TFAP
Tokyo Forum For Analytic Philosophy
Program
Imagining What It’s Like
Speaker: Margot Strohminger
From: Australian Catholic University
URL: https://webpublic.acu.edu.au/staffdirectory/?margot-strohminger=
Abstract: Several debates in the philosophy of mind rely on the notion of ‘imagining what it’s like’. Consider how we may be asked to imagine what it is like to be a bat or what it is like to become a parent in discussions of physicalism and transformative experience, for example. However it is not especially clear what it takes to successfully carry out imaginative projects such as these or how this category of imagination connects to existing taxonomies of imagination. This talk will sketch an account of imagining what it’s like, which relates it to more familiar categories and distinctions drawn among varieties of imagination (e.g. propositional/objectual, subjective/objective). Our approach builds on recent work on other kinds of ‘what it’s like’ mental states—particularly, knowledge of what it’s like—as well as work on the semantics of ‘what it’s like’ expressions. In closing we start to consider possible limits on our abilities to imagine what it’s like. (This talk is based on joint work with Yuri Cath.)
Thinking about Emotional AI: Personal Bonds with Social Chatbots?
Speaker: Eva Weber-Guskar
From: Ruhr-University Bochum
URL: https://www.pe.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophie/i/phil-ethik-emotion/index.html.en
Abstract: “Emotional AI” refers to systems that can detect or stimulate emotions in people, or visually or vocally simulate emotions. This technology is increasingly being combined with linguistic AI, which we know as ChatGPT, LaMDA and similar “large language models”, so that powerful social chatbots like Replika are emerging. While ChatGPT is designed only as an organizational assistant, the function of social chatbots is to engage in personal conversations and stimulate social feelings. More and more people report that they have relationships with such digital counterparts. How can we grasp what is really going on in these cases and what should we think of this new phenomenon from an ethical perspective? Are these kinds of systems and their use problematic, reprehensible, or a welcome addition to our lives? In the lecture, I will present different possible types of relationships and discuss them in terms of their potential and challenges.
Charitable Interpretation and Self-Understanding
Speaker: Ben Winokur
From: University of Macau
URL: http://benwinokur.com/
Abstract: Donald Davidson routinely argued that a certain principle of charity necessarily governs our interpretive activities. The principle implies that successful interpretation culminates in at least some understanding of one another, since successfully abiding the principle not only culminates in correctly attributing attitudes to one another but, also, in seeing those attitudes as constituting a rational point of view. And yet Davidson also argued that interpreters are not generally in the position of needing to interpret their own attitudes. Granting this, how does self-understanding generally arise, and what importance might self-understanding hold for us? I argue that self-understanding plays a key role in fortifying our first-person authority against interpersonal challenges, and that we might explain its non-interpretive origins by adapting “agentialist” theories from contemporary discussions of self-knowledge.
Art is not a game
Speaker: Zed Adams
From: The New School for Social Research, New York City
URL: https://www.newschool.edu/nssr/faculty/zed-adams/
Abstract: Interpretations of artworks seem governed by two requirements: on the one hand, we want our interpretations to be correct; on the other hand, in arriving at our interpretations, we prohibit ourselves from relying upon the testimony of others. These requirements can seem to be in tension: if we really aim at correctness, why prohibit ourselves from relying on others? Thi Nguyen proposes to resolve this apparent tension by arguing that art interpretation has a similar structure to playing a game, in which we impose artificial restrictions on the pursuit of goals in order to make the pursuit of those goals enjoyable for its own sake. When we interpret art, we aim at correctness (just as we sometimes aim to knock down a set of ten pins with a heavy ball), but we also impose an artificial restriction of not relying on others (just as in trying to knock down the pins we restrict ourselves from coming closer than 60 feet from them). This gives us an autotelic activity that we enjoy participating in for its own sake, whether it’s interpreting art or bowling (Nguyen 2020).
In this talk, I criticize Nguyen’s proposed resolution of the apparent tension between these two requirements and offer my own alternative account. On my account, unlike Nguyen’s, the prohibition on testimony isn’t an artificial imposition–it’s a consequence of the very nature of aesthetic judgments. The interpretation of art is, for this very reason, not a game.
TBA
Speaker: Tatyana Kostochka
From: Ashoka University
URL: https://www.ashoka.edu.in/profile/tatyana-kostochka/
Abstract: TBA
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Speaker: Doudja Boumaza
From: Center for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes
URL: https://phil-mem.org/members/boumaza.php
Abstract: TBA
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Speaker: Bronwyn Finnigan
From: Australian National University
URL: http://bronwynfinnigan.com
Abstract: TBA
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Speaker: Fiora Salis
From: University of York
URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/philosophy/people/fiora-salis/#research-content
Abstract: TBA
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Speaker: Fabian Wendt
From: Kellogs Center for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Virginia Tech University
URL: https://www.fabianwendt.com/
Abstract: TBA
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Speaker: Igal Kvart
From: Hebrew University of Jerusalem
URL: https://en.philosophy.huji.ac.il/people/igal-kvart
Abstract: TBA
TGBA
Speaker: Thomas Hofweber
From: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
URL: https://www.thomashofweber.com/
Abstract: TBA