you have a bent shape simpliciter. Although Lewis cannot always say that ordinary objects have intrinsic properties simpliciter, he can say that objects considered in some ordinary contexts have their intrinsic properties simpliciter – contexts in which we “restrict our domain of discourse so as to ignore everything located elsewhere in time” (Lewis 2002, p. 5). In some contexts, ‘you’ refers to the mereological sum of your temporal parts, but, in others, ‘you’ uttered at one time refers to your temporal part which has a bent shape simpliciter; and ‘you’ uttered at another refers to your temporal part which has a straightened shape simpliciter.

In any event, all Lewis needs for his objection is the following thesis:

**Having Simpliciter:** Any object that has an intrinsic property has it simpliciter.

On Lewis's view, your temporal parts (whether ordinary objects or not) have their intrinsic properties and they do so simpliciter. Having Simpliciter is compatible with Lewis's view. On the canonical solution, however, no object has temporary intrinsics simpliciter. So, given Having Simpliciter, no object has temporary intrinsics. But this can't be right. Having Simpliciter contradicts the canonical solution.

Having Simpliciter serves as a crucial premise in Lewis's argument. But, it needs clarification. To understand Having Simpliciter properly, we need to get clearer on two things.

First, the semantic question: what does it mean that an object has an intrinsic property simpliciter?

Second, the epistemological question: what reason is there for thinking that objects have their intrinsic properties simpliciter? Let us begin with the semantic question.

What is it for an object to have an intrinsic property simpliciter? The standard answer to the semantic question is: that an object has an intrinsic property simpliciter means that an object has an intrinsic property regardless of things “outside” the object’s having the property.<sup>4</sup> Along the line of the standard answer, Maya Eddon writes:

When object *a* has property F simpliciter, this has nothing to do with anything besides *a* and F and simple two-place instantiation. According to perdurantist, the properties involved in intuitively intrinsic matters of change are had simpliciter. But, the endurantist relativizes these properties to times (either by turning them into relations or relational properties, or by temporally relativizing the instantiation relation), and so they are not had simpliciter. (2010, p. 609)

Let us say that an object has a property *absolutely* just in case the object has the property independently of, or not relative to, anything else besides the object, the property, and (possibly) a two-place having relation between the object and the property. On the standard answer to the semantic question, “having simpliciter” means “having absolutely.” So, Having Simpliciter turns out to be the following claim:

**Absolute Having:** Any object that has an intrinsic property has it absolutely.

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<sup>4</sup> See Haslanger (1989a, p. 123); Wasserman (2003, pp. 416-9).

Clearly, Absolute Having contradicts the canonical solution. According to the canonical solution, that you have a shape means that you bear a having relation to a shape relative to a time or the having relation holds among you, a shape and a time. So, your having a shape is not an absolute matter because it depends on something else – i.e. a time – “outside” your having a shape. Given Absolute Having, this entails that you do not have your shape or your shape is not an intrinsic property. But neither one is acceptable.

So, if Absolute Having is true, the canonical solution is wrong. However, if Having Simpliciter is understood as Absolute Having, it is hard to see why the proponent of the canonical solution should accept Having Simpliciter. According to Lewis, intrinsic properties are at base properties “things have in virtue of the way they themselves are” rather than “in virtue of their relations or lack of relations to other things” (Lewis 1986a, p. 61). Given Lewis’s view of intrinsic properties, an object has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way it itself is independently of its relations to any other outside the object’s having the property – that is, objects have intrinsic properties absolutely. Lewis’s view of intrinsic properties entails Absolute Having. Thus, if one accepts Lewis’s view of intrinsic properties, she would have reason to accept Absolute Having.

However, one cannot appeal to Lewis’s view of intrinsic properties to justify Absolute Having without begging the question against the proponent of the canonical solution. The core of Lewis’s view is that an object’s having an intrinsic property is an absolute matter. And this is precisely what the proponent of the canonical solution denies. Unless one provides an independent reason, Lewis’s view of intrinsic properties cannot serve to justify Absolute Having.

I believe that, *pace* some philosophers<sup>5</sup>, Lewis himself did not assume his view of intrinsic properties in arguing against endurantism. Lewis thinks endurantism faces a problem regarding properties of some kind. And we know what kind of properties he has in mind. Lewis used the phrase ‘intrinsic properties’ to pick those properties. We can then follow his terminology to fix our subject matter and thereby keep our discussion going in a substantive way. In so doing, however, we are not required to accept Lewis’s view of intrinsic properties as well. And Lewis is required not to assume his view of intrinsic properties. So, by ‘intrinsic properties’, I shall mean properties Lewis intended to talk about without assuming his view of intrinsic properties. And I will use ‘Lewis-intrinsic’ to mean being intrinsic in Lewis’s theory-laden sense.

Anyway, it seems hard to see what reason Lewis could offer for accepting Absolute Having. Rather, perhaps, Absolute Having can reasonably be questioned. As Ryan Wasserman (2003, p. 418) pointed out, a variety of philosophical and scientific theories imply that intrinsic properties are not had absolutely or not Lewis-intrinsic. On the primary quality view of color, objects are red only relative to a certain kind of creature and a certain circumstance of viewing. So, on this view, color, a canonical intrinsic property, is not Lewis-intrinsic. This being the case, it would not be obviously wrong to think that objects have shapes only relative to something else.

Eddon (2010, p. 610) made Wasserman’s skeptical point more compelling. If we take the theory of relativity seriously, it may well be the case that nothing has shapes and sizes absolutely. According to the theory of relativity, spatial distance is only relative to a frame of reference. If we think the shape or the size of an object is determined in terms of the spatial distances between parts of the object, nothing would have shapes absolutely because spatial distances are frame-dependent. Absolution Having seems to be in jeopardy.

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<sup>5</sup> I agree with Haslanger on her dialectical remark that “to assume that an enduring object’s temporary properties must be extrinsic is to assume what is at stake in the debate with the (‘adverbial’) endurance theorist” (1989a, p. 123). So, Lewis would be begging the question if he assumed so. But, I believe Lewis didn’t assume so.



The prospects for denying the canonical solution on the basis of Absolute Having seem to me very dim. So, the standard response to Lewis's argument seems to be quite successful as long as the standard answer to the semantic question is assumed – i.e. as long as Having Simpliciter is understood as Absolute Having. However, the standard answer to the semantic question is neither the only answer nor the best one. A close examination will show that there is another and adequate answer to the semantic question that is ignored in the literature, which I will identify below.

## §2.

Recall that Absolute Having primarily concerns whether an object's having an intrinsic property holds independently of anything else *outside* it. But, Lewis's concern is rather with the *inner* workings of an object's having an intrinsic property. The passage from Lewis quoted above bears repeating.

I protest that there is still nothing in the picture that has *bent* or *straight simpliciter*. Not you; not your nonexistent temporal parts. Instead of having *bent simpliciter*, you bear the *having-at* relation to it and  $t_1$ . But it is one thing to have a property, it is something else to bear some relation to it. If a relation stands between you and your properties, you are alienated from your properties. (2002, p. 5)

Lewis's objection is this: when you have your shape, given the canonical solution, a relation – i.e. a having relation – stands between you and your shape; but, that can't be right.

But, Lewis's claim might seem to be puzzling. What is the having in your having your shape? Lewis can't say that it is a relation. Otherwise, a relation would stand between you and your shape. Lewis can't say that it is not a relation either. If it is not a relation, doesn't it follow that you and your shape are identical? It seems, for Lewis, the having is neither a relation nor a non-relation.

Unless we think Lewis says something contradictory, we must understand Lewis as saying that the having is not a relation in one sense but a relation in another.<sup>6</sup> What then is the sense in which the having is a relation? Lewis's predicament reminds us of Hume's. Consider a white globe. It is white. Is it distinct from its white color? If so, for Hume, they would be separable. But how is it possible to separate the white globe from its color? It seems impossible to do so in thought. Then, for Hume, it is also impossible to do so in reality. If not, for Hume, the white globe would be identical to its color and, by parity, to its shape. But how is it possible that the white globe is identical to its color and to its shape while the color is not identical to the shape? Hume's way of avoiding this problem is to distinguish two senses of distinction. For Hume, the white globe is not *really* distinct from its properties because the distinction between them is only a distinction of *reason* or a *rational* distinction. The white globe is not really distinct from its properties. Nonetheless, for Hume, it is not identical to them because it is still rationally distinct from them.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Indeed, Lewis says: he would be "willing enough to believe in a having relation that something bears to a property; or in a triadic having relation that an enduring thing (if such there be) bears to a property and a time; or in a relational property of, say, bearing-having-to-bent-and-t<sub>1</sub>" in so far as "these are not alleged to be fundamental relations or properties" (Lewis 2002, p. 6).

<sup>7</sup> Clearly, everything is not really distinct from itself. Is a thing then rationally distinct from itself? Arguably, for Descartes, there is no distinction (whether real or rational) whatsoever between identical things. (See Hoffman 2002.) Suarez (1947) distinguishes two kinds of distinctions of reason – i.e. the distinction of the reasoning reason and the distinction of the reasoned reason and claims that the distinction between identical things is a distinction of the reasoning reason – a distinction that has no foundation at all in reality.

It is a matter of controversy whether distinguishing the two kinds of distinction helps Hume get out of his predicament. Perhaps, Hume might not be able to do so without giving up some of his theoretical commitments.<sup>8</sup> But, it doesn't matter to us. Anyway, it is Hume's problem, not ours. Nor is Lewis's. So, Lewis can borrow Hume's terminology to distinguish the two senses of relation. What is the having in your having your shape? With the extended terminology, Lewis can say that the having is not a real relation but only a *rational* one. But naming the having a rational relation is only a first step toward the articulation of the sense in which the having is a relation. What is it for a relation to be a rational relation?

Lewis tells us nothing much. Nonetheless, for Lewis, one thing is certain: the having as a rational relation is not something that "can explain having simpliciter" on pain of Bradley's regress (Ibid, p. 6). Why is it that, if one tries to explain having simpliciter in terms of the having relation, we launch Bradley's regress? What is wrong with the regress? Let me put these questions to one side for the moment. What matters now is to articulate Lewis's characterization of the having as a rational relation. What Lewis has in mind is something like this: When you have your shape, you do not require anything else other than your shape for your having your shape. Your shape does not require anything else other than you for its being had by you. It is not that you and your shape are "alienated" from each other waiting to be related by the having. The having is not something in virtue of which you have your shape.

According to Lewis, the having is not a real relation but a rational relation in the sense that the having has no role in explaining that you have your shape: you and your shape between which the having holds are not alienated. This helps us better grasp what a rational relation is. But, to the extent that Lewis's language, especially the term "alienation," is metaphorical, our

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<sup>8</sup> On the basis of the interpretation that, for Hume, the relation between the white globe and the color is the identity relation, Baxter (2011) argues that Hume's philosophy runs into a contradiction. For a different interpretation, see Garrett (1997, pp. 58-64).

grasp remains at an intuitive level. Can we hope more? I think we can. In what follows, I will make precise the notion of alienation Lewis informally makes use of, and provide an answer to the semantic question with the help of the articulated notion of alienation.

The main notion that I will employ to articulate the notion of alienation is identity. In philosophical discourse, the dominant use of the term ‘identity’ is to pick a relation – a relation anything bears just to itself. But, my use of the term ‘identity’ shall deviate from the dominant use. Let me use the phrase ‘identity relation’ to mean the relation anything bears just to itself. When I use the term ‘identity,’ I shall rather mean something with which we are concerned when we talk about personal identity, cultural identity, and national identity and so on. A thing has features. Among them are privileged ones in the sense that the thing is that particular thing that it is in virtue of those features so that, in absence of any of them, the thing would not be the same. Let us call such privileged features of a thing the *identity* of the thing.

What is your identity? If one believes that there is no informative answer to this question, one might say that your identity includes only some primitive feature – i.e. your haecceitistic feature. If one is a neo-Aristotelian, one might say that your identity includes your individual essentialist feature – i.e. this particular human. One might believe that your identity is richer: your identity includes the features you locally have within the spatiotemporal region you occupy. The notion of identity is something anyone implicitly understands though philosophers have not used the term ‘identity’ to talk about it.

You have relational features as well. Is there any relational feature that is part of your identity? You are a child of your parents. If one believes biological organisms have their origin relations in their identities, your identity includes your origin relation to your parents. In that case, there is some sense in which you depend on your parents: in absence of your parents, the

origin relation would not exist; in absence of the origin relation, since it is part of your identity, you would not be the same. Let us say that one thing *internally depends* on another just in case the identity of the former includes its relation (or some of its relations) to the latter; and that one thing is *internally connected* to another just in case the former internally depends on the latter or vice versa.<sup>9</sup> If your origin relation is part of your identity, you internally depend on your parents.

I am now in a position to define the notion of alienation: one thing is *alienated* from another if and only if they are internally disconnected from each other – i.e. they are internally independent of each other; or, no relation between them is part of the identity of either one.

With this articulated notion of alienation in hand, let me return to Lewis's claim. According to Lewis, when you have your shape, the having is only a rational relation: it has no role in explaining that you have your shape. This seems to be impossible if you are alienated from your shape. If you are alienated from your shape, you and the shape would remain the same without your having the shape. So, in order for you to have the shape, something – i.e. the having – is required. That is, the having would play an explanatory role: it would be a real relation.

So, for Lewis, you must not be alienated from your shape – that is, it must be the case that your identity includes your having relation to the shape or the identity of the shape includes its relation to you. The latter is not a viable option. Suppose, for the moment, that your bent shape internally depends on you. If your bent shape is a universal, it is identical to my bent shape. Since it internally depends on you, once you cease to exist, your bent shape would cease to exist. Your bent shape is my bent shape. So, my bent shape would cease to exist. But, that seems

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<sup>9</sup> Anything bears the identity relation to itself. Is the identity relation part of the identity of anything? If so, given the above definition, anything internally depends on itself. Is this a problem for the notion of internal dependence? There are three possible answers. First, one might embrace the consequence: anything internally depends on itself. Secondly, one might restrict the above definition to any non-identical things *x* and *y*. The third answer is to concur with Armstrong (1978 II, pp. 91-3) that there are in fact no reflexive relations though there are reflexive predicates or concepts. Then, there would be no genuine identity relation.

wrong. Your shape can't be a universal. But, it seems it can't be a trope either. If your shape and other intrinsic properties as tropes internally depend on you, you cannot be individuated by such tropes, which undermines one principle motivation for trope theory.<sup>10</sup> So, let us set aside the latter.

Let us say that an object has a property internally just in case the identity of the object includes a having relation to the property. My answer to the semantic question then is this: "having simpliciter" means "having internally." So, Having Simpliciter becomes the following:

**Internal Having:** Any object that has an intrinsic property has it internally.

Internal Having clearly conflicts with the canonical solution. On the canonical solution, you change your shape by bearing a having relation to a bent shape relative to one time and to a straightened shape relative to another. If you were to have both a bent shape and a straightened shape internally, your bent shape and your straightened shape would be part of your identity: you *yourself as a whole* would look like a bent object and a straightened object. But nothing itself as a whole (whether or not it is relative to times) looks like a bent and straightened object. So, you do not have your shapes internally. Given Internal Having, thus, your shapes are not intrinsic properties or you do not have your shapes. But neither is acceptable.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> For those who take properties as tropes, tropes are individuated by their primitive quantities (Williams 1953; Campbell 1990) or by times (Ehring 1997) or by spatiotemporal relations (Schaffer 2001). To my knowledge, no trope theorist thinks that tropes are individuated by particulars that have them. For possible reasons, see Schaffer (2001).

<sup>11</sup> I think Internal Having contradicts not only the canonical solution but also other endurantist solutions because any endurantist solution is committed to the intra-object alienation. On the "temporary intrinsics are disguised relations" solution, you bear a bent shape relation to one time and a straight shape relation to another. If this solution defuses the puzzlement, it seems to be because, by taking shapes as relations, the solution alienates you from those shapes. If, however, the proponent of this solution claims that you have those shapes as relations in your identity, I would find the claim as puzzling as the claim that you have those shapes as properties in your identity. If the proponent of this solution insists that your having the shapes as relations internally, unlike your having the shapes as properties

As we saw, the standard defense of endurantism works effectively against Absolute Having. But, it would not go through against Internal Having if Absolute Having and Internal Having are independent of each other. Indeed, they are independent of each other. On the one hand, Absolute Having does not entail Internal Having. Suppose that *a* has *F*, where *F* is an intrinsic property. Assume Absolute Having. Then, *a* has *F* absolutely: *a*'s having *F* holds without regard to anything else outside *a*'s having *F*. But this does not entail that *a* has *F* internally because it might be the case that *a* is alienated from *F* and thus requires the having as a two-place relation for its having *F*. Hence, Absolute Having does not entail Internal Having.

The other direction does not hold either though it might be harder to appreciate. Assume Internal Having. Then, *a* has *F* internally: the identity of *a* includes a having relation to *F*. But this does not entail that *a* has *F* absolutely because it might be the case that *a*'s having *F* as a unitary event occurs only relative to some frame of reference. In that case, whether *a* has *F* is not an absolute matter. Hence, Internal Having does not entail Absolute Having. The standard defense of endurantism is not applicable to Internal Having.

One might think that Internal Having is implausible because it has an incredible consequence that an object has its intrinsic properties necessarily or essentially. If the intrinsic properties of an object are part of the identity of the object, wouldn't it follow that the object necessarily and essentially has the intrinsic properties? However, Internal Having entails neither the necessity of intrinsic properties nor the essentiality of them. Assuming Internal Having,

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internally, is not puzzling, I confess that I do not understand what shapes as relations are. I cannot but think that the "temporary intrinsics are disguised relations" solution is committed to the intra-object alienation. According to another endurantist solution, your having a bent shape and your having a straightened shape are basic tensed propositions – i.e. propositions that can be true at some times but not at others. (See, e.g., Forbes 1987; Haslanger 1989a) What does it mean that your having a bent shape is basic? If it means that you have a bent shape internally, by parity, you have a straightened shape internally as well: your being bent and your being straight are part of your identity. But this can't be right. Again, I cannot but think that the proponent of this solution must be committed to the intra-object alienation. (So, Caplan's defense of this solution after all fails. See Caplan 2005.) I take it that Lewis's argument from Internal Having is a general argument against all endurantist solutions altogether.

suppose that a has F, where F is an intrinsic property. Then, a has F internally: the identity of a includes its relation to F. So, in absence of its relation to F, a would not be the same. In absence of F, there is no relation to F. So, in absence of F, a would not be the same. Nothing without F, whether actual or possible, would be a. There is no world in which a is not F. But, from this, it would follow that necessarily a has F only if a's being possibly non-F requires that there be a world in which a *itself* is not F. If a's being possibly non-F only requires that there be a world where a is vicariously not F or a's counterpart is not F, it may be the case that contingently a has F. Similarly, if one accepts counterpart theory, one can say that, though a has F internally, F is not essential to a because a's being accidentally F consists in a's having a counterpart which is not F. Internal Having does not entail that intrinsic properties are neither necessary nor essential.

I think that, by Having Simpliciter, Lewis means Internal Having or something in the neighborhood. In any case, I believe it is Internal Having that Lewis should have employed in his argument against the canonical solution. But, Lewis's argument is an unfinished one because he left the epistemological question unanswered. It is true that, if Internal Having is true, the canonical solution must be denied. But, what reason would be there for accepting Internal Having? What is the price one has to pay if one insists that an object is alienated from its intrinsic properties?

### §3.

Given Internal Having, when you have your shape, the having has no explanatory role in your having your shape. Why does Lewis think so? Lewis's reason, as I mentioned, is that the denial of Internal Having leads to Bradley's regress. But, Lewis's assent to Bradley's argument should



be understood with caution. Two things are often ascribed to Bradley's argument: first, Bradley's argument relies on the principle of sufficient reason – i.e. every fact has a sufficient explanation; second, it purports to refute relations altogether.<sup>12</sup> But, Lewis has no intention to accept the principle of sufficient reason or to refute relations altogether.

What then is Lewis's argument? I confess I do not know. What he said does not give us enough information that enables us to reconstruct his argument. But, it doesn't matter. My interest is philosophical, not exegetical. My concern here is to see whether there is good reason for accepting Internal Having which Lewis would or should admit. In this section, I will provide an argument for Internal Having which relies on neither the principle of sufficient reason nor the wholesale rejection of relations.

If one rejects Internal Having, one commits oneself to the intra-object alienation. The main thesis I will defend is as follows:

**The Main Thesis:** If one commits oneself to the intra-object alienation, one incurs either unnecessary brute facts or unnecessary primitives.

If the main thesis is correct, the price of denying Internal Having or accepting the intra-object alienation is that one must live with brute facts or primitives even though they are not necessary. This is a problem – and I think a serious one which anyone must confront if she subscribes to the intra-object alienation. I call this the problem of alienation.

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<sup>12</sup> While it is widely held that Bradley's argument relies on the principle of sufficient reason (see, e.g., Russell 1910, p. 374; Hylton 1990, p. 56; Candlish 2007, pp. 46-8; van Inwagen 2009, pp. 44-51), Vallicella (2002) interprets that Bradley's argument does not rely on the principle. I think Bradley himself based his argument on the principle though, I think, his argument can go through without the principle. Russell (*Ibid.*) interprets that Bradley's argument assumes or aims to show that all relations are internal ones. Following Russell, van Inwagen (*Ibid.*) claims that Bradley begs the question against espousers of external relations. But, I consent with Hylton (*Ibid.*), Candlish (*Ibid.*), and Vallicella (*Ibid.*) that Bradley's argument purports to refute relations altogether.

To defend the main thesis, let me begin by supposing that an object *a* has an intrinsic property *F* while *a* is alienated from *F*. Since *a* is alienated from *F*, nothing in their identities dictates that *a* *have* *F*. The mere existence of *a* and *F* is not sufficient for *a*'s having *F*: *a* and *F* by themselves remain to be alienated waiting to be related. In virtue of what, then, is it the case that *a* has *F*? What grounds the having in *a*'s having *F*?

One obvious answer is to accept that *a* has *F* as a matter of brute fact. Indeed, the mere existence of *a* and *F* doesn't imply that *a* has *F* or the existence of *a*'s having *F*. Nevertheless, according to this answer, we should admit it as a brute fact: nothing grounds the having in *a*'s having *F*. It happens that *a* has *F*, and nothing explains it, period.<sup>13</sup>

This answer which we may call the BF view should not be easily dismissed. Unless we believe that every fact is sufficiently explainable, we should live with brute facts anyway.<sup>14</sup> There is something. Why then is there something rather than nothing? Perhaps there is no explanation for the fact.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, the fact is obvious – so obvious as to be beyond reasonable doubt. Even if we realize that it has no explanation, the epistemological force of the fact is too powerful to recant our belief in the fact. So, we rather admit it as a brute fact. Similarly, it is obvious that an object has intrinsic properties. The fact that *a* has *F* is not something we can reasonably doubt. Then, the proponent of the BF view might claim, even if nothing explains the fact, we must admit it as a brute fact.

Indeed, we would have to admit the fact that *a* has *F* as a brute fact if we cannot have an explanation. However, we *do* have an explanation if we only accept Internal Having. Given

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<sup>13</sup> This is an answer Armstrong (1997) would accept. For Armstrong, *a*'s having *F* is a state of affairs that serves as a truthmaker for the truth that *a* has *F*. And, for him, *a*'s having *F*, but not *a* and *F*, plays the truthmaker role though *a*'s having *F* is composed of *a* and *F* and nothing but them. See, also, Olson (1987) and Hochberg (1978).

<sup>14</sup> For a notable contemporary espouser of the principle, see Della Rocca (2010).

<sup>15</sup> On some modal theories, it is necessary that there is something. But, even if this is so, one might doubt that we thereby have an explanation of why there is something. (Cf. Lewis 1986a, pp. 73-74).

Internal Having, contrary to our supposition, a internally has F – i.e., the identity of a includes its having F. Then, a and F in themselves would dictate that a have F: a is the object that it is in virtue of its having F. The fact that a exists might be a brute one. So is the fact that F exists. However, we do not have to take a's having F as a brute fact. If one admits a's having F as a brute fact, one does so even if it is unnecessary. This is problematic.

The problem with the BF view can be seen in a different perspective. Consider the mereological sum of a and F.<sup>16</sup> Call it a + F. Under the supposition that a is alienated from F, it is clear that a's having F is different from a + F: the mere existence of a and F entails the existence of a + F, but not that of a's having F. In virtue of what, then, are they distinct? Given the BF view, a just has F, period. So, there is nothing more than a and F in a's having F. Then, since a + F is nothing more than a and F, nothing explains the distinction between a's having F and a + F. It is a distinction without difference. It is also a brute fact that they are distinct. On the BF view, not only a's having F but also the distinction between a's having F and a + F are brute facts.

Recall that, when we admit something as a brute fact, it has a powerful epistemological force which is hard to reasonably resist. Perhaps, such an epistemological force may be necessary for brute facts. No reasonable epistemic agent would deny that a has F. But, it is not at all obvious that a's having F is really distinct from a + F in view of the fact that, given Internal Having, a's having F after all is nothing but a + F though we might see them in different modes. Thus, the alleged distinction between a's having F and a + F seems to be not something beyond reasonable doubt: it fails to be qualified as a candidate brute fact.

If one accepts the BF view, one must incur not only unnecessary brute facts but also illegitimate ones. We may have to live with brute facts. But we should not generate them when they are not necessary or not legitimate. If we allow brute facts even when it is unnecessary or

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<sup>16</sup> If you deny that there is a mereological sum of a and F, you can take a mere plurality of a and F in place of a + F.

illegitimate, what would rationally stop “anything goes”? The BF view should not be adopted unless Internal Having is proven to be wrong.

Let me dismiss the BF view. Given the supposition that *a* is alienated from *F*, the fact that *a* has *F* can’t be explained in terms of only *a* and *F*. So, there must be something else other than *a* and *F* in virtue of which *a* has *F*. Let us call the something else the unifier. Note that the unifier (if such there be) has a double role. It primarily serves to explain *a*’s having *F* or how it is possible that *a* has *F*. But it also serves to distinguish between *a*’s having *F* and *a* + *F*: the former is distinct from the latter because the unifier is a constituent of the former but not the latter.<sup>17</sup> In other words, the unifier is a constituent of *a*’s having *F* in virtue of which *a* has *F*. Let us call this answer the unifier view.

The potential problem with the unifier view, as I will argue soon, is that we do not have theoretical resources that entitle us to affirm the existence of the unifier. It is not within our theoretical reach to affirm the existence of the unifier: we cannot affirm it by discerning it on empirical grounds or by somehow inferring its existence from things we already accept. That is, the unifier is something primitive. But, we cannot reject something simply because it is primitive. It is a plausibly modest idea to think that there might be some things in the world we may not be able to accommodate with our theoretical apparatus. Nonetheless, the potential problem becomes a real one because, the unifier, if really primitive, would be an unnecessary primitive: the unifier is not something we cannot but admit as a last resort, for we do not need to posit it if we only deny the intra-object alienation.

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<sup>17</sup> Vallicella (2000; 2002) would claim that the unifier distinguishes between *a*’s having *F* and *a* + *F* though it is a constituent of neither one. According to him, the unifier is some “external” logical operator which contingently unifies *a* and *F*, in virtue of which *a*’s having *F* is distinguished from *a* + *F* though they share exactly the same constituents. For lack of space, I will set aside this variant here. For an objection to Vallicella’s view, see my “Bradley’s Regress and the Problem of Alienation.”

Before proceeding to argue that the unifier is primitive, let me make precise what my argument targets at by making two preliminary remarks. If my argument is right, the unifier view would turn out to be the primitive unifier view. The primitive unifier view should be distinguished from the BF view. On the BF view, there is nothing *whatsoever* that can explain the distinction between a's having F and a + F. If one accepts the BF view, one commits oneself to a metaphysical outlook about the individuation of things: two things can share exactly the same constituents. But, the proponent of the primitive unifier view does not have to commit herself to the metaphysical outlook. The kind of commitment she makes is rather epistemological: there is something beyond our epistemic reach.

Secondly, I need to get clearer on what I mean by claiming that the unifier is primitive. Let us say that something is ideologically primitive just in case its notion is not definable in terms of other notions. The unifier might be ideologically primitive. But, the reason why I find the unifier potentially problematic is not that it is ideologically primitive. Similarity might well be ideologically primitive. But that can't be good reason for denying the reality of similarity. Look at an apple and an orange. And you will see their similarity. My reason against the primitive unifier is rather methodological. Unlike similarity, we do not have any experiential means to discern the unifier. Nor do we have any other theoretical means. My claim is that the unifier is primitive in that methodological sense. Henceforth, by primitive, I shall mean primitive in such a methodological sense unless specified otherwise.

Let me now explain why I think the unifier is primitive. It seems clear that we cannot discern the unifier by empirical methods. If our theoretical resources allow us to affirm the existence of the unifier, we somehow would be able to infer its existence in terms of other things we already admit. But, if one posits the existence of the unifier, as we will see, one ends up with

something we cannot catch with our theoretical apparatus. To see this, let us assume the unifier view: while a and F themselves remain to be alienated, they are unified in virtue of the unifier.

Let us consider whether or not the unifier is also alienated from a or F. The proponent of the unifier view cannot say that the unifier is alienated from a (or F) unless she admits a vicious infinite regress. Recall that a and F, due to their alienation, require the unifier for their being unified. So, if a is alienated from the unifier, by parity, a (or F) and the unifier, due to their alienation, would require another unifier (call it the unifier\*) for their being unified. Is then the unifier\* also alienated from a (or F)? The proponent of the unifier view cannot say that the unifier\* is not alienated from a (or F) without undermining her initial supposition that the unifier is alienated from a (or F). (Why not just say that the unifier is not alienated from a (or F) in the first place?) So, she must say that the unifier\* is also alienated from a (or F). Then, this invites her to posit the unifier\*\*, the unifier\*\*\*, and so on ad infinitum. So, unless she admits such an infinite regress, the proponent of the unifier view must not think that the unifier is alienated from a or F.<sup>18</sup>

The above argument presupposes that the unifier unifies a and F only if the unifier itself is unified with a and F. The proponent of the unifier view might respond by rejecting the presupposition. If the presupposition is rejected, she might claim, the unifier unifies a and F without being unified with a and F, so the unifier, though alienated from a and F, does not require another unifier to do its unifying job.<sup>19</sup> This response has a clear advantage: on this response, a vicious infinite regress is not launched. However, saying that the unifier relates a and

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<sup>18</sup> I assumed that the infinite regress is vicious. But is it really so? One might think not, claiming that the infinite regress is harmless or even virtuous. Indeed, Gaskin (2008) and Orillia (2009) provide a solution to Bradley's regress in this line of thought. I do believe that some infinite regresses (e.g. an infinite regress of truth-predication and a causal infinite regress) are not vicious. But I think this Bradleyan infinite regress is vicious. I can't justify this claim any further here. For more on this, see my "Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Alienation."

<sup>19</sup> This kind of unifier has often been called "a non-relational tie" (Strawson 1959) or "a non-relational nexus" (Bergmann 1967). As Meinersten (2008) described it nicely, the basic idea is that the unifier gets things related without being related with those things it relates.

F without being related with them seems to be nothing but saying that the unifier relates them in a mysterious (if not incoherent) way – i.e. that the unifier is something primitive. We can see that this response has no explanatory force in the following way. On this response, a's having F is distinguished from a + F: the unifier is a constituent of the former but not the latter. But, what distinguishes between a's having F and the unifier + a + F? The old problem recurs in a new form. The response fails.

There seems to be no hope for the unifier view if the unifier is alienated from a or F. So, let us suppose that the unifier is alienated neither from a nor from F. This supposition generates four possible combinations as follows:

- (i) The unifier internally depends on a, and the unifier internally depends on F.
- (ii) The unifier internally depends on a, and F internally depends on the unifier.
- (iii) a internally depends on the unifier, and the unifier internally depends on F.
- (iv) a internally depends on the unifier, and F internally depends on the unifier.

It is easy to see that (ii) and (iii) can't be true. According to (ii) or (iii), the unifier internally depends on only one of a and F. But, it seems arbitrary to think so in view of the fact that we know nothing about the unifier. Secondly, internal dependence seems to be transitive.<sup>20</sup> Then, from (ii), it follows that F internally depends on a. But this contradicts the supposition that a is alienated from F. (ii) is contradictory. So is (iii).

Let us consider (i). Given (i), the unifier internally depends on a and F. If a and F are the only things on which the unifier internally depends, since all it requires for its identity are its

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<sup>20</sup> If x has the feature of being related to y in its identity and y has the feature of being related to z in its identity, since being related to y includes being related to z, it follows that x has the feature of being related to z in its identity.

relations to a and F, a and F would be sufficient for implying the existence of the unifier. But, if the existence of a and F implies the existence of the unifier, since the unifier, by hypothesis, explains that a has F, the existence of a and F would be sufficient for explaining that a has F. But this contradicts that a and F are alienated and thus require something else for their being unified. So, the identity of the unifier must include some feature (whatever it is) other than its relations to a and F. What would be such feature? The only option seems to claim that it is being this unifier or its haecceity. But the haecceity of the unifier is something primitive: if there is such a thing, it is something we cannot reach except by “ontological insight.”<sup>21</sup>

Let us turn now to (iv). The unifier is a constituent of a’s having F in virtue of which a has F. Would the unifier be a unifier only for a’s having F? Or, would it be a unifier for all intrinsic facts such as b’s having G, c’ having H, and so on? Clearly, the former case seems possible. But, since the unifier does not internally depend on a and F, nothing seems to rule out the latter case either. (iv) leaves (at least) two equally plausible but incompatible possibilities undetermined: the unifier is a common constituent of all facts of intrinsic predication or there are many unifiers corresponding to many facts of intrinsic predication respectively. One of two possibilities must be right. But which one is correct? The proponent of the unifier view cannot choose one without being arbitrary.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> This consequence of (I) is more radical than the familiar claim that objects have haecceities. We might think that objects have haecceities in so far as we can admit those objects within our received theory. But the consequence of (I) is that there is a haecceity of something we have yet to know.

<sup>22</sup> Another consequence of (IV) is worth mentioning. Since a and F internally depend on the unifier, a and F cannot exist without the unifier existing. So, the existence of either implies the existence of the unifier. So, if a and F exist, the unifier exists. But, since, given the unifier, a has F, it is not possible that a and F exist without a having F. a has F necessarily. Three responses might be open. The first is to embrace the necessity of the fact that a has F. Secondly, one might attempt to claim that a necessarily has F in one sense but not in another by adopting counterpart theory. (Cf. Armstrong 2004) The last one is to claim that it is not the case that the existence of the unifier necessarily entails that a has F, claiming that a has F in virtue of the contingent determination of the unifier. (Cf. Vallicella 2000; 2002)



Thus, whether or not the unifier is alienated from a or F, the proponent of the unifier view cannot accept the unifier except as something primitive. Of course, the fact that the unifier is primitive alone can't be good reason for rejecting the unifier view. Indeed, in order for our theory to make progress, we might have to accept primitive things. In that way, our theory moves forward. But, as we considered, the unifier is not just something primitive but an unnecessary one because we do not need to posit it if we only deny the intra-object alienation. This, I contend, is good reason for rejecting the unifier view.

This completes my defense of the main thesis: if one accepts the intra-object alienation, one must commit oneself either to the BF view or to the unifier view; if one accepts the former, one incurs unnecessary brute facts; if the latter, unnecessary primitives. The proponent of the intra-object alienation might insist on unnecessary brute facts or unnecessary primitives, claiming that "ontological insight" forces us to pay the price of embracing them in favor of the intra-object alienation. That is not something I can rule out once and for all. However, I suspect no one in a naturalist spirit would take it seriously. As long as one lives as a naturalist, one cannot hold onto the intra-object alienation on pain of the problem of alienation.

#### §4.

The moral we can learn from Lewis's argument is this. If one thinks that one and the same object has incompatible intrinsic properties, one has to alienate the object from its intrinsic properties. Then, one confronts the problem of alienation. Thus, objects having incompatible intrinsic properties are not cross-temporal. They are time-bound. So, Lewis's argument leads us to the ontology of time-bound objects on which theories of persistence should be based.

There have been mainly two theories of persistence which share the ontology of time-bound objects. Consider a series of time-bound objects corresponding to your life. According to Lewis's perdurantism, you persist by being partly located at many times: you are the mereological sum of the time-bound objects which occupy many temporal locations. According to Sider's stage view, you persist by being vicariously located at many times: you are one time-bound object that bears a counterpart relation to the other ones which occupy many temporal locations. Despite differences in some respects, they share the same metaphysical foundation.<sup>23</sup>

It is implicitly assumed in the literature that the ontology of time-bound objects is one unitary metaphysical framework. However, our discussion provides another dimension in which the ontology of time-bound objects can be divided into (at least) two more theses as follows:

(ATO) Time-bound objects are alienated from each other.

(ITO) Time-bound objects are internally connected to each other.

Consider your current time-bound object. We know it is not alienated from its intrinsic properties. Consider a previous time-bound object in your life. Your current time-bound object bears relations to your previous one. Is there any relation between them which is part of the identity of either one? If not, they are alienated time-bound objects. (ATO) follows. If so, they are internally connected time-bound objects. (ITO) follows.

It seems clear Lewis commits himself to (ATO). Lewis understands intrinsic properties as properties "things have in virtue of the way they themselves are" and extrinsic ones as properties

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<sup>23</sup> Sider accepts the existence of the mereological sum of the time-bound objects corresponding to your life. For Sider, you *are* a temporal part of the sum. What he denies is that you are the mereological sum and that you *have* temporal parts. For Sider, there are arbitrary mereological sums of time-bound objects but they are never ordinary objects.

“they have in virtue of their relations or lack of relations to other things” (Lewis 1986a, p. 61).

The crucial thing is how to understand “the way they themselves are.” The way objects themselves are seems to be naturally understood as the way in which objects are such that they would be the same in no other way. That is, intrinsic properties are properties that things include in their identities. This being the case, if we assume that there is some object whose identity includes its relation (or some of its relations) to another, the property of having the relation to the latter would be both intrinsic and extrinsic to the former – intrinsic because it is part of the identity of the former; and extrinsic because it is a property the former has in virtue of its relation to the latter. In order for Lewis’s intrinsic-extrinsic distinction to be exclusive, it must be the case that objects do not include any relation to others in their identities. Lewis seems to assume that objects are at base alienated from each other.

Indeed Lewis seems to take the inter-object alienation as one fundamental presupposition of his philosophical project. For Lewis, all objects are individuated in terms of their parts, and no material objects are co-located. So, all material objects are well-individuated in terms of spatiotemporal regions they occupy. Consider two regionally non-overlapping objects *x* and *y*. Is there any relation between them that is part of their identities? Lewis thinks not. He writes:

Humean supervenience is named in honor of the great denier of necessary connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another. (But it is no part of the thesis that these local matters are mental.) We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether or fields, maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities:

perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes on that. (1986b, pp. ix-x)

Note that Lewis claims that fundamental qualities need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. So, there is no fundamental quality which occupies more than one spatiotemporal point: all fundamental qualities are “local” qualities; and all others supervene upon those local qualities. So, since x and y regionally non-overlap, there is no fundamental quality which they instantiate together. No matter what relation they may stand in, to use Armstrong’s phrases, it is “no addition to being” or an “ontological free lunch” (Armstrong 1997, p. 12). There is no relation added to being that x and y have in their identities: x and y are alienated from each other. As long as things do not share a part or they do not overlap, for Lewis, they are alienated. Since time-bound objects do not overlap, they are alienated from each other.

So, Lewis commits himself to (ATO). However, Lewis seems to have failed to appreciate the strength of his argument because, if his argument works against the intra-object alienation, as I will argue, it can be extended to refute (ATO) with equal force. Let me begin by distinguishing between reducible and irreducible relational properties.

Your apple is round. So is mine. Ours have a relational property of their being similar in shape. But, the relational property may not be something ours have in addition to their intrinsic properties: the relational property supervenes on their intrinsic properties. You are loved by your mother. But, your being loved by her may not be something you have in addition to her loving you: the relational fact that you are loved by her follows from the relational fact that she loves

you. Let us say that an object has a reducible relational property just in case the relational fact that the object has the property supervenes on other facts whether intrinsic or relational; and that an object has an irreducible relation property just in case it is not a reducible relational property.

We should first note that Internal Having which concerns intrinsic properties can be generalized as follows:

**Generalized Internal Having:** Any object that has an irreducible property (whether intrinsic or relational) has it internally.

It is obvious that Generalized Internal Having follows from Internal Having. It suffices to show that, if an object has an irreducible relational property, the object has it internally.<sup>24</sup> [*Proof:* Suppose that an object  $a$  has an irreducible relational property  $F_R$ . Replace an intrinsic property  $F$  in the argument for Internal Having with  $F_R$  systematically. And you will run into the problem of alienation.] If one cannot reject Internal Having on pain of the problem of alienation, one cannot reject Generalized Internal Having for the same reason.

It might seem that (ITO) follows from Generalized Internal Having. But Generalized Internal Having alone does not entail that time-bound objects are not alienated from each other. Suppose that  $x$  has an irreducible relational property concerning  $y$ . Given Generalized Internal Having,  $x$  has the relational property internally: the identity of  $x$  includes the relational property which concerns  $y$ . From this, can we infer that some relation  $x$  bears to  $y$  is part of the identity of  $x$ ? We can do so only if we accept the following thesis:

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<sup>24</sup> I assume that intrinsic properties are irreducible. If there are reducible intrinsic properties, Internal Having and Generalized Internal Having can be revised as necessary. But my main argument does not turn on this.

**Equivalence:** For any objects  $x$  and  $y$ ,  $x$  has a relational property concerning  $y$  if and only if  $x$  has some relation to  $y$ .

The right-to-left direction is undeniable: if  $x$  has some relation to  $y$ ,  $x$  has a relational property concerning  $y$ . But, the left-to-right direction might be contentious. A notable denier of Equivalence is Leibniz.<sup>25</sup> It is one of the central doctrines in Leibniz's philosophy that all relational properties an object has are reducible to its intrinsic properties, so all relations are at best ideal.<sup>26</sup> Perhaps, the motivation for Leibniz's view of relations may be precisely his espousal of the inter-object alienation: objects are independent monads which do not have "windows." Whatever Leibniz's motivation may be, however, it seems hard to deny Equivalence if we want to be a bona fide realist about relational truths. So, let us adopt Equivalence.

Once Equivalence is adopted, from Generalized Internal Having, it follows:

**Internal Relating:** For any  $x$  and  $y$ , if  $x$  has an irreducible relational property concerning  $y$ , there is some relation  $x$  has to  $y$  that the identity of  $x$  includes.

Given Internal Relating, (ITO) seems to follow unless one denies that time-bound objects have irreducible relational features. Consider two time-bound objects  $TO_1$  and  $TO_2$ , where  $TO_1$  is earlier than  $TO_2$ . It is a relational fact that  $TO_1$  is earlier than  $TO_2$ . It is clear that their relational

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<sup>25</sup> For a contemporary denier, see Fisk (1972).

<sup>26</sup> To borrow the quote used in Wong (1980, pp. 241-242), Leibniz said: "I do not believe that you will admit an accident that is in two subjects at the same time. My judgment about relations is that paternity in David is one thing, sonship in Solomon another, but that the relation common to both is a merely mental thing whose basis is the modifications of the individuals" (1969, p. 609). As the quote indicates, it is uncontroversial that Leibniz accepted the ideality thesis. But it is a matter of controversy whether he also accepted the reducibility thesis. It seems to be standard to ascribe the reducibility thesis to Leibniz. (See, e.g., Russell 1937; Rescher 1967). But, it is not universally accepted. (See Wong 1980).

fact is not reducible to their intrinsic facts or any others.<sup>27</sup> So, either  $TO_1$  has an irreducible relational property of being earlier than  $TO_2$  or  $TO_2$  has an irreducible relational property of being later than  $TO_1$ . In any case, the identity of either one includes its temporal relation to the other. So, time-bound objects are internally connected. (ITO) vindicated.

Internal Relating vindicates not only (ITO) but also a much more radical idea that, given the undeniable fact that, for any two objects, there is an irreducible relational fact about them, all objects are internally connected. So, Internal Relating refutes Absolute Having. Consider a's having F, where F is an intrinsic property. Given Internal Having, a is not alienated from F. Similarly for b's having G. Now suppose that a's having F has some irreducible relation to b's having G. Given Internal Relating, a's having F is not alienated from b's having G: a's having F would not be the same in absence of the relation to b's having G. Whether a has F depends on whether b has G. It is not the case that a has F absolutely. Absolute Having is wrong. Intrinsic properties are not Lewis-intrinsic.

Extreme though it may sound, these are the consequences that Lewis must embrace and that I believe is worth embracing. Indeed, it seems Lewis would have no serious reason not to embrace the consequences. Recall that Internal Having does not entail that an object has its intrinsic properties necessarily: if one accepts counterpart theory, one does not have to accept the necessity of intrinsic properties. Similarly for Internal Relating: if one accepts counterpart theory, one does not have to accept the necessity of relational properties. Lewis rather can accept

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<sup>27</sup> Given Lewis's description of Humean Supervenience, it seems that it is not an irreducible relational fact that  $TO_1$  is earlier than  $T_2$ . It seems to be reducible to the facts that (i)  $TO_1$  occupies point 1; that (ii)  $TO_2$  point 2; that (iii) point 1 is earlier than point 2. Lewis must have thought that the identity of  $TO_1$  (and  $TO_2$ ) does not include its occupation relation to point 1 (and point 2). (If not, given that point 1 is internally connected to point 2,  $TO_1$  would not be alienated from  $TO_2$ .) But, this is something Internal Relating refutes if (i) (and (ii)) is an irreducible relational fact.

Internal Relating and take it as one reason for his counterpart theory: to save contingency, we should understand de re modality in a counterpart theoretic way.

Hume famously denied necessary connections between distinct existents. Lewis is a notable follower of Hume's dictum. Take any two objects. Given Internal Relating, they have a strong connection – in some sense stronger than a necessary connection (perhaps the strongest connection if the identity relation is not a genuine relation). But, this does not mean that, if Lewis accepts Internal Relating, Lewis must give up Hume's dictum. Lewis can't deny a necessary connection between any two non-identical things. The mereological sum of a and b is not identical to a. But, the existence of the sum entails the existence of a. So, he must confine Hume's dictum to non-identical things which meet some condition. What is the condition? My proposal is alienation: deny necessary connections between any alienated things.<sup>28</sup> The sum is necessarily connected to its part perhaps because the sum is internally connected to the part. On my proposed construal of Hume's dictum, things have no necessary connection if they are alienated. Given Internal Relating, Hume's dictum becomes trivially true because there are no alienated things in the first place. Something trivially true is a truth. Hume's dictum vindicated.

As we already considered, if Lewis accepts Internal Relating, he cannot hold onto Humean supervenience as he understands it because his supervenience base consists of alienated things. Nonetheless, he can save the spirit of Humean supervenience by revising the supervenience basis to the effect that fundamental things include in their identities not only fundamental qualities but also spatiotemporal relations to others. This should not be

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<sup>28</sup> The proposed construal of Hume's dictum is not analytic. From the assumption that two things are alienated, it does not follow that they do not have a necessary connection. What follows from the assumption is only that nothing in their identities grounds a necessary connection between them. But, this does not rule out the possibility that a necessary connection is grounded in something else other than their identities. If there is good reason for rejecting the possibility, it would serve as a justification for the proposed construal of Hume's dictum. For more on this proposal, see my "Hume's Dictum in Naturalist Metaphysics."



unacceptable to Lewis. Lewis seems to imply that objects have spatiotemporal relations derivatively by occupying points that have spatiotemporal relations directly. Why not give the spatiotemporal relations to objects directly?

It seems there is no good reason for Lewis not to accept Internal Relating.<sup>29</sup> In any case, if Lewis's argument is to work against endurantism, Lewis must embrace Internal Relating. As a way to avoid accepting Internal Relating, can Lewis accept Internal Having simply on the ground that his *intuition* denies only the intra-object alienation but not the inter-object alienation? I then contend that he has no good *argument* against endurantism because the proponent of endurantism has every right to disagree with his intuition to insist on endurantism; and Lewis must solve the problem of alienation. Lewis might attempt to provide another argument for Internal Having without appealing to the problem of alienation. If he can have such an argument, I would love it. But it is by no means clear whether he could.

## §5.

Philosophers of the ontology of time-bound objects have assumed that time-bound objects are alienated from each other.<sup>30</sup> Hit a malleable ball. And there will be a dent in the ball. Why will it get a dent? Obviously it will do so because it is hit. But, given the ontology of alienated time-bound objects, this obvious phenomenon becomes puzzling. It is the previous time-bound ball,

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<sup>29</sup> I have argued that Lewis has no reason not to accept Internal Relating. Would there be any reason for him to accept Internal Relating? Lewis (2003) proposes a way to meet the truthmaker principle by exploiting his counterpart theory. His proposal seems to work fine for truths of intrinsic predication. But he didn't consider in detail how his proposal can provide truthmakers for truths of relational predication as well. I think his proposal fails with respect to truths of relational predication as long as he thinks that relational predications concern alienated things. If I am right, this might be one positive reason for him to accept Internal Relating.

<sup>30</sup> According to Hawley's view (2001), there is a non-supervenient relation between the time-bound objects. It is not entirely clear whether her view is committed to alienated time-bound objects. In view of the fact that she identifies the relation as something that does not supervene upon Lewis's supervenience base, I am inclined to think she admits Lewis's supervenience base and thus the inter-object alienation.

not the current one that you hit. And it is the current one, not the previous one that gets a dent. What bearing does your hitting the previous time-bound object have on the dent of the current one? Given the alienation between the two time-bound balls, whatever relations they may be in, their relations have nothing to do with the identities of the time-bound objects. But in what sense, then, does the ball change its shape?

Sally Haslanger (1989b) raised this question as an objection to the ontology of time-bound objects. Her challenge should not be taken lightly. If one simply tries to save the sense in which the ball can be *said* to change its shape, no matter how well the trial saves phenomena, I would conclude that the phenomena saved have no bearing on the ball's intrinsic change as long as the time-bound balls are alienated from each other. Saving phenomena is one thing. Saving truth is another. To save truth, some intimate connection between the two time-bound balls is needed.

I believe philosophers of the ontology of time-bound objects can meet Haslanger's challenge by accepting the ontology of alienation-free time-bound objects. For example, we may understand the current time-bound ball as an immanent resultant of the previous ball's causal interaction with other objects: the current time-bound ball is the particular ball that it is in virtue of its causal relation to the previous one. Then the dent of the current time-bound ball can be "explained" in terms of the previous one.

Of course, this is only a sketch. In order for this sketchy idea to work out, there are many halls to be filled in. If, as Internal Relating implies, all things are internally connected, what grounds a series of time-bound objects corresponding to the ball's life? Internal connections among them won't do: the time-bound objects are internally connected to other things as well.

What then properly collects the time-bound balls of which the ball's lift consists?<sup>31</sup> If I say that the current time-bound ball includes in its identity its causal relation to the previous one, my claim sounds very intuitive. What Internal Relating implies, however, is that the current time-bound ball includes in its identity many other relations it has to other objects. My claim suddenly loses the support from our intuition. How can I save the intuitive distinction? I will leave these questions for my future job.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> But if this is a problem, this is a problem for everyone. (See Haslanger 1994)

<sup>32</sup> A possible approach is this. The current time-bound ball *qua an object* includes in its identity all relations it has to other objects. It *qua a persisting object* may include in its identity some but not all relations it has to other objects. It *qua a persisting ball* may include in its identity some smaller class of the relations it has to other objects.

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